




UNDERSTANDING GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY:  















In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy  
Colorado State University  





 Department Chair: Robert Duffy 
Advisor: Michele Betsill 
 
William J. Chaloupka 













UNDERSTANDING GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY: 
THEORY, GOVERNANCE AND THE GLOBAL WATER CRISIS 
 
 
How does global civil society (GCS) fit in the history of world politics? Have 
technology and global capitalism liberated civil society from its former dependence 
on states and markets to develop into an autonomous and self-regulated sphere within 
the world political system?  If not, perhaps recent developments really signal the 
emergence of new strategic opportunities for non-state actors to project their domestic 
political concerns onto the international agenda.  Of course, there is also the 
possibility that GCS primarily functions to reinforce the privileged position of a 
hegemonic historic bloc, which rests at the confluence of dominant institutions, ideas, 
and material capabilities.  
 In the effort to answer how GCS fits in the history of world politics, this 
dissertation identifies and adjudicates the dominant theoretical accounts of GCS.  
This work rests on the observation that theoretical considerations of GCS have 
recently entered a new phase.  Previously, GCS scholarship worked to build 
credibility in a field traditionally dominated by a state-centric view of world politics.  
The success of this initial phase is manifest in the inclusion of GCS into the political 





first phase, turned inward, in the second phase, to weigh the implications of this 
phenomenon for our understanding of world politics.  The specific occasion for this 
dissertation project is the recent emergence, within the second phase, of three distinct 
theoretical positions.  The primary goal of this dissertation is to adjudicate these 
theoretical claims. 
  Thus, this dissertation will appeal to a diverse audience, including 
international relations scholars, students of global civil society, and water policy 
experts.  At its core this dissertation is concerned with the architecture of the world 
political system, the changes in this system over time, and the implications of these 
changes for our understanding of the power relations that both animate and hold this 
system together – topics that are central to the study of international relations. GCS 
offers an interesting way to explore these issues, not because its emergence is widely 
perceived as a new phenomenon in the history of world politics but rather because the 
very existence of GCS constitutes a potential threat to the core assumption in 
international relations that states are the dominant central actors within the world 
political system.  For students of GCS, this dissertation offers advice for improving 
the theoretical development of thier burgeoning field.  To achieve this end, the 
dissertation examines the role GCS plays in the global governance of freshwater 
resources, weighing this evidence against the diverse and divergent theoretical 
expectations regarding the role GCS plays in the history of world politics. In the 
process, this analysis highlights the depth and diversity of GCS engagement in the 





centric and institutional approach that has thus far consumed the attention of water 
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Chapter One: Framing the Research Question 
 
 
Until recently, talk of global civil society (GCS) primarily occurred on the margins of a 
dominant state-centric approach to international relations.  Most scholars held the view 
that states are the dominant actors in an anarchic world political system.  They believed 
that the rules of sovereignty, including non-intervention and the exclusion of external 
authority, ordered this anarchic system (Krasner 2001).   These scholars tended to define 
states as unitary actors, which means that all non-state actors were thought to be 
embedded within and accountable to a state or a collection of states.  Scholars then 
explained changes in state behavior as the response to structural changes in the 
international system; any suggestion of influence by transnational non-governmental 
actors was merely written off as epiphenomenal (Risse-Kappen 1995).  
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War thrust this state-
centric perspective into a paradigmatic crisis.  Scholars describing the events in post-Cold 
War Eastern Europe and Latin America recounted evidence of a new popular 
internationalism, which built new international linkages within civil society to establish 
bonds of transnational solidarity and reorient the social construction of knowledge 
(Drainville 2006; Kaldor 1991). By the early 1990s, additional evidence surfaced 
revealing dramatic growth in non-governmental organizations (NGO) at the international 
level (Lipschutz 1992).  Before long, scholars attributed this phenomenon to the 
emergence of a “global civil society,” a term that initially described their empirical and
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 verifiable observations of increased social and political participation at the international 
level (Anheier, Glasius, and Kaldor 2001).  It seemed that evidence of this phenomena 
was ubiquitous.  Scholars identified instances of GCS in epistemic or knowledge-based 
communities (Haas 1992), in the formation of transnational environmental networks 
(Keck and Sikkink 1998a), in other issue oriented advocacy efforts, like peace and human 
rights (Kaldor 2003a), and the ecological work of non-governmental organizations 
(Wapner 1996).  But perhaps the most compelling case for GCS appeared in studies of 
participation in international megaconferences and parallel NGO forums (Friedman, 
Hochstetler, and Clark 2005).  For example, scholars made much of the fact that the 1992 
Rio Conference on the Environment and Development included some 1,400 NGO 
representatives, a figure that was only eclipsed by the 18,000 NGOs representatives who 
attended the parallel forum (Carr and Norman 2008, 361).  Before long, defenders of the 
old paradigm found this evidence difficult to ignore.  For example, political realists 
Carothers and Barndt (1999, 20) acknowledged the growing influence of GCS in world 
politics, citing its ability to shape policy outcomes, generate citizen participation, and 
support leadership training.  However, the authors also warned that GCS is at best an 
ambiguous space, which consists of a “bewildering array of the good, the bad, and the 
outright bizarre” (Carothers and Barndt 1999, 20).  
 These comments touch on two significant points of tension in GCS research.  The 
first is the tension between the formative and more mature reflective phase of research.  
The goal in the formative phase of this research agenda had been to elevate the status of 
GCS within the discipline of international relations.  In this sense, these comments 
signify the acceptance of GCS into the political lexicon and therefore mark a point of 
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transition in the history of GCS research.  However, these comments also expose a degree 
of tension between the theoretical expectations for GCS and the empirical reality of 
transnational non-governmental behavior and influence.  Throughout the formative stage, 
scholars made a number of theoretical propositions about the implications of GCS for 
world politics.  As the pressure to gain credibility for GCS subsided, these propositions 
became the subjects of theoretical debate.  Although theoretical concerns appear in the 
late 1990s (Gale 1998; Pasha and Blaney 1998), there is a discernable shift in the 
conversation by 2006 (Blaney and Inayatullah 2006; Chandler 2007; Scholte 2007).  
2006 was noteworthy because it marked highpoints for global neoliberalism, American 
unilateralism, and the backlash against these forces in the form of global terrorism.  For 
these and a host of other reasons, GCS research came into vogue among the growing 
ranks of political scholars who expressed frustration with the political status quo.  
This attention led to a hardening of the theoretical perspectives on GCS into three 
discrete and prominent camps. These positions are elaborated in greater depth in chapter 
two. At this point it is worthwhile to note that contemporary divisions within the 
literature hinge on the positions each camp stakes out regarding the way GCS fits in the 
history of world politics.  The first camp consists of transformationalists who argue that 
GCS marks an ontological break in the history of world politics, which is to say it 
constitutes an autonomous political sphere that is in the process of displacing states and 
markets as the dominant central forces in the world political system (Kaldor 2007; 
Lipschutz 2006b, 2007).  Pragmatists identify the global expansion and diffusion of the 
strategic repertoire as the basis for its claim that GCS marks a political break in world 
political history (Betsill and Corell 2008; Hochstetler and Keck 2007).  Critical theorists 
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argue instead that GCS marks an axiological break in the history of world politics, which 
is another way of saying that it tends to erode cultural diversity by projecting and 
reinforcing the perspectives and values of a global capitalist class (Blaney and 
Inayatullah 2010; Scholte 2007; Stevis 2005).  
These debates are significant for a number of reasons, not the least of which has 
to do with the nature of political theorizing itself.   In his history of political inquiry, 
Sheldon Wolin (2004, 4) argues that the purpose of political theory is to reflect “on 
matters that concern the community as a whole.”  These deliberations over GCS are 
significant because they disrupt our traditional state-centric conceptions of what 
constitutes a community.  The way we conceptualize this global public space therefore 
shapes public perceptions about the nature of authority, the status of certain goals as 
objectives for political action, and the character of political knowledge (Wolin 2004, 5). 
These theoretical considerations are significant as well for what they reveal about the 
nature of political critique.  In his geneology of political knowledge, Foucault (1977, 81) 
located the defining feature of contemporary political inquiry in the local character of 
political criticism.  Foucault understood this to mean “an autonomous, non-centralized 
kind of theoretical production, one that is to say whose validity is not dependent on the 
approval of the established regimes of thought.” Viewed in this light, theoretical 
considerations of GCS mark “a return of knowledge” about the “ruptural effects of 
conflict and struggle that the order imposed by functionalist or systematizing thought is 
designed to mask” (Foucault 1977, 82).  In short, considerations of GCS are not only 
significant because of what they study but, following Foucault, because of how they 
study it.   
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The purpose of this dissertation is to adjudicate this theoretical debate in order to 
elucidate what we are studying and how we should study it.  Up to now, GCS has largely 
been whatever we made of it.  Scholars have made it out to be a means of disrupting the 
existing political architecture of world politics, a way of democratizing global decision-
making processes, and a mechanism for reinforcing the privileged position of a global 
elite.  In sum, the literature leaves us with the impression that GCS is not in fact a single 
social formation but is instead a multiplicity of social spheres.  Of course, Aristotle’s law 
of non-contradiction alerts us to the fact that GCS cannot simultaneously perform all of 
these functions.  That is, contradictory claims cannot apply to the same property at the 
same time in the same respect (Aristotle and Kirwan 1971). Thus, this dissertation grows 
out of a concern that the existing theoretical arrangement is unsatisfactory.  The aim in 
adjudicating these competing perspectives is to establish which of the views on GCS is 
more basic than others, to retain these and discard those that are less satisfactory, so that 
we might return to our normal discourse on GCS with improved structure and 
understanding. 
The remainder of this chapter builds toward the achievement of this objective.  It 
is organized as follows.  The next section introduces the methodology used to advance 
the research objectives.  This discussion focuses specifically on the strengths and 
limitations of the case study method and offers a defense of the particular case study 
methodology applied in this dissertation.  An introduction to the global water crisis 
follows this discussion.  The argument in this section is that the global water crisis offers 
an interesting opportunity to assess the congruence of competing theoretical claims about 
GCS.  In addition, this section identifies key points of variability within the GCS 
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response, which then forms the basis for a defense of the case study selection as well as 
the data collection and organization strategies.  The chapter concludes by offering a 
summary of the key points and outlining the organizational strategy for the remainder of 
the dissertation.    
Research Design 
My thesis, then, is as follows: world politics grows more diverse and complex over time, 
and GCS is an integral part of this historic process.  However, the problem is that we lack 
a satisfactory understanding of how it fits in the history of world politics.  Recently, 
theoretical accounts of GCS have hardened into three discrete and incommensurable 
clusters of thought, which can be distinguished by their emphasis on the ontological, 
political, or axiological characteristics of GCS.  Insofar as this marks an improvement 
over the more tentative and disorganized formative period of this theoretical enterprise, 
this theoretical development marks a step forward in our collective pursuit to understand 
recent changes within the world political system.  Nevertheless, the current state of our 
understanding is ultimately unsatisfactory.  The problem is that competing theoretical 
perspectives offer contradictory views on the ontological, axiological and political 
dimensions of GCS.  Thus, further improvement in our theoretical understanding of GCS 
is not only desirable but also necessary.    
Case S tudies  
 In the effort to improve our theoretical understanding of GCS, this dissertation 
uses a case study approach to determine which of our theoretical beliefs about GCS are 
more basic than others. At first glance it may appear that the case study method is poorly 
suited for this type of research.  In his analysis of the case study method, Gerring (2004, 
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350) argues, “general theories rarely offer the kind of detailed and determinate 
predictions on within-unit variation that would allow one to reject a hypothesis through 
pattern matching.”  The problem is that a single case study or even a small collection of 
case studies simply cannot cross the empirical threshold required to definitively prove or 
disprove a theoretical proposition.  However, such criticisms only apply to causal 
inferences, not inferences that are descriptive in nature, when the research objective 
values breadth over depth, or when the research design stresses causal effects over causal 
mechanisms (Gerring 2004).  In contrast, the stated objective of this study is inherently 
descriptive: the goal is to improve our conceptual understanding of GCS.  The stated 
purpose of this exercise is to gain greater detailed insight to the implications of these 
developments for our understanding of the world political system. Furthermore, it is the 
mechanism of these changes, identified here as GCS, that is the subject of this 
investigation.   
In this dissertation NGOs are the focus on my investigation into GCS.  This move 
is consistent with a literature that has a long tradition of framing NGOs as the vanguard 
of GCS (Reitan 2007).  This is true of tranformationalists, who interpret evidence of 
increased NGO cooperation in the transnational sphere as a sign of profound shifts in the 
architecture of the world political system (Held, McGrew, Goldblatt, and Perraton 1999; 
Lipschutz and Mayer 1996).  Pragmatists frequently credit NGOs with expanding and 
diffusing the strategic repertoire (Hochstetler and Keck 2007; Keck and Sikkink 1998a) 
and influencing the institutions of global governance (Betsill and Corell 2008).  Likewise, 
critical theorists just as frequently highlight the normative perils of rising NGO 
engagement in the transnational sphere (Pasha and Blaney 1998).  As the purpose of this 
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dissertation is to evaluate competing theoretical perspectives on GCS, the use of NGOs is 
therefore appropriate insofar as it allows for a more accurate assessment of these NGO-
centric perspectives.  
There are at least two ways to carry out a case study analysis.  The first and most 
rigorous of these attempts to verify theoretical propositions through an in-depth analysis 
of all the intervening steps within a hypothesized “causal chain” (Goertz and Levy 2007).  
This process-tracing method assumes that the production of a given outcome involves 
more than the simple summation of two or more causal factors: the temporal and spatial 
contexts as well as the complex interactions of causal variables are also important.  
Because this methodology places a premium on context and process, it tends to be highly 
case-centered.  In their effort to reveal the density of relationships between causal factors, 
researchers endeavor “to cover every significant step and every significant context factor 
for the process leading towards the outcome (without being able to invest a lot of 
theoretical reflections on every step)” (Blatter and Blume 2008, 335).  The strength of 
this process-tracing method rests in its capacity to provide a more accurate understanding 
of isolated events by situating them within their particular temporal context (Blatter and 
Blume 2008).  This degree of contextual specificity therefore makes this methodology 
well suited for verifying full-blown theories, that is, those theories that offer detailed 
accounts of the reasons, structures, mechanisms and motivations that link causes to 
effects.  However, this also means that the process-tracing method is poorly suited for 
discriminating between internally coherent theoretical frameworks or evaluating theories 
that lack clarity and internal consistency (Blatter and Blume 2008; George and Bennett 
2005). 
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For such occasions, the alternative congruence method is preferable. This method 
assesses the ability of a theory to explain or predict an outcome in a particular case in 
order to determine the relevance or relative strength of the theory for 
understanding/explaining the case under consideration. This method is often applied to 
narrow a theoretical field and/or refine theoretical models so that they can be subject to 
more rigorous testing under the process-tracing approach (George and Bennett 2005).  
Indeed, the main mechanism of control in this method is the rivalry between various 
theories (Blatter and Blume 2008).  Because the congruence method relies on the 
discriminatory power of specific observations, it is highly theory-centered.  The 
inferences it generates derive less from detailed empirical scrutiny than intensive 
reflection on the relationship between abstract concepts and concrete observations. This 
makes the congruence method particularly useful for analyzing social and political 
theories, the bulk of which lack the degree of clarity or internal consistency required to 
apply a more rigorous process-tracing method or quantitative method.  The principal 
weakness of the congruence method is its inability to falsify theoretical propositions, as a 
determination of congruence or incongruence alone is methodologically insufficient to 
conclusively confirm or reject a hypothesized relationship between cause and effect.  
While the congruence method does not allow for the falsification of theoretical 
propositions, it does allow for determinations of theoretical strength and weakness, the 
purpose of which is to improve the structure and understanding of our theoretical 
discourse – to nudge the conversation closer to the point at which the application of a 
more rigorous methodological tool is justifiable.   
 
   10 
Given its objective and the lack of clarity within the theoretical propositions under 
consideration, this dissertation adopts the theory-centered congruence method of case 
study analysis rather than the more rigorous and case-centered process-tracing approach.  
This decision imposed certain constraints on the dissertation project.  The interpretive 
aspect of this methodology makes it incompatible with the central tenets of a mainstream 
positivism, which strictly uses empirical observation and measurement to uncover the 
laws or universal truths that conclusively explain the relationship between cause and 
effect.  The congruence method simply lacks the degree of empirical rigor required to 
achieve verifiable, accurate and consistent observations. Not only is the number of cases 
too small to support such generalizations but the degree of analytical detail is 
insufficiently rigorous to guard against the possibility of false positives.  The congruence 
method is also insufficiently sensitive to conclusively determine which causal factors are 
significant; therefore, the data generated by this methodology do not provide strong 
enough evidence to generalize across cases because this data alone is insufficient to guard 
against the possibility of a false negative. The primary purpose and strength of the 
congruence approach then is not that it tests theories per se, but rather that it offers a 
means of refining these theories if possible so that they can be tested under more rigorous 
methods in the future (George and Bennett 2005).  Thus, the congruence method is best 
suited to producing generalizations about the theoretical discourse and not the wider 
population of cases these theories describe (Blatter and Blume 2008).  
Global  Water  Cris is  
In the application of this congruence methodology, this dissertation focuses on a 
particular sphere or subset of GCS activity associated with the global water crisis.  There 
 
   11 
are at least three key reasons this issue offers an interesting opportunity to assess the 
congruence of competing theoretical claims over GCS.  The first and most obvious of 
these is that water is essential to life.  Water is not substitutable, which means that once a 
resource has been depleted or polluted that is it, there is no viable alternative. 
Consequently, the excessive use and abuse of water resources tends to generate the kind 
of intensely impassioned and widespread response within civil society that is oftentimes 
lacking in issue areas like global climate change or deforestation, for which the threat to 
human life is calculated in years not days.  Second, the traditional conception of water 
resource problems as discrete and local matters has undergone a deep and widespread 
transformation.  Today, more and more people perceive their local water resource issues 
as part of a global governance crisis (Conca 2006; FOEI 2003; Gleick, Wolff, Chalecki, 
and Reyes 2002; IUNC 2000; Postel 1997; UN 2006; WWAP 2006, 2009).  When we 
combine these first two points, what we have is an issue that elicits the most intense 
passions, passions that are not just directed toward their local or state governing 
structures but are increasingly focused on the rules, norms and decision-making 
procedures that make up the global governance of freshwater resources.  These 
developments have most clearly been manifest in a dramatic increase in global water-
related activity by non-governmental organizations (Balanyá 2005; Conca 2006; Finger 
and Allouche 2002b).  However, these NGOs have not merely been content to pressure 
for reforms in the rules and norms of global water governance; many have begun to take 
matters into their own hands by undertaking ecological work or attempting to reconfigure 
widespread perceptions, preferences and values on water resource issues.   
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Finally, the global water crisis is interesting because few scholars pay much 
attention to the role that GCS plays in this story.  Instead, most water resource scholars 
remain spellbound by a traditional state-centric approach to global water resource 
problems (Saleth and Dinar 2004; Wescoat and White 2003a).  Global water resource 
scholarship has offered important insights to the political dimensions of transboundary 
issues (Blatter and Ingram 2001; Mumme 1988, 1993; Vogtmann and Dobretsov 2005) 
and the water-related concerns associated with environmental security (Cossi 1993; 
Pearce 2006; Ward 2002) but it has been virtually silent the important role GCS plays in 
story of global water governance.  Therefore, the global water crisis is interesting both 
because it offers an opportunity to adjudicate theoretical differences over GCS and 
because this research objective promises to bridge a widening gap in the literature on 
global water governance.  
Case Se l e c t ion  
 Using transnational NGOs as a way of evaluating competing claims about GCS, 
this dissertation endeavors to push beyond the state-centric approach in order to advance 
a more sophisticated and coherent understanding of global water governance.  Whereas 
states tend to focus on law and order approaches to water resource problems, or, to 
borrow a phrase from Foucault, “the right disposition of things” (Foucault 1994a, 234), 
NGOs can pursue alternative political objectives and employ a wider range of strategic 
tools in the pursuit of these objectives.  States simply face a number of structural 
constraints that are not as significant for NGOs.  For example, state governments are 
theoretically accountable to their citizens and are therefore expected to consider and 
reconcile a multiplicity of interests and perspectives in the course of their decision-
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making processes.  Governments also face territorial constraints, which limit their ability 
to shape water policies beyond their political territorial boundaries.  In contrast, NGOs’ 
effectiveness increases in proportion to their degree of specialization.  This specialization 
derives both from their knowledge about a particular issue (Betsill and Corell 2008) and 
the interpretive lens they use to filter this knowledge (Luke 1996; Pasha and Blaney 
1998). Thus, there is a strong incentive for an NGO to set aside or ignore issues that fall 
beyond its area of expertise, just as there is an incentive for NGOs to prevail over 
alternative interpretations of the data/problem.  In large part, it is their skill on both fronts 
that determines their success as an organization. Another point of difference is the fact 
that territorial considerations pose less of a constraint on NGO behavior.  Recent 
advances in communication and transportation technologies have made it possible for 
NGOs to capitalize on the comparative advantage they hold over states, which is evident 
in the recent growth of multinational and transnational NGO activity (Eschle and 
Stammers 2004; Held and McGrew 2000; Reitan 2007; Warkentin 2001).  
     Although many water-related transnational NGOs share many of these 
fundamental characteristics, there are also fundamental differences in the way they value 
water.  Some value water as an environmental good, others value it as a public good, and 
still others see it as an economic good.  Like all attempts at classification, this categorical 
scheme, if pressed, would likely appear to be manufactured and absurd.  However, 
insofar as it contains a degree of truth, this classification scheme offers a solid foundation 
upon which to base a theoretical comparison, and therefore it offers a starting point for 
genuine investigation (Berlin 1986).  In addition to serving this investigative function, 
highlighting this variability also functions as a safeguard against the kind of case 
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selection bias that has become all too common within the literature on GCS (Keck and 
Sikkink 1998a; Wapner 1996).  Like all political domains, GCS is a site of political 
contestation, where actors with different values and interests struggle against one another 
in the effort to advance their particular agenda.  In the effort to improve our 
understanding of the way GCS fits in world politics it is also necessary therefore to 
investigate the internal struggles for power that animate GCS.  
To capture this variability, this dissertation selected the most prominent NGO 
within each cohort of like-minded actors.  This selection process began with a soaking 
and poking investigative strategy, which involved a broad initial analysis of water-related 
transnational NGO actors and the categorization of these actors according to the value 
they inscribe on water.  Case studies were then selected from each cohort on the basis of 
their prominence within the group.  Three factors were selected to determine prominence: 
the level of global water related activity; success in articulating and advancing water 
initiatives; and material and cultural capabilities.  As a practical matter, the wealth and 
availability of water-related documentation was also a significant but less important 
factor.   
 Those who value water as an environmental good do so out of a fundamental 
concern for ecosystem integrity and biodiversity.  The Nature Conservancy (TNC) ranks 
among the most prominent members of this cohort, which also includes the Worldwide 
Fund for Nature (WWF) and the Global Nature Fund.  These actors hold the view that 
water possesses intrinsic value, which means it possesses value that is independent of any 
instrumental worth humans might recognize.  This view is informed by the ecological 
political philosophy of ecocentrism.  This philosophy rejects the Western enlightenment 
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view that humans stand apart from nature, arguing instead that humans constitute a single 
strand in the complex web of life (Naess 1995).  As freshwater resources play a vital role 
in sustaining life in all its forms, ecocentrics contend that water/nature and the self are as 
one.  Thus, we should not only incorporate the needs of nature into our water-related 
decision-making processes but we should prioritize those needs.  For it is only by saving 
nature that we can continue to sustain ourselves (Rolston III 1996).  Historically, TNC 
advanced this ecocentric agenda through its ecological work, which took a direct 
approach to the challenge of preserving ecosystem integrity through its buy and protect 
strategy.  However, its growing interest in global water resource problems has had two 
key effects.  First, TNC has played a more direct role in trying to interrupt and transform 
widespread preferences, perceptions and values of water resources, specifically, and 
water resource governance, more generally.  Second, TNC has made some initial 
attempts to reconfigure the rules, norms and decision-making procedures that make up 
global water governance.  This effort is most clearly manifest in its involvement in 
creating and promoting the Brisbane Declaration, which calls upon states and water 
managers to incorporate environmental needs into their decision-making processes.  
 Organizations that value water as a public good stress the importance of 
democratic decision-making and the satisfaction of basic human needs.  Among this 
cohort, the Council of Canadians (COC) holds a place of prominence among such 
organizations as Friends of the Earth International, the Sierra Club, and Red Vida.  This 
position emerged in response to growing pressure by the World Bank, the IMF, and 
others to privatize water resource management.  Those who take a public goods position 
argue that water resource problems are the consequence of undemocratic decision-
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making procedures that privilege the satisfaction of short-term interests in economic gain 
over the long-term interests of individuals and communities.  Privatization merely 
exacerbates the problem by further consolidating decision-making authority in the hands 
of multinational corporations, whose primary objective is not the long-term satisfaction 
of basic human needs but rather immediate desire of shareholders for ever greater profits.  
Public goods advocates also take issue with the commodification of water, which tends to 
cheapen the cultural and spiritual values people often inscribe on water.  As a group, their 
preferred solution to the global water crisis is one that enshrines the principle of water as 
a human right in national and international law.  It is on this front that the COC stands out 
among its cohort as a clear leader in the effort to transform the rules, norms and decision-
making procedures of global water governance.  
 Those who value water as an economic good focus on the problems of allocation 
inefficiency and the supply-demand disequilibrium. Green Cross International (GCI) has 
taken the most innovative approach to advancing this agenda, which ranks it above other 
like-minded organizations, such as the World Water Council and the International 
Secretariate for Water.  What these actors share in common is the view that water 
possesses economic value in all its competing uses.  Viewed from this perspective, the 
fundamental problem driving global water governance is the continued “failure to place a 
price on water that reflects its economic value in its various alternative uses” (Winpenny 
2003, 1).  This failure is blamed for wasteful and environmentally damaging use, 
resource misallocation, and low levels of international investment flows to the water 
sector.  To solve this problem, advocates support full-cost pricing, retracting government 
activity to the regulatory realm, and privatizing day-to-day management of water 
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resources.  Subjecting water to market pressures is viewed as the most efficient way to 
convey information about the degree of resource scarcity, thereby promoting water 
resource conservation and the allocation of water resources to their most valuable uses 
(Naiman, et al. 2002).  The benefits of full-cost pricing might also include greater equity, 
as “higher rates allow utilities to extend services to those not currently served and those 
currently forced to purchase water from vendors at very high prices” (Naiman, et al. 
2002, 2).   GCI’s support for commodification derives from its overarching desire to 
interrupt the parochial sensibilities that spawn destructive behavior and replace these with 
a deep awareness of global solidarity. 
In this dissertation, cases are the not objects of inquiry; rather, they serve an 
instrumental function by shedding light on the relevance and relative strength of 
competing theoretical expectations about GCS.  Put differently, the goal is not to provide 
a more accurate description of the pieces but rather to provide a more accurate 
explanation of how these pieces fit together.  This goal focuses our attention on the 
macro relationships between abstract theories and concrete observations, as opposed to 
the alternative focus of process-tracing methodology, which highlights the micro 
relationships among the causal variables within a particular case or event (Blatter and 
Blume 2008).  The instrumental value of these cases is magnified even further by the 
reduction of each theoretical framework to its conceptual core. This means that this 
dissertation does not endeavor to precisely weigh and measure every proposition 
associated with a particular theoretical framework but focuses instead on the core 
proposition that defines each theoretical perspective.  Consequently, the use of case 
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studies focus specifically on the goal of illuminating the empirical relevance of these core 
theoretical propositions. 
Organization 
 The point of chapter two is to explore the overarching research question in greater 
depth and identify the core propositions that animate theoretical debates on this question.  
This chapter makes three main points: (1) GCS has recently emerged as a significant 
feature on the landscape of world politics; (2) theoretical accounts of this development 
recently hardened into three incommensurable positions and what delineates these 
positions is the stress each places on the ontological, political or axiological 
characteristics of GCS;  (3) Aristotle’s law of non-contradiction dictates that these three 
theoretical perspectives cannot be true at the same time, thus, additional analysis of this 
question is not only desirable but necessary.  Apart from point three, the evidence for this 
chapter derives from the theoretical literature on GCS.  The purpose here is not to provide 
an exhaustive literature review but rather to shed light on the key points of tension or 
difference than animate theoretical debates.    
 This preliminary theoretical analysis in chapter two segues into an overview of 
the global water crisis in chapter three.  This chapter argues that the global water crisis 
offers and interesting opportunity to adjudicate the theoretical debates revealed in chapter 
two.  To this end, this chapter makes three key points.  First, it summarizes the modern 
history of global water governance to show that intensifying global water resource 
problems are primarily a crisis of governance.  We have the skill and technological 
capability to solve most water resource problems, what we lack is the political will.  The 
second point is that this global water crisis has been manifest in three distinct ways.  It 
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has been manifest as an environmental problem, a humanitarian problem, and an 
economic problem. By outlining the depth and breadth of each dimension, this section 
introduces the reader to the severity of this issue and adds weight to the point made 
earlier in the chapter regarding the principled origins of variability within the GCS 
approach to the global water crisis.  The third and final point reveals the depth of GCS 
engagement on this issue, which serves both to illustrate the relevance of this subject for 
GCS research as well as the relevance of GCS to our understanding of the global water 
crisis.  
 Chapters four through six present the concrete empirical evidence through cases 
study analyses.  As the purpose of these cases is to establish the relevance and relative 
strength of the competing theoretical perspectives, each case study focuses on four 
principal areas.  
Background: What are the organization’s origins? What purpose was the 
organization designed to serve? What is the nature of its organizational structure? 
How does the organization make decisions and to whom is it accountable? What 
is the nature of its involvement in the global water crisis? When did it take an 
interest in this issue and why?      
 
Political Ontology: How does the organization perceive its role in world politics? 
How does it make sense of the world political system? In other words, what does 
the organization perceive the world political system to be made of? How does it 
describe the general principles that govern the functioning of the world political 
system? And finally, what is the organization’s view on the separation of 
appearance and reality? In other words, to what extent does it believe the social 
and political world presents itself as it really is? (Hay 2006). 
 
Values: What are the core values that govern the organization? To what extent 
have these values changed over time? If changes have occurred, what prompted 
these changes? How does the organization value water? How does its concern for 
water fit within the context of its overarching values? How does the organization 
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Strategy: What are the strategies the organization employs in the pursuit of its 
objectives? To what extent do these strategies correspond to its values/political 
ontology? Have these strategies changed over time, and if so why? How 
successful are its strategies in achieving their short-term and long-term 
objectives? Who or what are the objects of its water-related activities? With 
whom does the organization frequently partner in the pursuit of its objectives? Is 
the organization strategically innovative?  
 
 To gather this data this dissertation relied heavily on document analysis.  I 
compiled documents from organizational websites, newsletters and other membership 
publications, reports, and historical records including meeting minutes and memoirs.  I 
supplemented these materials with monographs by organizational leaders, videos 
featuring organizational personnel, podcasts and video lectures, radio interviews, as well 
as journal and newspaper articles.  When gaps or points of contradiction appeared I 
contacted key organizational personnel for clarification.  Because this communication 
took place through email, the respondents had time to formulate thoughtful replies, 
which, with one exception, proved helpful in filling the necessary gaps and clarifying key 
points.  These multiple layers of material allowed for the construction of rich and 
descriptive narratives on which to base the congruence analyses that followed.     
 The process of congruence analysis is like pattern matching. The analytical 
challenge consists in matching the concrete empirical data with the abstract theoretical 
expectations about that data.  The overarching goal is then to find points of 
complementarity and difference and to then use these findings to make inferences about 
the relevance and relative strengths of the competing theoretical frameworks.  Chapter 
two develops these theoretical positions in detail, and identifies their key assertions and 
expectations.  These points serve as the theoretical basis for pattern testing with the 
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empirical data to determine how well these expectations fit what we see happening within 
GCS.  
 Whereas the case study chapters compare the strength of the theories in relation to 
the empirical data, chapter seven compares the strengths of the theories in relation to each 
other.  The purpose of the final exercise is to reveal which of our theoretical perceptions 
are more basic than others, to discard those that appear weak or unsatisfactory and keep 
the rest so that we can return to our theoretical deliberations over GCS with improved 
structure and understanding.  This analysis rests upon the ability of these theoretical 
perspectives to generate accurate predictions.  To be absolutely clear, this is not the same 
thing as verifying or falsifying a theoretical claim.  This methodology relies on inferences 
of relative strength rather than claims of absolute and universal truth.  Chapter seven 
concludes by offering reflections on the project and proposals for future research. 
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Chapter Two: The Theoretical Debate On Global Civil Society 
 
 
Chapter one located global civil society (GCS) on the scene of world political history.  It 
argued that nothing is more central to the history of world politics than the emergence, 
over time, of diversity and complexity. It went on to argue that GCS plays an important 
role in this historic development.  This chapter builds on these findings to show that this 
phenomenon, evident and undisputed as it is as a matter of fact, is nonetheless subject to 
energetic debate about what is going on, an empirical matter with deeper theoretical 
implications.   
What makes this debate compelling is that it disrupts a previous phase of 
theoretical inquiry in which theoretical progress appeared obvious and assured.  The 
difference between these phases consists in the absence, in the previous phase, “of 
competing schools that question each other’s aims and standards” (Kuhn 1970, 163).  The 
previous phase consisted almost entirely in gathering sufficient evidence to prove that 
GCS exists.  In contrast, the success of this endeavor gave to way to new concerns for the 
way GCS relates to the other elements of world politics, for its functions, and its 
implications for the attainment of normative goals. While theoretical progress continues 
in this current phase, it is harder to see.  The issue, therefore, is not the absence of 
progress but rather the “effectiveness and efficiency with which the group as a whole 
solves new problems” (Kuhn 1970, 164).  The energy these theorist channel towards 
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considerations of fundamental principles is energy that might otherwise be directed 
towards solving the multiplicity of problems a new paradigm would expose. 
To solve a puzzle of theoretical effectiveness, everything depends on the accurate 
identification of the points of tension that animate theoretical debate. These tensions and 
contradictions later function as the objects of analysis, for which the challenge is to 
determine which of these beliefs or propositions is more basic than the others so that we 
can discard the rest and return to our discourse on GCS with improved structure and 
understanding.   
It is on this preliminary point that this dissertation breaks from previous attempts 
to solve the theoretical debates over GCS.  With some exceptions, scholars have tended 
to negotiate this research terrain by mapping out its ontological, political, or axiological 
dimensions.  By zeroing in on just one of these variables, these scholars categorized 
theoretical frameworks according to whether or not they perceive GCS as an autonomous 
and self-directed political sphere (Chandhoke 2002), a force of democratization 
(Omelicheva 2009), or a vehicle of human emancipation (Frost 2002). In contrast, this 
chapter presents an alternative categorization that grants these ontological, political, and 
axiological elements equal weight.  Taking all three characteristics into consideration 
provides a more accurate and coherent understanding of the tensions and contradictions 
that animate theoretical discussions of GCS.  Therefore, this approach promises both to 
improve our understanding of the variability within GCS research and, subsequently, to 
enhance the accuracy of our assessments of theoretical congruence.   
The chapter unfolds in three stages.  The first stage provides an overview of the 
theoretical literature on GCS.  This discussion highlights the points of agreement about 
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GCS that make it possible to describe this theoretical endeavor as a coherent yet 
fragmented body of work.  The second stage focuses squarely on the points of difference.  
Here, the discussion turns to the ontological, political, and axiological positions that 
animate theoretical debates over GCS.  These are not subtle issues; rather, the emphasis 
placed on these issues signifies a reconstruction of the field of international relations 
from new fundamentals, “a reconstruction that changes some of the field’s most 
elementary theoretical generalizations as well as many of its . . . methods and 
applications” (Kuhn 1970, 85).  The third stage references Aristotle’s law of non-
contradiction to argue that further theoretical reduction is both desirable and necessary.            
Global Civil Society: What is it and why is it important? 
Although considerations of a universal civil society date to Kant, modern iterations first 
appeared in post-Cold War Eastern Europe and Latin America.  Fearing the harmful 
effects of an ascendant global liberalism, scholars looked to GCS as a countervailing 
force (Kaldor 2003b).  More recently, GCS developed into a key variable for tracking 
trends in the diversity and complexity of world politics.   
Put simply, civil society is the sphere of association that lies between the personal 
and the public.  Dominant traditional considerations located civil society in opposition to 
and separate from the state (Hegel and Knox 1942).  What changed, in addition to and as 
an advent of new powerful transportation and communication technologies, was the surge 
of transnational non-governmental activity described in chapter one.  Almost overnight, 
local actors perceived new global dimensions to the problems they faced and the interests 
they pursued.  Before long, they appropriated the mechanisms of global capitalism to 
solve their problems and advance their interests.  This development has been manifest in 
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a recent surge of transnational non-governmental activity, the result of which has been a 
dramatic increase in the complexity and diversity of world politics (Mason 2008; Reitan 
2007).  
 Few would dispute these observations.  Given this basic degree of consensus, how 
then can we explain the mounting theoretical debate over GCS?  First, research on GCS 
focuses our attention on the social and political implications of economic and 
technological globalization. This line of inquiry tends to cluster around two areas. The 
first area looks at the effects of economic and technological developments on the 
construction of preferences, perceptions and values, particularly as these relate to the 
formation of political identity and perceptions of imagined community (Dower 2003; 
Held 1995; Keane 2001). The second area of research examines the extent with which 
these economic and technological changes open new opportunities for contentious non-
governmental activity within the world political system.  Authors working within this 
tradition assert that globalization modifies the rules, norms and decision-making 
procedures of world politics, thereby improving the prospects for transnational non-
governmental activity (Keck and Sikkink 1998b; Tarrow and McAdam 2005; Tilly 2004).  
A second and more normative approach uses GCS to explain perceived changes in 
the world political system. This line of inquiry also contains two camps. The first camp 
explores GCS as a normative concept, which is to say that theorists think of GCS as a 
political project or ideal type (Anheier, et al. 2001; D. Della Porta and S. Tarrow 2005; 
Lipschutz 1992).  To a certain extent, this approach insulates this group from 
contradictory empirical findings.  A second approach characterizes GCS as an actually 
observable set of empirical phenomena. Within this context, research looks for trends in 
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the behavior and perceptions of actors within GCS in order to determine the extent with 
which these characteristics are consistent with or serve the interests of traditional sites of 
power in the world political system (Blaney and Inayatullah 2010; Cox 1999; Rosenau 
1992).  
  In each case, the recent debate over GCS flows from two underlying sources; the 
first is ideological, the second empirical. Viewed from an ideological perspective, 
research on GCS offers a constructive outlet for scholars frustrated by the failures and 
limitations of the state system.  States are the dominant and central powers in the world 
political system and therefore the solutions to transnational or global problems continue 
to depend on national policies.  However, insecurities often prevent states from acting in 
ways that advance the global common good.  More often than not, the fear of being 
systemically disadvantaged overwhelms other desires.  Frustrated by this status quo, 
scholars have looked to GCS as a means of interrupting and altering this structural 
condition. Here the term “structure” signifies the rules, norms and decision-making 
procedures that coordinate behavior in a particular issue area.   
Power plays a critical role in this storyline.  I understand power to be the measure 
of an actor’s probability of achieving a preferred outcome (Lamborn 1990).  Power 
ultimately rests on the ability to leverage capabilities, including military force, wealth and 
knowledge.  Therefore, structural change results from the redistribution of capabilities 
across units (Waltz 1979, 108).  What GCS offers scholars then is a conceptual 
alternative to the monistic presumptions of a state-centered world order, the function of 
which is to preserve the status quo by foreclosing the possibility of constructing a 
pluralist and democratic world political system.  Theoretical considerations of GCS 
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challenge this rationalist thesis of a world political system by shining light on the 
diversity of individuals, organizations and structures that make up and animate the 
history of world politics.  
GCS therefore reopens the possibility of democracy on a global scale. That is, the 
process of developing a system in which the governors are accountable to the governed.  
Put simply, democratization is a central concern within the GCS literature because there 
is a deficit of democratic accountability in the transnational sphere. Accounts of this 
deficit tend to highlight the recent proliferation of international institutions, globe trotting 
bureaucrats, and transnational corporations, on one hand, and the lack of a proportionate 
expansion in accountability mechanisms and standards, on the other (Mason 2008, 28; 
Rosenau 1992; Susan Strange 1995).  As this governance arrangement is widely 
perceived as the projection of powerful state and class interests (Cox 1997; Hardt and 
Negri 2000), GCS scholars agree that the initiative to improve democratic accountability 
must take root somewhere else. Consequently, many authors have looked to GCS as a 
potential means of overcoming this democratic deficit at the national and transnational 
levels (Etzioni-Halevy 2002; Pratt 2004; Rohrschneider and Dalton 2002).  
GCS performs this task when it enhances transparency, conducts policy 
monitoring and review, pursues redress for marginalized stakeholders, and promotes 
formal accountability (Scholte 2004, 201).  It also performs this function when it 
empowers marginalized people to acquire their fair share of public goods and a secure 
place in healthy ecosystems (Wapner 1996; Wescoat and White 2003b).  Put differently, 
GCS enacts democratic reforms when it expands the struggle “against the distribution of 
the public and the private that shores up the twofold domination of the oligarchy in the 
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State and in society” (Rancière and Corcoran 2006, 55).  Viewed from this perspective, 
the most pressing problem for students of GCS lies in uncovering the potential of the 
multitude to organize itself against the global forces of domination and construct an 
alternative to the capitalist imperatives that underwrite their authority (Hardt and Negri 
2004b, 189).   
As an empirical matter, the notion of a GCS is powerful because it offers a 
compelling explanation for the profound changes already underway in the world political 
system.  These changes are fundamentally political in nature because they involve the 
ongoing struggle over the distribution of benefits and risks associated with capitalist 
production.  In this context, capitalism is understood as a holistic concept entailing the 
production of communications, relationships and forms of life – as well as the production 
of material goods (Hardt and Negri 2004a, xv).  The novelty of contemporary struggles is 
that they increasingly spill beyond local and national boundaries to become the subjects 
of global debate. Technology fuels this process by lowering the barriers to trans-
boundary communication and transportation, thereby opening new strategic opportunities 
for political action (Held and McGrew 2002; Keck and Sikkink 1998a).  
A growing number of non-governmental actors have capitalized on these 
opportunities by expanding the scope of their interests and activities, establishing new 
coalitions, and generally improving their credibility as authorities in their particular areas 
of interest.  So armed, they have worked to leverage these capabilities in such a way as to 
increase the probability of achieving their preferred outcomes. In some cases, a desirable 
outcome may involve the modification of specific local or national policies (Hochstetler 
2002; Keck and Sikkink 1998a).  In other instances, the preferred outcome is one that 
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involves a change in international rules, norms or decision-making processes (Betsill and 
Corell 2008; Haas 1992).  Yet another possibility is that what they desire most is the 
preservation of the status quo (Lipschutz 2007; Pasha and Blaney 1998).  This discussion 
makes clear that the recent explosion of transnational non-state activity has raised new 
questions about its real and potential implications for the distribution and function of 
power in the world political system.  The concept of GCS offers scholars the fundamental 
theoretical tools to answer these pressing questions. 
Global Civil Society and the Theoretical Debate 
Thus far, observations of GCS, although widely accepted as empirical fact, have 
generated different interpretations of its relevance for the history of world politics.  Some 
perceive the emergence of GCS as an ontological break in this historical process (Kaldor 
2003b; Keane 2001; Lipschutz 1992; Wapner 2002).  Those who hold this view perceive 
power as a finite quantity.  Consequently, as GCS burst onto the scene of world politics, 
the perception is that it did so at the expense of states and markets, in effect de-centering 
the roles these actors play in the domain of global governance.   An alternative view is 
that GCS marks a political break in the history of world politics.  This theoretical 
perspective argues that the rise of GCS is significant because it contributes to the 
expansion and diffusion of the global strategic repertoire (Betsill and Corell 2008; Keck 
and Sikkink 1998a).  These scholars tend to perceive power as an unbounded and 
therefore unlimited quantity. Thus, while they sometimes advocate for contentious 
political strategies (Hochstetler 2002; Tilly 2004), they have a tendency to favor 
cooperative solutions in which all parties win (Kenny 2004).  The final camp perceives 
GCS as an axiological break in world politics.  In their view, GCS primarily functions as 
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a means of projecting the interests and values of the dominant global class, thereby 
reducing the diversity of values and cultural understandings in the world political system 
(Blaney and Inayatullah 2006; Inayatullah and Blaney 2004; Newell 2008).   The concern 
here is not the scope of power but its distribution.  This scholarship rests on a normative 
preference for the just distribution of power, which means a distribution of power that 
benefits the poor and disempowered.   
Before it is possible to evaluate these positions in greater detail, it is necessary to 
first provide some clarification as to what is meant by ontology, politics and axiology. In 
this context, ontology “relates to political being, to what is politically, to what exists 
politically, and to the units that comprise political reality” (Hay 2006, 80). Another way 
to think of ontology is as a systematic process of compartmentalization, which serves as 
the basis for diachronic and synchronic analysis (C. Taylor 1959). These ontological 
considerations constitute the foundation of political theorizing and analysis, whether the 
reference to ontology is explicit or not.  Ontological debates tend to revolve around the 
composition of a particular compartmental scheme, the justifications marshaled in 
defense of the scheme, and/or the implications of observed variability within the system.  
As such, they cover a wide range of topics, actors, and processes.  For example, scholars 
such as Wapner (1996), Rosenau (1992, 2002), Kaldor (1999, 2007), Keane (2003) and 
Keck and Sikkink (1998b) generally agree that GCS contains transnational humanitarian 
and environmental non-governmental organizations (NGO).  However, these same 
scholars tend to disagree about whether GCS also includes hybrid entities like the World 
Water Council, whose membership rolls include governments, multilateral institutions, 
and market actors.   
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Politics describes the struggle for power.  However, in this context politics is all 
about the strategies that actors employ in the course of their efforts to gain power. It 
describes the efforts of private individuals who struggle to intervene “in the sphere of 
international policy and strategy” (Foucault 1984, 65).  Politics focuses attention on the 
identification and distribution of capabilities, the skill with which different actors 
leverage these capabilities within a particular situational context, and the extent with 
which these activities enhance their degree of influence within this context.  Political 
interests in GCS tend to emphasize the role of strategic innovation and the diffusion of 
the strategic repertoire.  Consequently, these discussions tend to highlight the production 
of information/knowledge, access to decision-makers and decision-making processes, and 
the tactics used to convey information/knowledge (Betsill and Corell 2008).    
When describing global civil society, axiology refers to the values scholars 
inscribe upon global civil society.  These values are both intrinsic and instrumental and 
range from certain innate values, such as the value of moral diversity – the strength of 
which flows from the inclusion of competing and indeed conflicting values (D. Della 
Porta and S. Tarrow 2005), to instrumental values that signify the capacity of GCS to 
extend and deepen these intrinsic values (Sikkink 2005).  Whereas claims of intrinsic 
value are more or less normative assertions, the determination of instrumental value is an 
empirical endeavor.  As an empirical enterprise, scholars have observed and measured the 
extent with which GCS “straddles the whole earth, and [has] complex effects that are felt 
in its four corners . . . with the deliberate effect of drawing the world together in new 
ways” (Keane 2003, 8).  In other instances, scholars have measured instrumental value by 
mapping the flow of information and ideas (Keck and Sikkink 1998a).  Still others have 
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evaluated global trends in the frequency of “uncoerced collective action around shared 
interests, purposes and values” (CCS 2004).  Axiological debates over global civil society 
tend to break out over particular assertions of intrinsic value, the desirability of extending 
and deepening commitments to these values, as well as the configuration of opportunities 
and constraints that determine the potential for civil society to expand into transnational 
space (Comor 2001; Pasha and Blaney 1998; Stevis 2005).  
These points of tension have been manifest in three distinct theoretical 
interpretations of the way GCS fits in world politics.  Respectively, these are the 
transformationalist, pragmatic, and critical positions.  Each of the following sections 
identifies the central conceptual claims and theoretical propositions of these camps in 
turn. To be clear, this analysis is not exhaustive: it makes no attempt to capture the entire 
constellation of theoretical positions on GCS. Instead, the aim here is to identify the most 
prominent theoretical positions within the literature as a first step in a systematic 
assessment of their congruence to the concrete empirical data on GCS.  A theoretical 
perspective gains prominence when it is both durable and popular.   
The Trans fo rmati onal is t  Thes is  
The most controversial and optimistic of the three theoretical frameworks, these theorists 
argue that GCS fundamentally transforms the world political system by de-centering the 
state as the single most dominant force within the system (Lipschutz 1992).  Much of the 
work produced by this position is highly normative, which is to say that it stakes out a 
position on what states and individuals ought to do.  In this respect, the 
transformationalist argument is largely immunized from empirical attacks.  However, the 
fact that these normative propositions are theoretical abstractions of certain empirical 
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observations means that the transformationalist position can be subject to empirical 
analysis and critique.    
In order to assess the theoretical effectiveness of this position we must understand 
that this perspective grows out of the observation that the international political system of 
states has failed to manage and control the global financial system, protect the 
environment, or preserve the socio-economic balance between the powerful and the weak 
(Strange 1999).  Paul Wapner (1996, 18) concludes, “the state system, as the context 
within which states operate, impose constraints that render states incapable of working 
for genuine global well-being.”   If true, these observations lead ultimately to the 
conclusion that the state bias of traditional international relations theory must be modified 
so as to accommodate alternative governance mechanisms. The traditional approach 
describes the world political system as a complex of unitary states, whose relations are 
determined by power insecurities and the strict calculation of immediate self-interest. 
However, the deepening of global humanitarian, environmental and security problems 
shows “there is a real possibility of choice between doing what is right and doing what is 
in one’s own interests” (Dower 2007, 8). For students of world politics, the challenge, 
then, is to find a way to  “motivate agents, even in the face of conflicting interests” 
(Dower 2007, 9).  For transformationalists, meeting this challenge requires “the 
transformation of the state, the emergence of a new kind of global politics in which the 
state is one actor among many; and this in turn has profound consequences for the 
content and functioning of democracy” (Kaldor, Anheier, and Glasius 2004, 1). 
 In its axiological propositions, the transformationalist thesis has undergone a 
significant change of its own. It began by inscribing GCS with a set of progressive, 
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intrinsic values and asserted that its instrumental effects on the world political system 
were wholly positive. To support this claim, transformationalists highlighted the concept 
of civility, attributing to GCS certain “common norms or codes of behaviour that have 
emerged in reaction to the legal and other socially constructed fictions of the nation-state 
system” (Lipschutz 1992, 398).  De Oliveira and Tandon (1994, 2-3) expanded on this 
observation to include among its norms and behaviors the “solidarity and compassion for 
the fate and well-being of others, including unknown, distant others, a sense of personal 
responsibility and reliance on one’s own initiative to do the right thing; the impulse 
toward altruistic giving and sharing; the refusal of inequality, violence, and oppression.” 
It is no surprise, then, that transformationalists were equally optimistic about the 
instrumental value of GCS, for, in the diversity and complexity of GCS, they perceived 
the power to shape new identities (Keane 2001), to alter people’s minds and actions 
throughout the world (Wapner 1996), to broaden and strengthen cosmopolitan law 
(Kaldor 2003b), and to reconstruct, re-imagine, or re-map world politics (Lipschutz 
1992). 
 At the same time, criticism of this perspective prompted at least some 
transformationalists to mute these axiological propositions.  For example, in its 
inscription of intrinsic value scholars have retreated from their claims of altruism to 
emphasize instead its dynamism, inclusiveness, and cognizance (Warkentin 2001).  These 
terms, new in the transformationalist discourse, reveal efforts made to address their 
critics:  dynamism signifies its adaptability to changing environmental circumstances, 
including shifts in the political opportunity structure; inclusiveness is the “capability to 
reflect the broad range of experiences and ideas of the actors who create and employ 
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[global civil society]” (Warkentin 2001, 20); and, cognizance refers to purposive and 
self-conscious behavior.  Gone are the altruistic assertions of sharing and giving.  Instead, 
what transformationalists retain of their axiological assertions of civility consists solely in 
“various overlapping norms of non-violent politeness covering matters of indirection, 
self-restraint and face-saving” (Keane 2003).  
By embracing this shift, transformationalists now claim that in coordinating the 
behavior of its constituent elements, intrinsic values largely determine its instrumental 
value to the world political system. According to Lipschutz (2007, 304) the correct 
estimation of instrumental value should therefore “be understood as something of a 
protective mechanism directed against the depredations of the self-regulating markets of 
global neo-liberalism as well as the states that organize the political economy in which 
these markets function”. In short, “they [transformationalists] see it as a way of 
benefiting the many rather than the few” (Kaldor, et al. 2004, 3).  This end is promoted 
by shaping the preferences, perceptions and values of its constituent elements so that they 
might more effectively influence the “economic constitutionalism” of capitalist 
globalization and extend international law (Kaldor, et al. 2004; Lipschutz 2007; Wapner 
1996).   
Ontologically, the transformationalist thesis has undergone a similar process of 
revision in recent years. In its initial articulation, transformationalists interpreted the 
emergence of GCS as a rupturing of the state-centered world political system. At the 
time it appeared as if the voluntary nature of its associations, in addition to the intrinsic 
values outlined above, demarcated GCS as a special province of world politics (Keane 
2001; Lipschutz 1992; Warkentin 2001). In this telling, the rise of GCS had crowded 
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out the state, effectively de-centering it as the single dominant authority in the world 
political system, thereby forcing the state to compete for power on an equal footing with 
GCS and markets.  For if states no longer enjoyed a monopoly over the channels of 
finance or communication, there is no reason to expect them to retain monopoly control 
over the institutions of global governance (Keohane 2005; Wapner 1996). GCS had, 
quite simply, erased the old hierarchy of world politics and ushered in something new:    
[A] parallel arrangement of political interaction, one that does not take 
anarchy and self-help as central organizing principles, but is focused on 
the self-conscious constructions of networks of knowledge and action, by 
decentered, local actors, that cross reified boundaries of space as though 
they were not there (Lipschutz 1992, 238). 
 
Consequently, transformationalists portrayed GCS as an autonomous and self-directed 
sphere of political authority, whose legitimacy derived from its claims to communal ties. 
 Recent articulations of the transformationalist ontology, however, take a much 
more sophisticated view of power dynamics than those illustrated by the zero-sum game 
approach of earlier iterations. In this effort, Ronnie Lipschutz has led the way by 
restructuring the transformationalist ontology to align with his observation that the world 
political system consists of a single social formation, in which GCS “is constitutive of 
and constituted by states and markets” (Lipschutz 2007, 304).  According to Lipschutz, 
what theorists today label as GCS is little more than the contemporary transnational 
manifestation of 19th century bourgeois reactionaries.  Far from representing the interests 
of the poor or disenfranchised, what animates GCS is the erosion of property rights and 
physical protections. In this telling, it is the transformationalist desire to preserve and 
extend these rights that ultimately distinguishes GCS actors from the exploitative 
tendencies of market and state forces. When coupled with the emphasis on civility, this 
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conservative tendency excludes from the list of GCS actors all non-civilian institutions, 
organizations and entities, including political parties and hybrid NGOs, as well as any 
non-governmental entities that tend to have violent effects (Keane 2003, 14).  
 Surprisingly, these axiological and ontological revisions have had little effect on 
the core political argument of the transformationalist thesis.  With respect to the 
relationships between agents and structures, transformationalists continue to perceive 
GCS as contentious political agent.  According to Keane (2003, 15), its political function 
is to serve “as a brake or potential check upon various forms of government, and 
especially absolutist political rule.”  But, as Lipschutz (2006b, 110) points out, GCS is 
the product of global liberal governmentalism and therefore “largely serves to reproduce 
that form of governance within the structures of power and discourse rather than change 
it.” GCS is no longer an agent of revolutionary change but rather functions as a fierce 
defender of the status quo. As a political agent, its transformative effect on the world 
political system consists, in part, of providing the channels through which individuals 
and non-state actors can pursue these ends by acquiring influence over political and 
economic authorities within the world political system (Kaldor 2007).  
In addition to these shifting axiological and ontological perspectives, 
transformationalists also pay particular attention to the strategic deployment of cultural, 
social and economic devices provided by GCS.  In this area of research, Paul Wapner 
(Wapner 1996, 2002; Wapner and Ruiz 2000) has played a particularly influential role. 
His expansive definition of politics as “the employment of means to order, direct, and 
manage human behavior in matters of common concern and involvement” (Wapner 
1996, 7) expands the scope of inquiry beyond the more traditional concern for structure-
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agent relationships by focusing instead on the ways in which non-state actors shape 
widespread preferences, perceptions and values. Yet, as Wapner has also come to 
recognize, for these strategies to work cultures must first be receptive to such 
manipulation (Wapner 2002). And, as Lipshutz has added, cultures are most susceptible 
to these influences when the fictionalized public-private divide has been disrupted 
(Lipschutz 2007, 307). Therefore, in its cultural strategies GCS is more likely to 
reproduce liberal governmentalism than to transform it.  
In sum, the transformationalist thesis portrays GCS as an ontological break in the 
history of world politics.  Its overarching claim is that states and markets must 
increasingly contend with GCS, and therefore GCS constitutes an increasingly powerful 
political force in world politics.  While GCS may not prove to be the progressive and 
autonomous political sphere transformationalists previously described, its emergence is 
nonetheless perceived as a disruption and reconfiguration of the world political system.  
From this perspective, its emergence marks the introduction of a new and contentious 
entity on the scene of world political history, a change which has direct implications for 
the ability of traditionally dominant actors to sculpt the world political system in such a 
way as to advance their particular preferences, perceptions and values.  
The Pragmat ic  Thes is  
Unlike the normative approach of transformationalists, pragmatists focus on the 
mechanics of GCS. The pragmatist ontology embeds GCS within a set of enabling 
political institutions, including states and inter-governmental organizations (Keck and 
Sikkink 1998a; Sikkink 2005). As the nature of these institutions or structures 
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determines the potential for political action, pragmatists tend to be cautiously optimistic 
about the contribution of GCS in growing the diversity and complexity of world politics.  
Unlike transformationalists, pragmatists express little interest in the axiological 
characteristics of civil society; rather, their research focuses on “social relationships, the 
patterns they form, and their implications for choices and behavior” (Anheier and Katz 
2005, 207). The intrinsic value of these mechanisms resides in their ability to expand the 
political resources available to those actors who lack the capacity to govern (D. Della 
Porta and S. G. Tarrow 2005). Pragmatists view these relationships as political fissures 
in the edifice of world politics, which opens channels for bringing alternative 
understandings and information into play. Their intrinsic value, therefore, flows from the 
opportunities these openings create for the production, exchange and strategic 
deployment of information (Keck and Sikkink 1998a).  
Like transformationalists, pragmatists locate the instrumental value of GCS in its 
potential to break oppressive cycles of history, to create and proliferate alternative 
channels of communication, and to empower the voices of the powerless (Hochstetler 
and Keck 2007; Keck and Sikkink 1998a; Tarrow and McAdam 2005).  Pragmatists and 
transformationalists differ, however, in their ontological assertions.  Transformationalists 
interpret these instrumental functions as signals of an ontological break in the history of 
world politics; a moment in which GCS emerges as a voluntary and autonomous sphere 
within the world political system. In contrast, pragmatists interpret the diversity and 
complexity of modern political history within the context of a state-centric world politics 
(D. Della Porta and S. Tarrow 2005; Sikkink 2005).  
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For pragmatists, the rise of GCS marks a break in the political history of the 
world politics. Thus, from a pragmatic perspective, GCS is successful when it interrupts 
the abuse or suppression of information, reframes debates by changing their terms, 
forcing an alteration in the sites of debate, and/or prompts a reconfiguration of the 
participants. GCS is also successful when it has an influence over the widespread shape 
of preferences, perceptions, and values (Keck and Sikkink 1998a; Sikkink 2005).    
 To give this perspective context, pragmatists begin with the ontological assumption 
that states are the dominant and central actors of the world political system.  Pragmatists 
distinguish GCS from the other prominent features of world politics on the basis of its 
“voluntary, reciprocal, and horizontal patterns of communication and exchange” (Keck 
and Sikkink 1998a, 8). At first glance, the particular emphasis on horizontal 
communication and exchange appears to position GCS in stark contrast between 
“markets and hierarchies as they have less uncertainty than the former and less 
complexity than the latter” (Henry, Mohan, and Yanacopulos 2004, 842). This 
observation has led some scholars to mistakenly narrow the scope of pragmatist inquiry 
to “the World Social Forum (WSF), as well as a web of regional, national, local, and 
thematic forums modeled on the WSF’s horizontal, “open space” format” (Reitan 2007, 
445), all of which are unified by their contentious orientation to neoliberal globalization.  
 Underscoring the voluntary, reciprocal, and horizontal characteristic of GCS does 
not preclude the participation of state and market actors. On the contrary, pragmatists’ 
lists of GCS actors often feature international intergovernmental organizations, parts of 
branches of governments, the media, and firms, many of which are fiercely committed to 
the project of neo-liberal globalization (Keck and Sikkink 1998a, 9). From the pragmatic 
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perspective, the internal organizational structure and preferences of a particular entity are 
less important than that entity’s willingness to “commit resources to mutually acceptable 
objectives, sharing risks and long term collaboration” (Henry, et al. 2004, 843) . 
Therefore, the pragmatist ontology would have little trouble incorporating political 
parties and hybrid NGOs into its conception of GCS.  
 In their political observations, pragmatists perceive GCS as both the product of its 
environment as well as an agent of environmental change. In the first instance, 
pragmatists explain the ascendance of GCS as the strategic response to structural 
opportunities and blockages. For example, Keck and Sikkink (1998a, 12) find that GCS 
networks are most likely to appear when “the channels between domestic groups and 
their governments are blocked or hampered.” The globalization of civil society is 
therefore seen as the rational reaction of local and national civil society actors to new and 
extra-territorial strategic incentives. Pragmatists also hold that globalization can increase 
the profile and legitimacy of civil society actors, enlarge their prospects for coalition 
building, and expand the scope of their action repertoire (D. Della Porta and S. Tarrow 
2005; Sikkink 2005; Tarrow and McAdam 2005). However, unlike transformationalists, 
pragmatists do not take this to mean that GCS can supplant or dislodge the state from its 
role as the single dominant force of the world political system. This conclusion follows 
from the observation that GCS is contingent upon and conditioned by the legal and 
physical protections provided by states (Raustiala 1997).  
In addition, pragmatists often portray GCS as a contentious political force, 
positioning it against states and other power brokers in the world political system. 
However, simply because GCS often engages in contentious behavior, would it then be 
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correct to assume that its activities are inherently democratic? Della Porta and Diani 
(2006) say no. Although most manifestations of GCS tend to promote democratic ends, 
fascist and neo-fascist elements have endeavored to deny democracy altogether. This 
leads the authors to conclude that GCS is only democratic when it “explicitly demands 
increased equality and protection for minorities” (246). Yet, even under these heightened 
conditions, GCS is not immune from the law of unintended consequences.  For example, 
networks promoting democratic reforms on the basis of identity politics can spark the 
flames of ethnic violence; efforts designed to strengthen democracies can prompt their 
collapse; and even when successful, the democratic activities of GCS can generate an 
authoritarian backlash (Della Porta and Diani 2006; Hochstetler 2002). 
 In sum, the pragmatic perspective perceives GCS as a political break in the 
history of world politics. This argument breaks from the transformationalist approach in 
its assumption that GCS remains firmly embedded within the existing state-centered 
power structure of the world political system.  Building on this assumption, pragmatists 
argue that GCS constitutes an expanding domain of strategic innovation and diffusion 
within this overarching structure. (Betsill and Corell 2008; Friedman, et al. 2005).  The 
unifying bond within this framework is the emphasis these authors place one the 
production and strategic use of knowledge. Pragmatists argue that GCS illuminates these 
dynamics through its collective efforts to expand and diffuse the strategic repertoire. 
The Cri t i cal  Thes is  
Finally, critical theorists determine the contribution of GCS to the diversity and 
complexity of world politics by attempting to locate its relative position within the 
broader structural configuration of the global political economy (Inayatullah and Blaney 
 
   43 
2004; Pasha and Blaney 1998; Stevis 2005). This research agenda springs from their 
overarching axiological interest in protecting the diversity of values and cultural 
understandings they see as a necessary condition for creating “a world of the mutual 
coexistence” and human emancipation (Blaney and Inayatullah 2002, 130). Their 
concern is that the same processes of economic globalization that underwrite GCS may 
in fact function through GCS to create a global social hierarchy, which, if true, “risks 
being self-organized as oligarchy, as effective governance by the few” (Blaney 1995, 
58).   Hierarchy therefore poses a threat to the critical project of securing human 
emancipation because hierarchy implies a “centralized construction of norms and far-
reaching production of legitimacy, spread out over world space” (Hardt and Negri 2000, 
31).   
 Pragmatists and transformationalists operate under the assumption that political 
entities posses a consistent set of preferences, perceptions and values and that they then 
act opportunistically in response to external stimuli.  Transformationalists pose the 
possibility of a cosmopolitan middle class engaged in a continual struggle to preserve 
and expand its property and rights whereas pragmatists focus on the shifts in political 
opportunity structures to explain the emergence and calculate the success of actors 
pursuing local, national and global interests. In contrast, a critical perspective challenges 
these assumptions by pointing out that rationality is a relative conception insofar as 
claims of rationality reflect and reproduce an actor’s particular ideological, institutional, 
or economic position within the international political economy (Foucault 1994b; Stevis 
2000).  Claims of rationality then are “time and space specific, and the product not of 
reason, but recurrent practices and instituted belief systems” (Amin and Palan 2001, 
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564).  Thus, GCS cannot contain any universally identifiable intrinsic or instrumental 
value. 
Based on these assumptions, critical theorists contest those theoretical 
approaches that subsume GCS to an ontology featuring a rationally ordered world 
political system. Instead, they propose a strategy that is “capable of grasping the 
orderings of practices that are intersubjective, historicized, socially embedded, and non-
cognitive” (Amin and Palan 2001, 560).  From this we can infer an ontological 
perspective that frames the global political order as something that is always in flux and 
therefore always contingent, with the contingency of political order resting upon the 
particular structure of class relations at a particular moment in time. This is not to 
suggest that states no longer matter; on the contrary, critical theorists contend that states 
are the “institutional condensation of class relations” and therefore remain the dominant 
and central actors of the world political system (Görg and Hirsch 1998).  Thus, GCS “is 
constituted in relation to and as a check on, rather than a replacement for, the state and 
the state system” (Pasha and Blaney 1998, 428).  
This critical observation of a class-based ontology grows out of its dialectical 
understanding of reality.  That is, critical theorists are primarily concerned with the 
interplay of historical forces that produce qualitative changes in world politics.  This line 
of inquiry has led to the identification of three key forces that animate the world political 
system, these are material capabilities, institutions, and ideas/knowledge (Cox 1996).  
Following Gramsci (1971), critical theorists define the convergence of these forces at 
any given moment in time as a historic bloc.  This term merely designates the site and 
modality of hegemony within the world political system.   Guided by this ontological 
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method, critics inquire into the origins, nature and historical development of power in 
world politics.  
 From a political perspective, critical theorists look beyond the binary modernism 
of transformationalist and pragmatic theorizing to define as democratic those actors and 
institutions which seek to incorporate, not assimilate, alternative and marginalized 
people, issues, and ways of knowing and being in the world (Pasha and Blaney 1998; 
Stevis 2000).  In contrast, transformationalists conceive of difference as a threat to be 
overcome. They therefore endeavor to naturalize those policies and practices that purport 
to defend human rights, the articulation and enforcement of international law, the 
integration of transnational society, and the production of a cosmopolitan identity. 
Viewed from a critical perspective, pragmatists endeavor to reduce cultural differences 
to patterned processes and mechanisms, the sum of which functions to deny the value of 
diverse peoples and cultures. This is perhaps best illustrated by the pragmatist assertion 
of horizontal and reciprocal relations, which functions to depoliticize the power 
inequities within GCS. 
Transformationalist and pragmatist approaches both reify the dominant 
hegemony by taking global capitalism and the nation-state system for granted without 
consideration of the inequalities and alienating relationships they produce. Inequalities 
are only deemed problematic to the extent that they threaten to undermine the project of 
liberal modernization. In contrast, critical theorists look to the points of interaction and 
opposition as opportunities to deepen social policies and democracy, not as threats to 
manage and challenges to overcome (Blaney and Inayatullah 2002; Pasha and Blaney 
1998; Stevis 2002). Democracy, when viewed from this critical perspective, “is not a 
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type of constitution, nor a form of society but is instead the act of interrupting the social 
edifice by those who lack the capacity to govern” (Rancière and Corcoran 2006, 47). 
In sum, critical theory perceives GCS as an axiological break in the history of 
world politics.  Its observations grow out of the normative claim that the diversity of 
values and cultural understandings within the world political system is an attribute we 
should protect and nourish, not a problem to be surmount.  Building from this normative 
position, critical theorists focus specifically on the extent with which GCS can recognize 
and accommodate cultural diversity (Blaney and Inayatullah 2006; Inayatullah and 
Blaney 2004). Studies also focus on the hegemonic origins of cultural homogeneity in 
order to position GCS in relation to these structural features (Stevis 2005).  
Consequently, critical theorists are less concerned with variations in the scope and scale 
of power.  Rather, they are more concerned with whether particular configurations of 
power tend to reinforce the realm of hegemony that is supportive of the status quo or the 
realm of counterhegemony within which emancipatory forces can be constituted (Cox 
1999).  GCS reinforces the realm of hegemony when its values and practices conform to 
the established social order rather than working to bring about its transformation into 
“heterogeneous (global, regional and local) social processes and political arrangements, 
involving complex ways of demarcating and negotiating, separate, shared, and 
overlapping authority” (Blaney and Inayatullah 2002, 130).   
The Law of Non-Contradiction 
This discussion makes clear that further reductions to our theoretical understanding of 
GCS are both desirable and necessary.  As the situation now stands, these theoretical 
propositions offer contradictory assessments of the role GCS plays in the history of world 
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politics.  For example, GCS cannot simultaneously mark an ontological break and a 
political break in the history of world politics, as the former signifies a reconfiguration of 
the world political system whereas the latter necessarily rests on the assumption that the 
traditional configuration of the world political system remains more or less intact.  
Similarly, the observation of critical theorists that GCS functions as means of projecting 
the norms and values of a historic bloc is contradictory to transformationalist propositions 
regarding its role as a force of democratization. 
This observation that this situation is unsatisfactory derives from Aristotle’s law 
of non-contradiction, which states “it is impossible for the same thing to belong and not 
to belong at the same time to the same thing and in the same respect” (Aristotle 1971, IV 
3).  Aristotle argued that all things possess an essential nature. For example, a human 
being cannot simultaneously be an aardvark, as these entities have essential and 
contradictory natures.  Aristotle also distinguished between what is essential and what is 
accidental.  For example, it is merely accidental that human beings possess rationality.  
The observation that many humans possess this capacity is not sufficient to define the 
entire species, as infants and the insane lack the capacity to reason yet are generally still 
considered human. A human being only ceases to be a human being when she dies.  
Thus, Aristotle argued that to signify something is to identify a bearer that has an 
essential nature (Gottlieb 2007).  Aristotle conceded that a single thing may appear 
differently to different people but went on to argue that these situations are not 
necessarily irreconcilable.  To overcome this predicament, it is necessary to identify the 
points of contradiction so that we can reveal which of our beliefs are more basic than 
others.  By retaining what is most basic or essential and discarding the rest, we can return 
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to our normal discourse with improved structure and understanding (Aristotle and Barnes 
1994).  
Conclusion 
How does GCS fit in the history of world politics? Have technology and global 
capitalism freed civil society from its traditional state moorings, prompting its rapid 
maturation into an autonomous and inherently democratic political force? Or, have 
structural adjustments to the world political system merely afforded traditional forms of 
civil society new opportunities for transnational action? Put differently, does mounting 
evidence of civil society behaving globally add up to a GCS? Among the diverse 
theoretical solutions to these questions there is a dividing line between 
transformationalists who treat GCS as a self-directed and emancipatory political sphere 
and their skeptics, who frame it, more or less, within the context of traditional state-
centric politics. Among the skeptics there is a further division between critical theorists 
who implicate GCS in the maintenance and expansion of global power asymmetries, and 
pragmatists who downplay considerations of power in order to highlight the mechanics of 
transnational non-governmental activity.  
By clarifying, evaluating and comparing these diverse theories – 
transformationalist, pragmatic and critical – this chapter created a foundation on which it 
will become possible to assess the role of GCS in the domain of global water governance.  
Because these theories privilege ontological, political or axiological interpretations of the 
role GCS plays in the history of world politics, they create an opportunity to weigh the 
congruence of concrete empirical observations with these abstract theoretical 
propositions.  For example, we might ask if claims of democratizing potential are born 
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out in the observed behavior of key non-governmental organizations.  Chapter three 
builds on these findings by arguing that the global water crisis offers an interesting and 
salient opportunity to adjudicate these contradictory theoretical frameworks. It also points 
out that the benefits of this exercise ripple beyond the GCS literature by showing that the 
role of GCS has largely been overlooked within the literature on global water 
governance.  This point demonstrates the broad value of this research and, more 
importantly, the salience of GCS to our understanding of world politics. 
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Chapter Three: The Global Water Crisis 
 
 
This chapter argues that a consideration of global water resource governance offers an 
interesting way of evaluating competing theoretical claims about GCS.  In doing so, the 
chapter builds on the argument made in chapter one that GCS plays an integral role in the 
history of world politics.  It demonstrates that GCS has played a prominent role in 
drawing interest to the problem of water governance, in framing the totality of these 
problems as a global water crisis, in pushing concern for the global water crisis ever 
higher up the global agenda, and in taking direct action to address this crisis.  This 
chapter also builds on the observations made in chapter two regarding the variability in 
theoretical considerations of GCS.  It argues that a similar degree of variability exists in 
the values transnational NGOs inscribe on water.  The primary purpose for highlighting 
this variability is to defend the case study selection.  However, a secondary goal is to 
show that this variability adds depth to my application of the congruence method. 
Featuring a range of principled positions on the global water crisis makes it possible to 
assess the congruence of certain theoretical propositions to GCS as a totality, as opposed 
to observations that base their inferences of GCS on a particular instance or subset of that 
totality (Keck and Sikkink 1998a; Wapner 1996).  
This chapter proceeds in three stages. The first stage briefly sketches the historical 
development of global water governance. This section demonstrates that GCS plays an 
increasingly prominent role in the global governance of this critical resource. The second 
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section draws on recent empirical data to outline the depth and breadth of the crisis in 
terms of its environmental, humanitarian and economic dimensions. This section goes on 
to reveal how these problems are manifest in the contradictory values various 
transnational NGOs inscribe on water.  A defense of this categorical framework is then 
marshaled to support the use of these positions as a basis for the case-study selection.  
The final section outlines the key functions of GCS within this larger context. Findings 
point to the role GCS has played in disseminating information, generating greater 
awareness of interdependence, and integrating this awareness across multiple perceptions 
of community and authority.  
Global Water Governance: Tradition and Transformation 
The debate over global water governance is one of the most divisive political issues of 
our time.  All across the world, in every region, every state, every social class, in every 
industry and every institution, people argue over water.  For many, if not most people, 
water is not a trivial matter.  Instead, water is fundamental:  people need reliable access to 
safe water resources in order to obtain an education, to raise a family, to be productive 
members of society, etc.  Put differently, people need water to fulfill basic needs, which 
results in improved health, action and happiness.  In short, each person needs water to 
live.  Water is also fundamental to the production of things that are instrumental to this 
pursuit.  For example, industries require reliable water access to produce the goods that 
clothe us, educate us, feed us, and keep us healthy. And water is fundamental to the 
integrity of natural ecosystems, of which humans are but one member of a larger natural 
community. In sum, global water governance is politically divisive because, regardless of 
your vantage point, water is a key to determining our prospects for living well.  
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 For much of modern political history the dominant paradigm of global water 
governance held that states exercise exclusive and sovereign authority over domestic 
water resources. During the inter-war and post-war periods, this paradigm coincided with 
the rise of apolitical utilitarianism, scientific management, and engineering as the key 
ideological and managerial solutions to global resource problems (Irwin 2001).  This 
meant that states relied heavily on supply-side strategies to overcome conditions of water 
scarcity.  In short, states drilled and dammed their way out of water resource problems 
(Gleick, Wolff, et al. 2002). 
 Beginning in the 1990s, empirical studies of global water resources unearthed 
critical flaws in this traditional, centralized, supply-side approach to water governance.  
In one such study, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP 1998, 41) 
concluded: 
Global freshwater consumption rose six fold between 1900 and 1995 – at 
more than twice the rate of population growth. About one-third of the 
world’s population already lives in countries with moderate to high water 
stress – that is, where water consumption is more than 10 percent of the 
renewable freshwater supply.  
 
Water stress is made worse by population growth, urbanization, and increasing rates of 
household and industrial consumption (WHO 2009).  While these pressures are evident 
worldwide, the negative manifestations are most acute in poor countries.  In a detailed 
global analysis of the relationship between water and human health, the World Health 
Organization (WHO) found that one in three people worldwide lack sufficient water to 
satisfy their daily needs.  The study goes on to identify water scarcity as the primary 
cause of over 6.3% of annual deaths worldwide, including 1.4 million child deaths from 
diarrhea.  The study concludes that improvements in the governance of drinking water, 
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sanitation, hygiene and water resources management would relieve 9.1% of the total 
global burden of disease (Pruss-Ustun, Bos, Gore, and Bartram 2008, 7-12).  In sum, 
these findings indict the traditional model of water governance that privileged a state-
centered and supply-side approach to water resource problems.  What these findings 
make clear is that this traditional approach failed to satisfy the most basic levels of 
reliable access to safe drinking water.   
 While gripping, the shortcoming of this kind of empirical work is that it often 
fails to elucidate the points of interdependence that transform popular preferences, 
perceptions and values related to water governance.  When such tranformations occur, 
they move outward from the local to the global, prompting individuals and organizations 
to re-imagine their understanding of political community.   
 To make these points of interdependence more explicit, contemporary scholars 
and practitioners have placed a significant emphasis on the concepts of virtual water and 
human rights.  Virtual water simply describes the amount of water consumed in the 
production process (Allan 1998).  In a detailed study of the concept and its implications, 
the World Water Council (2004, 14. emphasis added) found that considerations of virtual 
water cause stakeholders to question their fundamental assumptions about the discrete 
and local nature of water.  
At the global level, virtual water trade has geopolitical implications: it 
induces dependencies between countries; it is influenced by and has 
implications on the world food prices as well as on the global trade 
negotiations and agreements on tariffs and trade. Indeed the issue of virtual 
water is related to that of globalization, which raises a concern among many 
politicians and the general public.  This can be understood from the fact that 
increasing global trade implies increased interdependence of nations. This 
can be regarded either as a stimulant to co-operation or as a reason for 
potential conflict.  
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Transnational NGOs like the Stockholm International Water Institute and the World 
Water Council (WWC) played a leading role in identifying these points of 
interdependence, in framing these issues in the context of a global water crisis, and in 
pushing this global water crisis ever higher up the global agenda.  For example, the 
WWC performed these functions by producing information on the global water crisis and 
disseminating this information through its triennial World Water Forum.  
 Transnational NGOs have also interrupted traditional perceptions of water 
governance by highlighting the humanitarian dimension of interdependence associated 
with these water resource problems.  Indeed, transnational NGOs like Red Vida, Food 
and Water Watch, the Sierra Club, and the Council of Canadians played a key role in 
framing these humanitarian points of interdependence in a human rights context.  These 
actors defended this claim by arguing that some minimal level of reliable access to safe 
drinking water is necessary for the satisfaction of other internationally recognized human 
rights, not the least of which is the right to life.  This argument has attracted wide 
support, providing these transnational NGOs a strategic opportunity to press for a new 
and more just paradigm of global water governance – one that rests “on the principle of 
equality and capability to do and to be” (Mehta 2003, 567).  Richard Jolly (as quoted in 
Gleick 2007, 3), a former special advisor to the Administrator of the United Nations 
Developmental Programme (UNDP), summarized the human rights position by pointing 
out its potential implications, not just for domestic policies but also for the common but 
differentiated responsibilities states share as members of the world political system.  
To emphasize the human right of access to drinking water does more than 
emphasize its importance. It grounds the priority on the bedrock of social 
and economic rights, it emphasizes the obligations of states parties to ensure 
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access, and it identifies the obligations of states parties to provide support 
internationally as well as nationally.        
 
 Those who propose such a radical reconfiguration of global water governance 
ultimately ground their arguments on the assumption that recent evidence of a deepening 
global water crisis reveals a set of critical and irreparable flaws within the traditional 
paradigm. But as Sandra Postel (2007, 52) argues, to adopt this assumption is to risk 
throwing out the baby with the bathwater. She says, 
The water strategies of the twentieth century helped provide much of the 
human population with drinking water, food, electricity, and flood control.  
Indeed, it is difficult to imagine today’s world of 6.5 billion people and $55 
trillion in economic output without the vast network of water infrastructure 
now in place—from dams and reservoirs to wells, pumps, and canals.  
This infrastructure, however, has disrupted the functioning of aquatic 
ecosystems on a large scale. If future human needs are to be met without 
costly and irreparable harm to ecological health, new strategies will be 
needed that incorporate a broader set of ecological goals into water planning 
and management.  
 
 Recent empirical findings produced by transnational NGOs tend to support this 
conclusion. In a 2006 study of the health of the world’s freshwater ecosystems, the WWF 
found that freshwater species declined by 30% between 1970 and 2003.  The study goes 
on to attribute this decline to the systematic damming and alteration of river systems.  To 
support this assertion the WWF cites a detailed study of dam-based impacts on large 
ecosystems (Nilsson, Reidy, Dynesius, and Revenga 2005, 405).  This study found that of 
the 292 largest rivers in the world over one half (172) are negatively affected by dams.  
The study concluded that dammed and reregulated rivers strongly limit organism 
dispersals, which means that biodiversity is less likely to persist and organisms within the 
affected area are less able to adapt to new environmental conditions (Nilsson, et al. 2005, 
407). 
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 In economic, social and political terms, another transnational NGO, The Nature 
Conservancy, has played a leading role in framing this evidence of environmental 
degradation in the context of environmental services.  In their analysis of freshwater 
biodiversity conservation, Karen Silk et al. (2005, 5-6) link the global declines in 
freshwater ecosystems to declines in human health and well-being. They write, 
Many rivers can no longer provide flood control for downstream 
communities, since they have been channelized or engineered to stay within 
their banks and their watersheds have been altered through land clearing, the 
draining of wetlands, and the expansion of impervious surfaces (e.g., 
through paving). When the flood comes, it is often larger and more 
destructive than would have occurred naturally as it moves into the river 
more quickly, has no place to meander or spread, and moves faster to 
downstream locations. In many areas of the world, water extracted from 
rivers, lakes and groundwater is no longer safe for drinking without 
additional and often costly treatment. Rates of infectious disease carried by 
water are on the rise. Many commercial as well as recreational fishing 
catches in freshwater and marine declined or have been eliminated.  
 
Thus, the failure to incorporate ecological concerns into water governance decisions costs 
money and it costs lives.  Moreover, these costs ripple throughout the world political 
system in ways that are difficult to quantify.  Still, we can say with a high degree of 
certainty that the consequences include lower levels of productivity, higher levels of 
political and social instability, and a more widespread awareness of regional and global 
interdependence.   
 However, this growing sense of interdependence has not yet generated the 
political will required to solve these critical water resource problems.  There are many 
reasons for the continued absence of political leadership and government commitment to 
water resource issues.  According to Easter and Hearne (1993, 2), the problem originates 
in the conflation of rule-making and service delivery functions. Thus, “without some 
assurance that water resources agencies will provide the desired levels of services, users 
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are not willing to share in the investment, operations, and maintenance costs.” Claudia 
Pahl-Wostl, et al. (2007, 13) contribute to this observation by pointing out the 
complexities of learning a new, more complex and diverse governance system – a 
learning process that is more art than science. They claim, 
the development of . . . adaptive institutional settings involves continued 
processes of social learning in which stakeholders at different scales are 
connected in flexible networks and sufficient social capital and trust is 
developed to collaborate in a wide range of formal and informal 
relationships ranging from formal legal structures and contract to informal 
voluntary agreements.  
 
 
Variables that slow this learning process include the lack of institutional capacity, 
institutionalized gender discrimination, and financial constraints (Lenton, Wright, and 
Lewis 2005, 26-27).  
 These are precisely the kinds of problems that GCS is well suited to address.  
Theoretical considerations of GCS often count its high degree of specialization, mobility, 
and strategic repertoire among its greatest strengths.  Yet, while GCS has proved to be an 
effective advocate for making improvements in global water governance, as “technical 
specialists, civil society actors, and others [have failed] to make a compelling case to 
decisionmakers concerning the social and economic benefits of access to water supply 
and sanitation services” (Lenton, et al. 2005, 26).  In its most recent analysis of the state 
of the world’s water resources, the United Nations World Water Development Report 
(2009, xix) attributes this shortcoming to the failure of many actors within GCS to 
recognize the role water plays in achieving their objectives. The study goes on to stress 
the importance of inclusive decisionmaking processes and implementation efforts to 
achieving the goals of long-term sustainability and expanded service coverage. The 
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Report concludes that the problem has not so much to do with the quality of GCS 
engagement on water resource issues but is instead a function of its quantity: “With the 
large numbers of water management stakeholders, governments are increasingly 
constrained in what they can achieve alone. They will need to rely more on an informed 
and capable civil society whose role in water management complements the work of 
government agencies” (UN 2009, 256).  However, at the present time there are simply 
not enough actors within GCS who address water resource problems to adequately meet 
these needs.   
 Thus, the history of global water governance has grown more complex and 
diverse over time.  GCS has played an integral role in this historic process, a role that will 
likely grow well into the foreseeable future.  For example, there is greater need for direct 
engagement by GCS in the management of water resources; precisely the kind of role 
already performed by organizations such as The Nature Conservancy, the WWF, and 
Friends of the Earth.  These NGOs function as the resource hub of transnational 
networks, tying local and national non-governmental water organizations to key decision-
makers at the global or regional scales.  Furthermore, there is also a need for advocacy 
groups, like the Council of Canadians, International Rivers, and Green Cross 
International, that perform a critical role in elevating the status of water resource 
problems up the national, regional, and global agenda (WWAP 2009).  According to 
Steven Loranger (2010), water resource problems fall into that category of issues that 
people tend to ignore until it’s too late (Loranger 2010).  Therefore, there is a pressing 
need to raise the profile of this issue, and this is a function at which GCS tends to excel.  
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 Struggle and disagreement are integral to this learning process.  Although the 
scalar transition to a global perception of water resource problems and solutions is now 
widespread, political entities continue to perceive water issues differently.  Thus, the 
landscape of global water governance has emerged as a site of intense political struggle 
and contradiction.  These disagreements are not, however, a sign of weakness but should 
instead be perceived as a sign of strength, both because they contain the promise of 
producing solutions that work for improving human well-being and environmental 
sustainability and also because they make it possible to expose proposals that do not 
work.  The following section outlines the diverse and complex range of positions on 
global water governance by highlighting the key points of disagreement within this 
unfolding global debate.  
Global Water Governance: Diversity and Complexity 
Throughout much of human history, the political divisions over water resources were 
largely confined to their specific local or national context.  Were it not for the most recent 
wave of economic globalization, it would likely have remained that way.  Today, 
however, powerful states, international institutions, and corporations have come to 
perceive water resource problems as a threat to their neo-liberal project of global capital 
accumulation.  Even when local or national governments retain authority over water 
resource decision-making, these governments often come under pressure to allocate water 
in whatever way promises the greatest economic return.  At least with respect to 
economic considerations, this means that more and more people are finding it difficult to 
draw “a clear distinction between international and domestic, external and internal 
affairs” (Held 1999, 7).  This also means that water and its governance are in the process 
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of a scalar transition, meaning the point at which widespread perceptions of 
interdependence shift upward from the local to the national and finally to the global, 
while conceptions of authority move outward from centralized and participatory forms to 
decentralized and exclusive forms of governance. 
Evidence of this scalar transition first appeared in the early 1990s (Gleick 1999, 
1526).  Previous articulations of water use objectives had underscored concerns for 
localized and discrete issues of power, economic status, recreation and spiritual renewal, 
and human survival (R. Barlow 1956; Muir 1918).  To some, however, it seemed that 
many of these objectives were out of sync with the mounting evidence of a deepening 
global water crisis.  These considerations of appropriate scale culminated in the 1992 Rio 
Declaration, which identified the overarching objective of global water resource use as 
the maintenance of social well-being (UN 1992a).  In making this claim, the Rio 
Declaration intended to prioritize the satisfaction of basic needs and ecosystem integrity 
in matters of global water governance over other less-essential, utilitarian claims to water.  
Simply put, the Declaration’s aim was “to ensure that water policy and its 
implementation are a catalyst for sustainable social progress and economic growth” 
across the world (UN 1992a). 
Because of attention garnered by this scalar shift, the Declaration prompted an 
intense and enduring philosophical debate.  In the course of outlining a global strategy for 
solving water resource problems, the Rio Declaration overreached by reducing the social, 
economic, and environmental dimensions of water problems to a single integrated 
approach. The Declaration variously defined water as a social good, a basic need and an 
economic good, and found it to be vital to the integrity of aquatic ecosystems (UN 
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1992a).  Practitioners, scholars, and others have since struggled to reconcile these 
different dimensions of water governance.  For example, a social goods argument tends 
toward a utilitarian conception of water governance that establishes the criterion for water 
decision-making as the greatest good for the greatest number. In contrast, a basic needs 
approach tends to align more closely with an individualist human rights argument, which 
places an emphasis on equal access and just distribution. These debates over the most 
appropriate principle or value for adjudicating competing water resource claims have 
developed over time into three dominant perspectives: water as an economic good, a 
public good and as a basic need.  
Water As An Economic  Good 
For some, water is first and foremost an economic good.  Typically this means that water 
possesses economic value in all its competing uses, with the economic value holding 
precedence over any other value type.  The standard argument is that full-cost pricing can 
help to maintain the sustainability of water resources by correctly structuring economic 
incentives in such a way that “the resource will be put to its most valuable uses” 
(Naiman, et al. 2002, 2).  Thus, as the price of water increases, we are told to expect 
corresponding reductions in demand, more efficient allocation, and, consequently, an 
overall increase in water supplies (Saleth and Dinar 2004).  The economic position also 
claims that the benefits of full-cost pricing may lead to greater equity, as “higher rates 
allow utilities to extend services to those currently not served and those currently forced 
to purchase water from vendors at very high prices” (Naiman, et al. 2002, 2).  To support 
these assertions, advocates point to high black-market prices for water as evidence of the 
willingness to pay; and, since official pricing estimates often come in well below the 
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prices charged by black market retailers (Cho, Easter, McCann, and Homans 2005; 
Serageldin 1994), the implication is that full-cost pricing is not just a viable approach but 
is also one that could generate substantive improvements in quality and access. It is the 
“failure to place a price on water that reflects its economic value in its various alternative 
uses,” some argue, that produces “wasteful and environmentally damaging use and 
results in its misallocation” (Winpenny 2003, 1).  
Among those who advocate an economic approach, the preferred political 
strategy is therefore to promote monetization and privatization. To do so, economic 
advocates employ three broad argumentative strategies.  First, they assert that the 
pressure to marketize grows in proportion to the intensification of physical water 
scarcity. They see scarcity as the consequence of perverse incentive structures that mask 
the true value of water in all its competing uses.  Assigning water an accurate economic 
value therefore promises to convey a more precise signal of resource conditions to 
consumers, thus discouraging low-value uses and allocation inefficiencies (KPMG 
2008). Second, advocates contend that the centralized public management model should 
be replaced with a decentralized system. In this context, decentralization refers to the 
separation of management and regulatory functions. Decentralization is thought to 
enhance accountability by reducing political interference in management decisions and 
increase efficiency by introducing competition and market discipline in water 
management decision-making (Bank 2002). Finally, advocates argue that “legal changes 
are needed to facilitate a private and transferable water rights system that ensures full 
legal, physical, and tenure certainty of water rights” (Saleth and Dinar 2004, 11), as 
property rights create a favorable climate for private investment, increase individual 
 
   63 
initiative and choice in resource use, encourage allocation to high-value uses, and 
promote politically neutral decision making.  
To advance this economic agenda, advocates tend to rely on top-down 
approaches that use the comparative advantages of formal international institutions like 
the World Bank and IMF. These institutions provide technical assistance and financial 
support for the construction and maintenance of large infrastructure projects, but often 
do so with strings attached. This was the case in Tanzania, where government officials 
succumbed to pressure from the World Bank and the IMF to transition management 
authority over the water utility in Dar es Salaam to private hands (Greenhill and Wekiya 
2004, 2).  In some cases, these international institutions actively promote private sector 
investments by insuring investors against a variety of risks, including local resistance 
(M. Barlow 2008a, 40). Advocates also create networks comprised of powerful states, 
NGOs, International Institutions, Corporations, and individuals who shared a common 
agenda. According to one researcher, these networks employ a complex strategy of 
information production and social learning through the use of transnational water 
conferences, training seminars, and policy papers, the sum of which  “effectively filled 
the spaces and saturated the marketplace of ideas on water policy in global civil society” 
(Goldman 2007, 793).  
Water As A Publ ic  Good 
A second position claims water as a public good, approaching the problem of water 
resources governance through the lens of local communities.  Advocates argue that water 
resource problems are the consequence of undemocratic decision-making systems in the 
pursuit of short-term interests.  Their solution is to argue for a re-focusing of water 
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governance on the interests of people and nature, not profits (Gleick, Wolff, et al. 2002). 
To advance this agenda, advocates argue that water possesses particular physical 
characteristics, which make it more of a collective or common pool resource than a 
purely private good.  Whereas private goods are generally understood to be rival and 
excludable in consumption, several scholars have pointed out the nonexcludable nature 
of water. This characteristic is evident in collective efforts to use and manage water 
resources for agricultural systems (Ostrom 1990) and in examples of cooperation in 
conditions of scarcity (Trawick 2003).  The most noteworthy claim is that water is not 
only vital to human and ecosystem survival, but that it is also non-substitutable (Gleick 
and Palaniappan 2009).  Additionally, water resources are frequently inscribed with 
cultural and spiritual values, values which are impossible to accurately assess through a 
pricing regime (Shiva 2002). This finding is significant because it deflates the claim that 
pricing strategies can effectively convey the value of water in all its competing uses.  
Therefore, the answer to water resource problems is that we need to construct a 
regulatory framework that guarantees a just distribution, rather than rely on an economic 
model that advances profits over all other considerations (Bakker 2007; Quesne, Pegram, 
and Heyden 2007).  
 The shortcoming of this position is that it tends to operate on an abstract and 
theoretical plane, detached from the power struggles and knowledge asymmetries that 
animate real-life ambiguities of water resource governance. In her analysis of public 
goods claims to water, Lyla Mehta (2003, 559) points out that claims of cooperative 
management often miss the mark, that instead most “people see water as an issue over 
which they compete and are divided. Thus there is an urgent need to broaden the notion 
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of water users. In most cases users are disparate groups with diverse institutional and 
social positions.” 
In practice, public goods advocates use a variety of political strategies. Most 
notably, they lobby for the protection of a social and public right to water in legal and 
constitutional arrangements. Typically the pressure to incorporate this right also includes 
protection for environmental needs, an effort which, more recently, has centered on the 
concept of environmental flows (Hirji and Davis 2009) and environmental services (Silk 
and Ciruna 2005). To generate this pressure, public rights advocates educate, mobilize, 
and direct grass-roots campaigns. They also reach out to transnational organizations and 
powerful states in order to bring pressure to bear from the top-down (Hochstetler 2002). 
Some rely on specialized knowledge to make their case to protect vital resources (Haas 
1992) and others resort to violent protest (FOEI 2003; Hall and Lobina 2006).  
Water As A Basic  Need 
A final position defines water as a basic need. This concept draws attention to the 
minimum amount of water that is essential to several aspects of human life, ranging from 
safe drinking water to bathing (Ryan 2001, 11).  For the basic needs position, the 
question is not whether individuals can survive without these things, but rather about 
what quantity of water is required in order to live well.  Clearly individuals can survive 
without water for bathing, without reliable access to safe water for cooking, etc.; 
however, those who live in such conditions are more susceptible to disease and 
premature death. In one study, Peter Gleick (1996) measured basic water needs by 
calculating the minimum daily needs for drinking water, hygiene, sanitation services, 
and food preparation to arrive at a general figure of 50 liters per person per day.  What 
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these types of studies assume is that the satisfaction of a basic need for water is 
necessary and prior to the satisfaction of other needs.  Much of this assumption relies 
upon the theory that starving people, sick people, and impoverished people are denied 
their agency, their dignity, and their equality (Nussbaum 2006; Sen 1999).  Thus, a basic 
need is different from a public good in that it points to the needs of individuals, not 
simply the needs of collectives, making water resource issues simultaneously 
individualistic and universal, insofar as the issue of water allocation references a 
minimum quantity and quality that cannot be denied to any person, at any time, or in any 
place. 
Whereas a public goods approach tends to promote a top-down regulatory 
solution, the basic needs approach calls for bottom-up efforts that empower marginalized 
people to demand their fair share of water resources. Because the satisfaction of a basic 
need to water is essential to the satisfaction of other basic needs, advocates of this 
position argue that water resource concerns rise above economic and utilitarian logics 
that ignore considerations of equality and justice (Calaguas 1999).  Thus, the rhetorical 
strategies used by basic needs advocates prioritize the particular needs of the powerless. 
Viewed from this perspective, the need for water is something one has simply by virtue 
of being human. Water is an entitlement possessed by all people everywhere. This 
implies that basic needs are equal, meaning that everyone has the same legitimate claim 
to a minimal amount of water as everyone else (M. Barlow and Clarke 2002). Therefore, 
needs translate into rights and the right to water is inalienable: it cannot be denied to 
anyone, by anyone, for any reason. At the rhetorical level, the attempt to reframe needs 
as rights constitutes an effort to depoliticize the issue of water, since to agree with the 
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claim “water is a right” is to agree that no one can be denied water. While people may 
argue about what quality and quantity is reasonable for living a life of dignity, defining 
water as a right forecloses any debate that such a minimum exists. Furthermore, by 
acknowledging such a right, the grantor of the right bears a duty or responsibility to 
secure the right for the grantee; no analogous prescriptive burden exists under an 
economic or public-goods approach (Gutmann 2001; Waldron 2000, 121).   
In order to secure one’s basic need for water, advocates pressure for guarantees 
to the human right to water in state and international law. These guarantees have already 
been enshrined in more than 30 countries, the most notable of which are Britain, 
Uruguay, and South Africa (Salman and McInerney-Lankford 2004, 70). In addition, 
human rights advocates also promote the reframing of water as a public trust, which they 
view as necessary to reinforce the authority of states against the threats posed by 
privatization (M. Barlow 2008a). By modifying the norms of international society, states 
could be more easily subject to shaming strategies of NGOs and others. Of course, 
grounding international norms of water governance in a human rights context also works 
to ensure that water governance decisions are subject to political will, as opposed to 
short-term economic interests. In addition, the implementation of human rights 
protections at the national level elevates the role of the judicial system over that of the 
executive and legislative. Because human rights advocates tend to frame water as a 
public trust, the multiplication of legitimate users generated through the adoption of a 
human rights regime inevitably leads to conflicts over the appropriation of finite water 
resources (Getzler 2004). As such conflicts tend to erupt over competing legal 
interpretations and variability in the application of legislative statutes, these conflicts 
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tend to fall under the purview of the courts, which raise concerns about participation and 
legitimacy as the judicial branch is the weakest and least democratic branch of 
government.  
Global Civil Society: Agreement and Discord  
Because reliable water access is essential to the integrity of economic, social, 
environmental, and political systems, everyone has a stake in the outcome of water 
resource decision-making. Yet many states have thus far failed to resolve this 
fundamental problem.  In recent years, this vacuum allowed GCS to play an increasingly 
prominent role in the global debate over water resource management.  In one respect, 
GCS has been united in its insistence both that the contemporary paradigm of water 
governance is unsustainable and that the depth of water resource problems constitutes a 
crisis of global proportions.  On these points, GCS has played a key role in the global 
discussion on water resources management by generating and disseminating information 
about the depth and breadth of the global water resource crisis; by raising public 
awareness about the interdependence between the economic, social and political 
dimensions of water resource problems; and by integrating this sense of interdependence 
across local, national and global perceptions of community. Yet beyond these 
fundamental points of agreement, the unity of purpose that motivates GCS falls prey to a 
deep and persistent discord over the most effective solution to these global water 
resource problems.  What animates this discussion is a disagreement over the 
fundamental values outlined above.  
 Surprisingly, this is a conversation that has been largely ignored by global water 
resource scholars.  To a large extent, the academic literature on global water politics 
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remains transfixed on the transboundary dimension of water resource problems.  
Inexplicably, this research has been spellbound by the question of how states resolve the 
disagreements that erupt over shared water resources (Eckert, Smith, and Egteren 2008; 
Norman and Bakker 2009; Severskiy 2004; South, et al. 2004; Uitto and Duda 2002), 
granting little to no consideration of the role that GCS plays in the history of global 
water resource governance.  Indeed, The United Nations World Water Development 
Report 3: Water in a Changing World (WWAP 2009) cites the need for additional 
research into the role GCS plays in this unfolding story.  Specifically, the Report finds 
the need for “a thorough analysis of the contributions of the NGO sector . . . showing the 
unique characteristics of different kinds of NGOs, their contributions, their limitations 
and a perspective on their future role” (WWAP 2009, 54).   Thus, while the principal 
aim of this dissertation is to explore the way in which GCS fits in the history of world 
politics, a topic that will appeal most to the community of GCS theorists, a secondary 
but equally important task is to jolt the substantially larger community of global water 
resource scholars out of their fixation on the state.  
 The most prominent exception to this state-centric view of the global water crisis 
is Ken Conca’s (2006), Governing Water: Contentious Transnational Politics and 
Global Institution Building.  In this work, Conca addresses two central questions: (1) 
how have the institutions of global water governance changed over time and (2) what 
role have non-state actors played in initiating and shaping these changes. Institutions are 
important, he argues, because they make up the “embedded, enduring sets of roles and 
rules that give shape and form to a whole array of struggles over time” (Conca 2006, 
24).  However, institutions are not isolated from societal pressures but are instead 
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somewhat vulnerable to shifts in social values.  What makes the institutional 
development of global water governance so interesting, Conca argues, is the presence of 
several parallel and distinct trajectories of normative development. Evidence of these 
normative trajectories emerge within case study chapters that explore the various ways 
in which epistemic communities, social and environmental activists, international 
organizations, and states create and recreate the institutional dimension of global water 
governance.  This finding prompts Conca to conclude (1) that the depth and breadth of 
the global water crisis exposes the urgent need for a more coherent institutional 
framework of global water governance, and (2) that the normative conflicts that animate 
contemporary debates over water constitute the foremost obstacle to the realization of 
this goal.  Conca’s preference is to overcome this problem by creating more robust forms 
of deliberative democracy.  This means more effective and inclusive stakeholder 
dialogue and more hybridized authority in institutional arrangements.  
 So far, however, few scholars have taken up the challenge of polishing and 
extending Conca’s analysis.  Instead, contemporary scholars appear content to work 
within the comfortable constraints of their state-centric traditions.  One aim of this 
dissertation is to persuade these scholars to take GCS seriously.  To this end, I extend 
Conca’s analysis beyond the institutional sphere by examining the role the GCS plays in 
two additional areas: the direct governance of water resources and the formation of 
preferences, perceptions and values about water.  Institutional arrangements are most 
effective when they are consistent with the values of the people they seek to govern.  
Therefore, it is logical to assume that civil society actors might endeavor to reconfigure 
popular values as a means of altering institutional arrangements. Furthermore, civil 
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society actors frequently pursue objectives that have little or no connection with the 
functions or goals of governing institutions.  For example, groups like TNC and WWF 
frequently undertake ecological work that is unrelated to any immediate institutional 
aim.  Nevertheless, such actions are political insofar as they generate questions about 
accountability, legitimacy, and the origins of political authority.  By drawing attention to 
these issues, this dissertation promises to provide a more coherent and nuanced 
understanding of way in which GCS fits in the history of global water governance.  
The remainder of this dissertation will show the contributions of GCS to be as 
diverse as it is substantial.  Its diversity is manifest in the preferences, perceptions and 
values of its competing factions.  As the competition among these factions intensify, 
these arguments serve to attract greater attention to this important issue and they 
function to define the possible constellation of legitimate solutions to this seemingly 
intractable problem.  Consequently, these conversations shape the way decisionmakers 
and the general public think about water resource problems.  But the significance of 
GCS also extends beyond the theoretical and rhetorical.  GCS is also increasingly 
involved in direct ecological work, including everything from ecosystem assessments to 
environmental education to water resources management.    
 To illuminate this diversity, the case studies that follow feature organizations that 
are prominent players within their particular ideological cohort.  The Nature 
Conservancy (TNC) ranks foremost among those organizations that value water as a 
public good.  Specifically, TNC perceives water as an environmental good, a view that is 
consistent with its overarching mission to preserve ecosystem integrity and prevent the 
loss of biodiversity.  The Council of Canadians (COC) ranks foremost among those 
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organizations that privilege the value of water as a basic need.  The COC champions the 
view that water is first and foremost a human right, a value it endeavors to enshrine by 
incorporating this right into national and international law.  Green Cross International 
(GCI) holds the view that water is an economic good.  This view is consistent with 
GCI’s desire to interrupt and reconfigure widespread preferences, perceptions and values 
of water and nature.  In other words, its economic conception of water serves an 
instrumental function, which is to effectively realign widespread behavior so as to secure 
a more sustainable level of resource use.  
 In addition to illuminating the diversity of GCS, my strategic goal is to determine 
the extent with which competing theoretical perspectives on GCS can effectively explain 
the variability that exists within GCS.  To advance this objective, each case study 
chapter weighs the strengths and weaknesses of each theoretical approach by 
determining their ability to accurately explain the behavior of each NGO in the realm of 
global water governance.   
Conclusion 
The transition from a local to a national and finally to a global conception of water 
resource governance, although still contested, requires an even more fundamental shift in 
the way people value water and the way they perceive their place within the world 
political system. This transition is achieved by identifying points of interdependence, 
with this sense of interdependence integrated into local, national and global conceptions 
of community. It is achieved as well by integrating those ecological conceptions of 
community that govern the human-nature relationship. It is a transition that preserves 
 
   73 
distinct and localized conceptions of community/resource problems even as it cements 
more abstract notions of globally shared interests, rights and obligations.  
The question of GCS much discussed in the social sciences, is, politically 
speaking, a question of interdependence, which is also a question of integration. In short, 
it is a question of “fit”: what is the role and place of GCS in the history of world politics?  
Considerations of water governance, the focus of this chapter, bring this question to the 
fore. Reliable access to safe water resources is essential for the preservation and 
flourishing of all environmental and social systems, thus the stakes of governing water 
are high. Nonetheless, a growing body of empirical data shows that traditional strategies 
of water governance led to the emergence of a widespread and worsening water crisis. As 
conditions deteriorate worldwide, traditional conceptions of water as a discrete and local 
resource are giving way to the conception of water as a shared and global problem. This 
growing awareness of interdependence has been manifest in a display of diverse and 
complex forms of water resources governance. However, with at least one notable 
exception, this development has been largely overlooked within the literature. Thus, 
given the high stakes of water resource governance as well as the recent and ongoing 
transition in popular perceptions water resource problems, the issue of water governance 
provides an interesting and largely unexplored lens for exploring the question of GCS 
and its fit within the world political system. 
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Chapter Four: The Nature Conservancy 
 
Chapter Three argued that scholars once thought of global water governance as the 
exclusive domain of states; but that was yesterday.  Today, the picture is far more 
complex.  States now share the stage with a wide assortment of actors, each of which has 
a unique part to play.  Chapter three also demonstrated that global civil society is a key to 
understanding this complex arrangement. Few actors have been as vital to this historic 
process as The Nature Conservancy (TNC).  Fifteen years ago, TNC burst onto the scene 
of global water governance and has played a leading role ever since.  Few other 
transnational non-state actors have had as broad and deep an effect on the history of 
global water governance in as short a time.  But what makes TNC interesting has as much 
to do with the way TNC has been transformed by these efforts as it does with its efforts to 
transform the domain of global water politics.  Investigating both aspects makes it 
possible to adjudicate competing theoretical claims about the way GCS fits into the 
history of global water governance specifically and the history of world politics more 
generally.  
In short, this chapter uses TNC and its Freshwater Conservation Initiative as a 
means of adjudicating the dominant theoretical claims about GCS introduced in Chapter 
Two.  This use of environmental NGOs as a vanguard for GCS is common within the 
literature on GCS (Hochstetler 2002; Keck and Sikkink 1998a; Wapner 2002) and global 
water governance more specifically (Conca 2006; Finger and Allouche 2002a).  As 
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Chapter Three demonstrated, TNC is relevant to this endeavor because it focuses on 
solving the environmental dimensions of water resource problems, and as such it tends to 
behave differently from more mainstream approaches that stress the public good or 
economic dimensions of these problems.   
 This chapter unfolds in several stages. It begins with a discussion of TNC’s 
origins and organizational structure.  This background sets the stage for a detailed 
analysis of TNC’s political ontology, values, and strategies.  This investigation reveals an 
organization that is as transformed as it is transformative.  The final section weighs these 
findings against the expectations of competing theoretical perspectives on GCS, 
concluding that a pragmatic perspective offers the most satisfactory understanding of 
TNC and its role in global water governance.  Nevertheless, the ultimate conclusion is 
that further theoretical reduction is needed before we can determine what is essential and 
what is ancillary to our understanding of GCS and the role it plays in world political 
history.  This reduction, if done correctly, holds the promise of allowing us to return to 
our normal discourse about GCS with improved structure and understanding.  
 
Introduction to TNC 
Orig ins  
Just forty miles from Manhattan, the Mianus River cuts through a steep sylvan gorge of 
gneiss and schist1 as it winds it way to the murky water of Long Island Sound; the clear 
and sometimes rushing river flows around moss-covered boulders under a dense canopy 
of old- growth hemlock and beech. Hidden above, among the boulder-choked and vertical 
                                                
1 Gneiss and schist are types of metamorphic rock.  
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walls, is a patchwork of wetlands and free-flowing tributaries, which both cleanse and 
nourish the river on its short but swift journey.  
 For centuries, developers probed the edges of this rugged Gorge, clearing the 
surrounding land to make way for pastures and farms, but the steep valley walls made the 
Gorge unsuitable for grazing or timber cutting. After the Civil War, farmers abandoned 
the area to seek out new opportunities further west. Trees and weeds reclaimed the 
pastures; and although the previous degree of biological diversity did not return, the 
abandoned farms nonetheless acted as a buffer zone by protecting the unscathed 
ecosystem within the Gorge from the modern pressures of suburban sprawl.  
 This was the situation when, in the fall of 1953, a small group of local 
conservationists and neighbors rediscovered the Mianus River Gorge. What they found 
was a thriving and diverse ecosystem containing 150 species of birds, over 100 species of 
trees, shrubs and vines, and 250 species of wildflowers (USGS 2003). It was, in the 
words of one observer, nothing less than “an outdoor schoolroom, a sanctuary, a museum 
and a place of abiding beauty” (MRGP 2009a). 
 Unfortunately, the thrill of this discovery was short lived. In the winter of 1953, 
the Greenwich Water Company announced its plan to dam the Mianus River and drown 
the Gorge.  In response, these local conservationists and neighbors joined forces to form 
the Mianus Gorge Conservation Group, the purpose of which was “to preserve, protect, 
and promote appreciation of the natural heritage of the Mianus River Gorge and the 
quality of its watershed” (MRGP 2009a).  In its first official act, the Conservation Group 
forged a coalition of local garden clubs and concerned neighbors to successfully negotiate 
with the water utility for a smaller and less threatening dam.  However, within months of 
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concluding its agreement with the Water Company, the Group learned of another threat 
looming on the horizon.  On Christmas Eve, 1953, word reached group organizers that a 
local developer had planned to buy up sixty acres of old-growth forest in the heart of the 
Mianus River Gorge. To meet this new threat, the Group scrambled to raise enough 
money to match the developer’s down payment by the New Year.  Although successful, 
the Group had just six months to raise the remaining balance and close the deal.  
 To raise this money, the Conservation Group turned to TNC for help. 
Incorporated in 1951, TNC splintered from the Ecological Society of America, a 
professional organization of ecologists that promotes ecological science. What made 
TNC unique was its resolve to take direct action to protect critical natural areas and the 
biodiversity they contain. An early mission statement outlines the type of actions TNC 
had in mind: 
The Nature Conservancy is a body dedicated to the preservation of natural 
areas for scientific, educational and aesthetic ends. It is an action 
organization which through private voluntary efforts acquires a bit of 
wilderness, an unspoiled natural spot, a treasure of God’s handywork to 
study, to exult over, to draw strength from (Pough 1954, 3).  
 
Between 1951 and 1953, TNC built up its organizational capacity: it held regular 
meetings, published several newsletters, increased its membership base, and attracted 
donations (Pough 1955).  Thus, when the Mianus Gorge Conservation Group approached 
TNC President Richard Pough in December 1953, it was in a prime position to help.  
After visiting the site, Pough and future TNC President Richard Goodwin agreed 
that the Gorge was worth saving. In 1954, TNC pledged $7,500 to help purchase the 
sixty-acre tract on the condition that the money be repaid for use in other conservation 
projects (TNC 2009o).  This deal spawned a new land trust, the Mianus River Gorge 
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Preserve, Inc., which was charged with managing the site. Since its inception, the 
Preserve has grown in size to 738 acres, of which TNC owns 555 acres (TNC 2009o). In 
1964, the Mianus River Gorge became the first National Natural Landmark in the United 
States, thus validating the time and energy spent protecting this unique example of 
biodiversity and old-growth forest (MRGP 2009b).  
In many respects, TNC’s involvement in the Mianus River Gorge established a 
pattern for many of the projects that followed.  From the outset, TNC envisioned itself as 
a leading national environmental organization, whose objective was “to weld the energies 
represented in sporadic local efforts into a continuing united campaign that would have 
the size and strength to take its rightful place in a country that does things on a gigantic 
scale” (Pough 1954, 1).  In the Mianus River Gorge, TNC established its role as a 
technical and financial resource for local conservation groups.  In this capacity, TNC has 
amplified the effects of local conservation efforts providing the knowledge and resources 
needed to achieve conservation goals. In this case, TNC loaned money to the local 
organization, bought land on the group’s behalf, and paid for environmental studies of the 
Gorge including ongoing inventories of its plants and animals.  TNC has helped the local 
group leverage these capabilities to attract national attention by seeking and acquiring the 
National Natural Landmark designation.  In sum, TNC’s involvement in the Mianus 
River Gorge project established a scientific, collaborative and solution-based philosophy 
to its ecological work, the goal of which is to produce tangible and lasting results.  
    Over time, TNC has forged this philosophy into one of the largest and most 
successful conservation organizations in the world.  Today TNC works in over 600 sites 
scattered across 30 countries and 5 continents.  The organization has over 3200 
 
   79 
employees, an operating budget of nearly $450 million, and over $4.6 billion in assets.  It 
ranks as one of the top 20 charities in the United States in terms of private funds raised.  
According to its 2009 annual report, foundations constitute the largest source of dues and 
contributions at 43%, followed by individuals at 25%, and bequests at 24%.  TNC also 
won $125 million in government grants (TNC 2009t). TNC claims to have more than one 
million members, each of whom receives a quarterly magazine. TNC also works with a 
diverse range of partners, including indigenous groups, non-governmental organizations, 
corporations and governments.  According to its website, TNC has leveraged these 
resources over time to protect nearly 120 million acres of land and 5,000 miles of rivers 
worldwide (TNC 2009a).   
Organizat ional  Struc tu re  
TNC focuses its efforts on seven environmental issues, each of which it classifies under 
the heading of “Conservation Initiatives:” 1) Protected Areas, 2) Marine Conservation, 3) 
Freshwater Conservation, 4) Climate Change, 5) Fire, 6) Invasive Species, and 7) Forest 
Conservation. Some of these initiatives are more fundamental than others.  For example, 
the Protected Areas, Forest Conservation and Invasive Species initiatives are the primary 
focus of TNC’s work, and, as such, are the general concern of all TNC staff and 
volunteers.  In contrast, Freshwater Conservation, Climate Change, Fire, and Marine 
Conservation initiatives each warrant specialized attention by a dedicated staff of 
scientists, lawyers and administrative personnel.   
What these initiatives share in common is the structural capacity to fuse the local 
and global dimensions of each issue area into a reflexive and coherent strategic effort.  
TNC structures each Initiative from the ground up (see Figure 2 below).  The strategic 
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process begins by undertaking ecological work on the ground. This experience provides 
the skill and knowledge needed to identify the sources of ecological stress.  Next, TNC 
traces these stresses to their socioeconomic source, which, for each initiative, entails at 
least some aspect of global economic, social or political processes. For TNC, this stage of 
the process is essential to developing strategic efforts at a sufficient size and scale to 
actually solve the problem. Finally, TNC sets out its definition of success at both the 
local and global scales of analysis so that it can evaluate the efficacy of its strategic 
efforts over space and time (Weeks 1997, 15).   
 
Figure 1: Map of TNC Field Offices 
 
 Data compiled from http://www.nature.org/contactus/contact and presented using Google Maps 
 
 
What makes this strategic effort both possible and effective is the structure of 
TNC’s global organization. At the grassroots level, TNC relies on a large network of 
chapters and field offices (see Figure 1 above).  However, unlike other transnational 
NGOs, these entities are not autonomous. Rather, from its international headquarters in 
Arlington, Virginia, TNC’s Board of Directors establishes each chapter and field office, 
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then selects a director of each site who manages its annual plan and budget. Each director 
reports to the President’s office, which reports in turn to the Executive Committee and 
the Board of Directors. Volunteer Boards of Trustees assist and advise the Board in 
setting goals and developing strategies in support of TNC’s mission.  
Figure 2: TNC Organizational Structure 
Source: http://www.nature.org/aboutus/leadership/art15478.html 
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 Thus, the Board of Directors plays the leading role in shaping the global mission 
and goals of the organization. Made up of no less than nine and no more than twenty-five 
volunteer members, the Board bears the ultimate fiduciary responsibility for the 
organization. The Board meets four times per year, although the President may call 
additional meetings when necessary.  Board members are selected to represent the varied 
areas of interest and expertise of the organization.  The Governance, Nominating and 
Human Resources Committee initiates this selection process by nominating new 
members prior to the annual meeting of the Board, at which time the Board chooses from 
among the nominees by majority vote.  Once selected, Board members serve for three 
years and are prohibited from serving more than three consecutive terms (TNC 2009d).  
 TNC’s executive body is the Executive Committee, which exercises the powers of 
the Board of Directors between annual meetings.  The Executive Committee consists of 
the Board Chair, up to three Vice Chairs, the President, Secretary, Treasurer, and the 
Chairs of the three standing committees: 1) Audit, 2) Finance, and 3) Governance, 
Nominating, and Human Resources. It has the authority to act for the Board of Directors 
in all respects, except the addition or alteration of bylaws and issues related to Board and 
Executive Committee membership. In sum, the Executive Committee implements the 
global goals and strategies agreed on by the Board of Directors (TNC 2009d).  
 To enhance the efficacy of its global conservation strategy, TNC relies on three 
key advisory bodies: the Science Council; the Trustee Council; and the International 
Leadership Council (ILC). Each advisory body represents a key stakeholder group. The 
Science Council represents the scientific community and is charged with providing TNC 
leadership with access to the cutting edge science and scientists in areas related to the 
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organization’s diverse and global conservation mission.  This Council consists of five to 
nine members appointed to three year terms (TNC 2009h).  The Trustee Council 
represents the interests of state, country and regional chapters and field offices.  Its 
purpose is to enhance communication between TNC leadership and the diverse elements 
of its global field operations (TNC 2009e).  The ILC represents the interests of businesses 
and corporations by providing a corporate forum designed to develop a better 
understanding of the relationship between business and biodiversity.  Each corporate 
participant purchases a membership to the ILC.  As of 2009, the membership price was 
$25,000 and members could designate a portion of this fee to a particular conservation 
initiative (TNC 2009m).  
 TNC’s principal officer is the President. The President acts as the chief executive 
officer, with responsibility for providing leadership and direction to TNC and its global 
activities.  For example, Mark Tercek, who is TNC’s current President, serves on and 
reports to the Board of Directors as well as the Executive Committee and is the chief 
spokesperson for the organization (TNC 2009c). This means that TNC conforms to a 
presidential model of leadership, as opposed to the more traditional board-centered 
model, in which the president primarily serves that an implementer of board politics.  In 
the presidential leadership model, board members, staff, and organizational members 
hold the president responsible for organizational successes and failures (Ott 2001).  Thus, 
the president’s office is unique in its ability to shape the organization’s philosophy as 
well as the strategies it employs to implement and project that philosophy.    
Whereas the organizational structure of most other transnational NGOs rest upon 
a network of autonomous national and local chapters, all of which have voting rights in 
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the organization’s governance structure, TNC functions more like a classical hierarchical 
organization (Blagescu and Lloyd 2006, 29).  This unique organizational structure allows 
TNC to remain consistent to its mission; however, its advisory boards and membership 
base function to keep the organization responsive to new challenges and new ways of 
thinking.  Because all conservation work ultimately links back to the Board of Directors, 
TNC retains a high degree of control over its operations, which is remarkable given the 
organization’s size and diversity.  Advisory bodies keep the Board informed of problems 
and opportunities that emerge at the local and regional levels, thus working to ensure that 
decisions made by the leadership are responsive to the changing reality of conditions on 
the ground level.  This reflexive organizational arrangement is therefore a key to 
understanding how and why TNC adapted over time to address a wide range of issues 
across a diverse range of situational contexts.  
TNC and Water  Conserva tion 
TNC’s foray into water resource conservation marks one of the more recent 
developments in this historic progression.  From the outset, water resource issues have 
been inextricably linked to TNC’s overarching concerns for forest conservation and 
protected areas.  For instance, water was a critical concern in the Mianus River Gorge 
project – TNC’s very first land preservation effort - where successive attempts to develop 
the Gorge and adjacent buffer zones threatened to degrade the quality and quantity of its 
free-flowing tributaries and wetlands.  However, TNC viewed the preservation of these 
resources as instrumental to its broader land preservation goals.  As such, TNC tended to 
frame water resources as environmental services, which meant that water preservation 
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was significant only to the extent that it sustained the old-growth forest of hemlock and 
beech and produced reliable, high quality drinking water for surrounding communities.   
Throughout most of its history, TNC has been reluctant to directly take on water 
resource problems.  As discussed below, this reluctance can be attributed to the 
incompatibility between TNC’s traditional values and strategies, on one hand, and the 
nature of global water resource problems, on the other.  In the words of one observer, 
TNC was reluctant to directly target water conservation problems because the 
organization felt these issues were simply “too broad, too complex, [with] too many other 
parties involved” (Horton 1999, 16). 
 By the mid 1990s, evidence of dramatic global declines in freshwater biodiversity 
nevertheless compelled TNC to reevaluate its position.   In A Practitioner’s Guide to 
Freshwater Biodiversity Conservation (2004b, 4), TNC staffer Nicole Silk attributes this 
re-thinking to a number of important early studies that showed “the decline in freshwater 
biodiversity has reached alarming rates.”   To reinforce this point, Silk cites several of 
these studies, all of which point to significant and sudden declines in the quantity and 
variety of freshwater species.  In one such study, Moyle and Leidy (1992) examined the 
condition of the world’s aquatic ecosystems and concluded that the rate of degradation, if 
left unchecked, will produce a 20% decline in global freshwater fish stockpiles by 2017.  
An inventory of global freshwater biodiversity undertaken several years later found, 
among other things, that nearly 60% of freshwater dolphins and 70% of freshwater otters 
are either vulnerable or endangered (McAllister, Hamilton, and Harvey 1997).   Follow-
up studies established the extinction rate of freshwater biodiversity to be as much as five 
times faster than all other groups of species and that 20% to 35% of all freshwater species 
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are either endangered, threatened or have recently gone extinct (Gleick, Cohen, and 
Mann 2002; Ricciardi and Joseph 1999).   
By 1998, this body of evidence convinced TNC to undertake its first global 
Freshwater Initiative.  Its long-term goal was to maintain the ecological integrity of key 
river systems while also making sure that water needs are met for municipalities, 
agricultural production, flood control and hydropower (Sawhill 1999; Silk 2004b).  In the 
short-term, TNC structured the Initiative as a five-year capacity-building program, during 
which time TNC set out to identify key areas of freshwater biodiversity, devise strategies 
to arrest and repair biodiversity decline, and establish partnerships with key stakeholders.  
TNC staffed this program with a team of 15 scientists and lawyers then tasked them with 
the additional challenge of raising $10 million to fund water conservation work (Silk 
2004a).  Disbanded in 2003, work continued for a time through TNC’s Sustainable 
Waters Program. This Program is a ten-year effort to ensure that at least 30 state 
governments in the United States and 10 other countries adopt and implement adequate 
environmental flow policies (TNC 2009s).  Over time, TNC has added the following 
seven water conservation goals and subsumed these diverse efforts under the general 
heading of its Freshwater Conservation Initiative: 
• Reducing the ecological impact of dams 
• Reconnecting floodplains with rivers 
• Protecting watersheds and water supplies for cities 
• Promoting sustainable agricultural practices 
• Protecting coastal rivers and estuaries 
• Guarding freshwater ecosystems from invasive species 
• Sustaining ecosystem resilience to climate change 
 
Today, there are seventeen scientists, lawyers and administrative personnel who staff this 
global Initiative, which is headquartered in Boulder, Colorado.  
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TNC in  Global  Water Governance  
Thus far, this discussion revealed the process through which TNC transformed from a 
small and national organization to a large and global one.  At this point, the analysis 
shifts to a focus on the points of continuity and difference within this transformation.  
Specifically, this analysis inquires into TNC’s interest in global water resource problems 
and the role this interest played in shaping TNC’s behavior over time.  The purpose of 
this analysis is not simply to demonstrate the role that TNC plays in the governance of 
global water resources nor is it primarily to recount how the organization changed over 
time. Rather, the principal aim is to examine the ontological, political, and axiological 
dimension of TNC in order to adjudicate competing theoretical claims regarding how 
GCS fits in the history of world politics.   
Political Ontology 
In his study of political ontology, Colin Hay (2006) reminds us that ontological 
assumptions and perceptions are logically antecedent to our discourse and actions.  This 
is so because ontological choices are critical for determining the character, nature, and 
“reality” of ontological entities on the global stage.  As a philosophical act, a political 
ontology shapes our understanding of what exists politically and how these political 
entities hang together.  As a practical matter, ontological choices shape the way that 
actors understand their place in the world political system.  This is a significant because it 
determines which entities an actor perceives as allies and which it perceives as foes, a 
philosophical matter with practical strategic implications.  Consequently, considerations 
of political ontology are key to understanding how transnational NGOs fit in the history 
of world politics.    
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TNC perceives the world political system as a single social formation but also as 
one that is fragmented into unnatural and therefore unsustainable political entities.  This 
political ontology flows from TNC’s overarching concern for the “intricate connections 
among environmental health, natural diversity, our economies and human wellbeing” 
(Tercek 2009).  Too often, our political units were created with little or no regard for the 
natural conditions in which they are embedded.  Considerations of global freshwater 
ecosystems make this point explicit.  Indeed, New Zealand is the only country in the 
world with watershed-based political units ("Resource Management Act 1991"  1991).  
Elsewhere, watersheds are subdivided into local, national and regional boundaries that 
bear little or no correlation to the environmental reality in which they are embedded.  
Consequently, “dialogues, policies and programs focused on integrated water resources 
management, poverty alleviation, or sustainable development have not adequately taken 
ecosystem water needs into consideration” (TNC 2009u).  
This singular and disjointed ontology shapes TNC’s actions.  This fact is 
demonstrated most clearly in TNC’s preference for collaborative rather than contentious 
political action.  Operating from the premise that “what is good for nature is good for 
people” (TNC 2009u), TNC perceives its role within this fragmented and disordered 
world political system as a builder of coalitions.  Its political goal is to demonstrate “that 
human needs and prosperity can be fully realized while maintaining the health of 
freshwater ecosystems, if ecosystem water needs are fully integrated into water planning 
and management” (TNC 2009u).  To bridge the political divides that cause and 
perpetuate environmental degradation, TNC argues it is important to collaborate with 
these key stakeholders.  This means that TNC works with local actors, the scientific 
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community, water managers and other important resource managers, as well as states and 
business leaders. While this conversation reveals important information about the way 
TNC pursues its objectives, the overarching point here is to reveal how TNC views the 
world.  To advance this objective, the discussion now turns to a more detailed analysis of 
TNC’s interactions with key actors.  This discussion contributes insights to the 
relationship between ontology and action that will prove relevant to the congruence 
analysis that follows.  
Col laborati on wi th l ocal  and indig enous groups 
Indeed, a key to TNC’s overarching strategy is to build community partnerships 
in order to generate widespread support for its broader global Freshwater Conservation 
Initiative. To do this, TNC endeavors to earn the confidence and trust of local 
communities by developing conservation strategies from the ground up.  As one 
Conservancy staffer put it, “When they [water managers] ask how much water do critters 
need, we [TNC] ask how much do humans need and figure out how to meet these needs 
with the least amount of damage possible” (Horton 1999, 16).  This grassroots and 
participatory approach is intended to greatly amplify the positive impact of TNC’ s 
conservation efforts.  In considering this issue, former Conservancy President Mark 
Sawhill (1997, 9) argued that a collaborative approach is not just the most convenient 
solution to conservation problems, but it also the best solution: “local people have to 
provide the leadership to protect the natural heritage of these countries, and we can best 
advance that goal by providing these people with training, tools, and resources.”  
Therefore, for TNC, “the answer in addressing problems in natural rather than political 
scales lies in community-based conservation” (McCormick 2000, 4).  
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By allocating the resources necessary to elicit the preferences, perceptions and 
values of local stakeholders, TNC strives to unleash and leverage the “latent power of a 
community’s love of place” (McCormick 2000, 4). For example, on the Micronesian 
Island of Pohnpei, TNC supported a two-year study of local village attitudes about water 
resources, and, having gained the trust of local stakeholders, was able to educate villagers 
on the negative consequences of particular activities within local watershed. This effort 
led to the creation of community management committees and the training of Community 
Conservation Officers, developments which promise to formalize the rules and 
regulations for watershed management within local communities and thereby foster local 
participation in water management decisions (Birchard 2005, 189-191; Raynor 1998). In 
Belize, TNC works with the Toledo Institute for Development and Environment, a local 
conservation organization, to enlist and train indigenous peoples to monitor water quality 
within the aquatic ecosystems stretching between the Maya Mountains and the coastal 
reef (TNC 2009n). And in China’s Yunnan Province, TNC provides low-cost methane 
production systems to local villagers in an effort to help prevent river contamination 
related to deforestation (Gaetz 1999; Sawhill 1999). 
Col laborati on wi th s ta tes  
By adopting a community-based strategy informed by the natural sciences, TNC 
has quickly built up the reputation as a global expert on issues of freshwater 
conservation. Over time, this reputation enabled TNC to enlist other organizations, 
powerful states, and international institutions to its cause. For example, TNC receives 
funding and assistance from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) for 
a variety of watershed-related projects in Ecuador’s Condor Biopreserve (discussed 
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below) and the Panama Canal watershed.  As another example of its transnational 
influence, in 2002 TNC developed an eco-regional conservation plan that guided World 
Bank funding to water conservation work in Guatemala.  And in 2004, TNC hosted a 
conference of Latin American leaders entitled “Water: Source of Life, Development and 
Peace”, which featured discussions on the subject of water use fees and watershed 
conservation (TNC 2004, 55).  
TNC views these collaborative arrangements as essential to achieving its 
conservation objectives.  As one observer notes, “from our first government ‘co-op’ in 
the sixties to the state land-for-conservation bond issues of the eighties and since, it was 
increasingly plain that only in partnership with government could we hope to achieve 
some of our goals" (Blair Jr. 1991). Today, TNC argues that these experiences led to the 
conclusion that to achieve success, global conservation strategies “must include 
partnerships with governments, lending institutions, and other non-governmental 
organizations at all levels local, national and international” (TNC 2009l). 
Col laborati on wi th NGOs and bus inesses   
In addition to its collaborations with local groups and governments, TNC also frequently 
pursues its freshwater conservation goals in collaboration with key players in the NGO 
and business sectors. For instance, TNC is currently collaborating with the Worldwide 
Fund for Nature (WWF) and Stanford University to develop the economic tools needed 
to accurately assess ecosystem services (Meeks 2008; TNC 2006). By thus “recognizing 
that ecosystems should be protected for their intrinsic values as well as their economic 
values,” TNC argues it will be better positioned to “prioritize the conservation of the 
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world’s natural systems. This, in turn, can help improve the quality of life for people 
throughout the world” (TNC 2006) 
TNC partners in the business sector provide financial and land donations, engage 
in cause-related marketing, foster direct conservation action, and participate in event 
sponsorship (TNC 2009l).  For example, TNC partnered with Dow Chemical to conduct 
restoration work on 855 acres of wetlands near Brazil’s Cachoeira reservoir (TNC 2008).  
In this arrangement, Dow provided $1.5 million for an ecosystem survey of the area and 
the implementation of a community based effort to begin restoration work (Dow 2009).  
In return, Dow will receive carbon credits to offset its corporate emissions (TNC 2009f).   
In conclusion, this discussion of collaboration reveals that the pursuit of 
collaborative solutions rather than contentious activities is not merely a matter of political 
expediency but is instead a behavior that is more deeply ingrained in the ontological core 
of the organization.  Regardless of the actors it encounters in the pursuit of its goals, TNC 
does not question whether it should collaborate but asks only with whom it should 
collaborate and how.  As a consequence, TNC is not given to the types of headline-
grabbing political activism of organizations like Greenpeace or Earth First.  Instead, its 
ontology leads TNC to adopt behaviors that position it in the political shadows of 
environmental debates.  It would, however, be a mistake to infer from this that TNC is an 
ineffective political actor.  On the contrary, the evidence below indicates that the TNC 
has grown from its ontological roots into one of the largest and most successful 
environmental NGOs in the world.  
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Axiology: The Defensive Compromise 
Whereas political ontology is about what exists in world politics and how an individual or 
organization relates to these entities, values are about the things an individual or 
organization holds as good.   Considerations of value are key to revealing the way 
transnational NGOs fit in the history of world politics because they expose the level of 
import that values play in guiding not just what these organizations think but also what 
they do.   
At the core of TNC’s conservation work is its commitment to preserving the 
“plants, animals, and natural communities that represent the diversity of life on Earth by 
protecting the lands and water they need to survive” (TNC 1990, 5).  Until recently, TNC 
understood this to mean that nature possesses intrinsic value, which is to say that all 
forms of species-life and all their interrelations possess a value independent of any 
usefulness they may offer for human purposes.  This means that TNC interpreted every 
extinction event and every reduction in the richness and diversity of nature as the 
severing of “strands from the web of life” (Sawhill 1995, 5).  To guard against such 
losses, TNC initially set out to preserve and protect threatened species and their habitats.  
Over time, however, these activities have developed into a broader effort to restore and 
maintain the integrity of entire ecosystems.    
TNC’s other key values developed organically from this core ecocentric concern 
for the intrinsic value of nature.  For example, this ecocentric foundation informs TNC’s 
commitment to science, which functions as a way of reducing the complexity and 
diversity of nature and the human-nature relationship to a concrete set of tangible and 
solvable problems – solvable, that is, if you have the right training. Ecology, biology, 
hydrology, and the science of natural resource management guide TNC decision-making 
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in every aspect of its operations, from setting priorities to making strategies to taking 
action to measuring results (TNC 2010).  Because TNC has traditionally prioritized the 
needs of nature over the needs of people, the fact that it privileged an exclusionary 
scientific discourse was viewed as more of a strength than a weakness.   
 Yet, for a variety of reasons, these values made TNC ill-suited for meeting the 
particular challenges of freshwater conservation. Whereas its traditional approach 
focused on saving species and biotic communities by buying up and protecting critical 
habitat, it is difficult if not impossible to buy up an entire river.   Even if it was possible 
to purchase an aquatic ecosystem, it is unlikely that the area would be in pristine 
condition.  It is generally the case that people want to build their homes and businesses 
along streams and rivers, which means that there are few untrammeled aquatic 
ecosystems left to preserve.  Additionally, population growth and changes in 
consumption patterns tend to generate competition for water, which makes the water 
resource issue as much a political as a technical problem.  Thus, the challenge of 
conserving freshwater ecosystems is not about a strict ecocentric delineation between 
society and nature, nor is it fundamentally a scientific problem; rather, it is about 
“managing the human uses in and around them” (Birchard 2005, 81).  
Thus, in setting out to protect aquatic ecosystems, TNC thrust itself into a 
paradigmatic crisis.  The question was, “should TNC remain true to its values or to its 
objectives?”  Some might object that posing the question in this way constitutes a false 
dilemma, which is to say that it papers over other alternative options.  However, there are 
key personnel within TNC leadership who have defined the problem in just this way.  On 
one hand, there is a strong contingent that argues TNC’s mission is not about helping 
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people but about conserving biodiversity (Weeks 1997).   These individuals argue that 
attempts to behave differently should be viewed as mission drift or just plain funding 
opportunism.  Others argue that “if you want to protect biodiversity you need to give 
local residents a stake in preserving it” (Lloyd 2006, 27).  Former Conservancy President 
Steve McCormick adopted this latter approach, counseling Conservancy members: “we . . 
. must be wary of letting our idealism blind us to the real world in which our work must 
be grounded” (McCormick 2006).  
In order to reconcile these competing factions, TNC has adopted a defensive 
compromise: it stopped articulating its ecocentric philosophy publicly in order to retain 
credibility and standing among opponents of these principles and to attract new 
partnerships with key stakeholders (Naess 1995, 65).  TNC feared that were it to persist 
in voicing its ecocentric value the organization might be in danger of losing influence and 
status among those who are in charge of overall policies (Naess 1995, 65).  Yet, in 
private, TNC staff continue to feel the need for deeper and more profound changes, even 
thought many no longer articulate this concern publicly2. Thus, whereas its traditional 
values led TNC to prioritize the needs of species and ecosystems, today it claims to value 
and even privilege the needs of local communities, which it argues are key to TNC’s 
continued success (Sawhill 1998, 6).  
For TNC, this development is akin to a scientific revolution.  According to Kuhn, 
a scientific revolution occurs when a community rejects “one time-honored theory in 
favor of another incompatible with it” (Kuhn 1996, 6).  This process ends with a 
wholesale transformation of the way this community undertakes it work, which involves 
everything from what it considers an admissible problem to the criteria legitimating 
                                                
2 This claim is based on interviews with TNC staff.  
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problem-solutions (Kuhn 1996).  This process is on display within TNC as it rejects the 
idea of protecting nature from people in favor of promoting the idea of protecting nature 
for people (McCormick 2005, 5).  TNC’s Freshwater Conservation Initiative has been a 
catalyst in this development.  This is both due to the particular characteristics of 
freshwater resources as well as the global scale of water resource problems.  
 While this paradigmatic struggle still rages it seems that the human-centered 
viewpoint will prevail, at least for the time-being.  To crystallize this transition, in 2007 
TNC adopted a new organizational symbol and a new motto (Figure 3). The symbol 
shows TNC’s green leaves enveloping the Earth, signaling the global scope of its mission 
and activities. The new motto, “Protecting nature. Preserving life” marks a clear break 
from the former maxim, “Saving the Last Great Places.”  Although the emphasis on 
protecting nature signals the global scope of its conservation mission, the stress on 
preserving life designates the object of its conservation efforts.  TNC seeks to protect 
nature in order to preserve life. Thus, what the new motto signifies is the shift from an 
ecocentric conception of nature to one that is instrumental, in which the value of nature 
consists in the real or potential contribution it offers to all life, but especially human life.  
 
Figure 3: Nature Conservancy Logos 
                          
Old TNC logo                                        New TNC logo  
Source: http://support.nature.org/archive/200412.htm             Sourc: http://www.nature.org 
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Further evidence of this paradigm shift is on display in TNC’s recent move to 
articulate the value of water as an ecosystem service.  This effort endeavors to redefine 
freshwater resources and the aquatic ecosystems they sustain as vital assets, the purpose 
of which is to prompt people and institutions to recognize and appreciate the roles these 
assets play in supporting human well being, and, ultimately, to induce decision-makers to 
incorporate these concerns into the decision-making process (Daily, et al. 2009, 21).   
This discursive shift, which seeks to explicate both the monetary and non-monetary 
values of water, effectively supplants TNC’s former articulation of an intrinsic or 
inherent value to water/nature with one that defines water/nature in accordance with its 
instrumental value.    
Traditionally, ecocentrics expressed the value of nature in ethical terms. For 
instance, Aldo Leopold established a strong ecocentric position when he argued that an 
ethical obligation offers the only visible remedy to the hopelessly lopsided logic of 
economic self-interest.  Leopold (1989, 224-225) summed up this ecocentric ethic as 
follows:  “a thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of 
the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise.”  The effort to redefine 
freshwater resources as ecosystem services constitutes an attempt to shortcut the more 
difficult ethical path to valuing nature.  Thus, on this discursive level, the valuation of 
water as an ecosystem service marks a strategic move to reconfigure the everyday cost 
benefit analysis that guides water resource decision-making from one that bases the value 
of water on an assumption of long-term intrinsic value to one that rests instead on a more 
short-term and utilitarian assessment of value.  Put differently, the issue is no longer that 
we should preserve nature for its own sake but rather that we must conserve nature for the 
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satisfaction of real or potential human needs and desires.  The result is that a utilitarian 
assessment results in a far less comprehensive level of environmental protection.  
Political Behavior 
Chapter three demonstrated that considerations of political behavior or strategy are also 
essential for uncovering the way GCS fits in the history of world politics by 
demonstrating how an organization attains and exercises power.   As chapters one and 
two made clear, power is the key to understanding world politics. Whereas considerations 
of political ontology and values exposed the philosophical origins of power, 
considerations of strategy reveal the technologies of power, that is, the points at which 
intentions are exercised through real and effective practices (Foucault and Gordon 1980).  
Under its original mandate, TNC relied most heavily on its traditional strategy of 
land acquisition. It sought out land containing representative examples of vital 
ecosystems and/or rare species then set about raising money to buy and protect the land. 
Whenever possible, it also bought the land bordering vital areas to create protective 
buffer zones between the core and the human activities that endanger it. When buying 
land was not an option, TNC tried to buy or negotiate conservation easements instead. 
Conservation easements allow private landowners to claim tax deductions and receive 
other forms of compensation. In return, the land owners accept restrictions on the future 
development potential of their land. This strategy has the added benefit of allowing TNC 
to pursue its conservation objectives in a manner consistent with its preference for 
cooperative and apolitical solutions. As measured in crude terms of acres preserved, this 
strategy has been hugely successful.  According to TNC, it has used this land acquisition 
 
   99 
approach to save over 119 million acres and 5,000 miles of river worldwide in the fifty 
plus years since its founding (TNC 2009b).     
The peculiar nature of freshwater resource problems forced TNC to modify its 
strategic approach.  As noted above, a land acquisition strategy is poorly suited for 
solving biodiversity problems involving large, politically fragmented, and/or highly 
developed river corridors and watersheds.  More often than not, pristine land adjoining a 
river or stream is in short supply and expensive.  As one Conservancy staffer put it, 
“there’s nothing in real estate that’s quite so appealing as water, and that’s what 
developers go for first” (Tanner 1988, 11).  Additionally, aquatic ecosystems commonly 
fall within multiple and overlapping political jurisdictions.  It is not uncommon for a 
single river to travel across multiple states nor is it uncommon for a river to fall under the 
jurisdiction of several local and national agencies.  Furthermore, securing the integrity of 
aquatic ecosystems is more about restoration than preservation.  According to one study, 
human impacts on the hydrological environment have increased nine-fold since 1950 
(Postel and Richter 2003, 199).  Because many of the world’s river systems are heavily 
developed and/or dammed, there are few untrammeled aquatic ecosystems left to 
preserve.  Third, water resource problems are bound up in relations of wealth, knowledge 
and power, in which the goals of competing factions are often incommensurate. More and 
more, stakeholders perceive the governance of water as a zero-sum game, which is 
another way of saying that TNC’s preference for apolitical and cooperative solutions is 
often difficult to achieve within the domain of freshwater resource conservation (Sawhill 
1999). 
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 It is difficult to know if values shape strategy or vice versa. Whatever the case 
may be, TNC’s adaptation to this unfamiliar strategic environment coincided with the 
defensive compromise described above.  However, in its strategic adaptation TNC 
appeared to conform to a Lakatosian model of progress as a succession of incremental 
changes over time. Unlike Kuhn, Imre Lakatos argued that progress radiates outward 
from a ‘hard core’ of shared ideas or practices. Thus, progress is more of a cumulative 
and adaptive process than the kind of punctuated equilibrium envisioned by Kuhn 
(Lakatos 1978). In a Lakatosian formulation, new ideas, strategies or ways of knowing 
build upon and modify our traditional ways of thinking and doing; they do not constitute 
a wholesale replacement. 
 Although TNC’s strategic repertoire developed across the dimensions of time and 
space, its land acquisition approach still constitutes the “hard core” of TNC’s ecological 
work.  Put simply, this means TNC continues to buy and protect land that contains or 
buffers representative examples of aquatic biodiversity.  Nevertheless, TNC has 
augmented this land acquisition strategy over time by expanding into education, 
ecosystem monitoring and restoration, and conservation finance. In order to illustrate this 
strategic shift, the discussion turns next to an examination of TNC’s water-related 
activites in Ecuador’s Condor Bioreserve, which TNC classifies as one of its 
demonstration sites.  This examination of TNC’s ecological work set the stage for the 
discussions of its strategic efforts in the domains of science and public policy that follow.  
Ecolog ical  Work:  The  Condor Bioreserve  
TNC’s work in the Condor Bioreserve offers a good example of its multifaceted strategic 
approach.  The Bioreserve is a patchwork of six protected areas in Ecuador’s Northern 
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Andean mountains that contains the headwaters of six significant watersheds and twenty 
major rivers.  These watersheds support a wide assortment of plant and animal species, 
including endangered species, such as the Andean condor, the speckled bear, and the 
mountain tapir.  They also supply roughly seventy percent of the water for Quito’s 1.8 
million inhabitants (TNC 2009g).  
Despite its importance, the Bioreserve is really only a park on paper; Ecuador 
enshrined these parks in national law but did not allocate the resources to protect them. 
Today, inappropriate agricultural practices and poorly conceived infrastructure projects 
threaten the integrity of the Bioreserve’s vital aquatic ecosystems.  To create new cattle 
pastures or support subsistence agriculture, commercial and residential farmers cut 
further and further into its high plateaus (TNC 2009j).  These activities destabilized 
fragile soils, which means more runoff and therefore heavier sediment loads in adjacent 
streams and rivers. By failing to fully consider the environmental impacts of their 
infrastructure projects within the Bioreserve, utility companies, municipalities and other 
entities made these problems worse (Clark and Padwe 2004; Ziegelmayer, Clark, and 
Nyce 2004).  The roads, dams and water distribution systems they built in or near the 
Bioreserve often increase the rate of soil erosion, leading to further reductions in water 
quality (TNC 2009j). 
 With support from the US Agency for International Development (USAID), in 
1994 TNC set out to protect the Condor Biosphere Reserve as part of its broader Parks in 
Peril Program.  Working through local conservation groups, TNC hired, equipped and 
trained local villagers to patrol the parks; it marked the park’s boundaries; and it 
purchased strategic buffer zones adjacent to the Bioreserve (TNC 2009g). On one hand, 
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this endeavor reinforces the point made above regarding TNC’s collaborative approach to 
problem solving.  On the other hand, while these collaborative efforts achieved marginal 
reductions in the rate of resource degradation, it quickly became apparent that the scale 
and depth of the problem warranted a more dramatic, more comprehensive approach. 
In 1998, TNC responded by identifying the Condor Bioreserve as a demonstration 
site for its first Global Freshwater Initiative (TNC 2009j). Having already secured 
financial support from USAID and cultivated durable partnerships with an indigenous 
group, local community organizations, municipal governments and government agencies, 
TNC set out to develop these relationships into a broad base of support for advancing its 
water conservation efforts (Krchnak 2007).  These efforts included education and 
restoration work (USAID 2009); however, the primary thrust of TNC’s work involved 
the development of a financial mechanism to support watershed protection and 
restoration projects.   
TNC argued that further degradation of these watersheds would lead to lower 
quality water, thereby necessitating higher cost water treatment techniques (Krchnak 
2007, 7).  To address this problem, TNC created a trust fund financed through the 
assessment of water user fees.  TNC rationalized user fees as payments for ecosystem 
services. By using the money generated through these fees to promote the conservation of 
upstream areas, downstream users benefit by receiving lower cost access to higher quality 
water (Krchnak 2007, 7).  In 2000, this initiative was institutionalized in the form of the 
Quito Water Fund, or FONAG (Fundo Para la Conservation del Aqua).  Today the Fund 
generates roughly $1 million per year to support watershed restoration projects, 
monitoring and evaluation work, and incentives for adopting appropriate agricultural 
 
   103 
techniques (TNC 2009p).   Thus by altering the incentive structures attached to water 
allocation and provision, TNC endeavors to modify the preferences, perceptions and 
values of water users to align more closely with its conservation goals.  
Scienti f i c  Mode l s   
In addition to its ecological work, TNC develops scientific models to shape the ways in 
which water managers identify and solve resource problems. Over time, TNC used its 
ecological work to build scientific methods of calculating the ecological limits of 
hydrological alterations and low cost tools for identifying areas of critical need within 
aquatic ecosystems (TNC 2009i, 2009r).  It also developed sustainable farming practices 
that reduce water withdrawals and watershed contamination (TNC 2009k).  TNC 
provides these methodologies and scientific tools to decision-makers at little or no cost 
by providing easy access to the information through conferences and trainings, 
publications, and via its website nature.org.  According to TNC, the goal of these efforts 
is not to reduce political decision-making to a scientific formula.  On the contrary, it 
explicitly recognizes that “the process of balancing competing interests is not scientific 
but should be informed by science” (LCAOF 1995, 32). Ultimately, “local people have to 
provide the leadership to protect the natural heritage of these countries, and we can best 
advance that goal by providing these people with training, tools and resources” (Sawhill 
1997, 9).  To be absolutely clear, what Sawhill refers to here are local decision-makers, 
meaning local water resource managers.  
Pol icy Proposal s  
However, TNC does more than merely offer support; in recent years it also supplemented 
its core land acquisition strategy by attempting to directly influence the rules, norms and 
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decision-making procedures of global water governance.  This global policy dimension of 
its strategic repertoire focuses on two issue areas: environmental flows and payment for 
ecosystem services.   
The concept of environmental flow describes “the quantity, timing and quality of 
water flows required to sustain freshwater and estuarine ecosystems and the human 
livelihoods and well-being that depend on these ecosystems” (Brisbane Declaration 2007, 
Appendix 1).   TNC has played a key role in establishing the concept of environmental 
flows as a crucial consideration in the global governance of water resources (Poff 2009).  
In 2007, TNC headed up an effort to unite over 750 scientists, water managers and policy 
makers from around the world behind a collective call to action for greater global 
protection and restoration of environmental flows (TNC 2009v).  This effort led to the 
Brisbane Declaration (2007), which calls upon governments, development banks, donors, 
river basin organizations, water and energy associations, multilateral and bilateral 
institutions, community-based organizations, research institutions, and the private sector 
across the globe to integrate environmental flow considerations into every aspect of their 
decision-making and implementation strategies.  Essentially, the Declaration endeavors 
to move discussions of environmental flows beyond the domain of science by cajoling 
governments to take immediate action to protect and restore rivers and the aquatic 
ecosystems they sustain (TNC 2009v). At the domestic level, TNC scientists have 
worked in concert with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to improve the environmental 
health of several rivers in the United States (Poff, Richter, and Arthington 2010; Richter, 
Warner, and Meyer 2006)  
 
   105 
By focusing attention on the services ecosystems provide, TNC has also taken 
steps to determine the economic value of these services as a means of influencing water 
resource decision-making processes.  In the words of former TNC President Steven J. 
McCormick (2009), this effort endeavors to take “land and water protection a step 
beyond traditional emotional appeals to preserve our natural heritage by making an 
economic and business case for conservation.”  TNC has pursued this objective by 
experimenting with the use of water funds in key demonstration sites then leveraging 
these experiences to promote their payment for ecosystem services (PES) scheme as a 
norm or standard of global water governance.  This adoption of PES schemes was 
consistent with a global wave of innovation in small-scale economic instruments that 
introduced new incentives and disincentives designed to induce behavioral changes tied 
to the extraction and pollution of natural resources, such as water, forests, and air (Chan, 
Shaw, Cameron, Underwood, and Daily 2006; Jack, Kousky, and Sims 2008; Millennium 
Ecosystem Assessment 2005).  Thus, the application of PES schemes by TNC are now 
part of a broader trend, a trend which reinforced in the U.S. when, in 2008, Congress 
created the Office of Ecosystem Services and Markets in the Department of Agriculture, 
and when, in the same year, the United Nations sponsored an Intergovernmental Science 
Policy-Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (Nature 2009).  
But in the specific area of water resources governance, TNC has emerged as a 
global leader in the creation and implementation of PES models. For example, in Brazil 
TNC is attempting to protect threatened watersheds by paying farmers to replant trees 
along riverbanks deforested for soybean and cattle production. To fund this program, 
TNC works with water utilities in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, which levy a fee on 
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water users there.  This user fee pays upstream farmers $28 per acre, per year, for 
keeping their riverside forests standing (TNC 2009p).  TNC has leveraged its success 
with this Brazilian case by expanding this Water Producer Program to other South 
American countries, including Ecuador, Peru, and Columbia (TNC 2009q).  
Congruence Analysis 
What does this information tell us about the role GCS plays in the history of global water 
governance and world politics?  Does this evidence support the transformationalist claim 
that the emergence of global civil society marks an ontological break in world political 
history by de-centering state and markets as the dominant actors in the world political 
system?  Alternatively, does it support pragmatic assertions that the development GCS 
marks a historic break in the size and diffusion of the strategic repertoire?  Or, as a final 
option, can we rely on this evidence to support the critical proposition that GCS marks an 
axiological break in the history of global water governance by reducing the global 
heterogeneity in values and cultural understandings? 
Trans formational is t  Framework 
Of the three theoretical frameworks, transformationalists’ expectations about the role of 
GCS are the most incongruent in the TNC case.  Transformationalists ground their 
observations on the assumption that GCS consists of individuals and actors that act as a 
check on the depredations of states and markets.  Regardless of whether they perceive 
GCS as normatively progressive (Keane 2003) or conservative (Lipschutz 2007), 
transformationalists universally perceive it as a contentious and ontologically 
transformative political sphere.  To analyze the concrete empirical evidence with these 
abstract theoretical claims, we need only ask two questions: Does GCS function as a 
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check on the authority of state and market forces? And, if so, does it perform this 
function in a contentious manner? 
In this case, there is very little empirical support for this transformationalist 
position. Transformationalists might point to the Brisbane Declaration as a contentious 
political action, the purpose of which is to check the water resource decision-making 
authority of states and water managers by drawing global attention to the water resource 
needs of aquatic ecosystems.  However, the fact that so many state officials participated 
in drafting the Declaration suggests that the Declaration itself is not so much a check on 
state authority as it is a means of legitimizing and extending this authority. Thus, it was 
through this cooperative and collaborative endeavor that TNC effectively normalized the 
already privileged position of the existing power structure.   
Considerations of ecological work (Wapner 1996) and cultural influence (Wapner 
2002) ostensibly offers transformationalists’ firmer ground on which to base their claim 
that organizations like TNC  transform the ontology of world politics.  It might appear 
that in reconfiguring cultural understandings of water in places like Pohnpei, TNC’s 
behavior is congruent with the transformationalist assertion that GCS acts as a check on 
the cultural authority of states and markets.   Moreover, because TNC approaches its 
ecological work in places like Ecuador, Panama or Brazil from the ontological 
perspective that what exists in the world is a dysfunctional and unnatural political 
structure, its efforts to fully integrate ecological realities into political decision-making 
practices might also appear congruent with transformationalists’ claim that GCS de-
centers the role of state in markets within the world political system.  However, the fact 
that TNC pursues these strategies is in and of itself insufficient to support such a claim.  
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To make this move, a transformationalist must demonstrate that such activities are 
contentious, that is, that they are contrary to the interests of states and markets.  Lacking 
this, GCS may prove to be little more than an appendage of these more traditional spheres 
of global politics.  In this case, TNC’s aversion to conflict coupled with its extensive 
history of collaboration with state and market forces means that there is insufficient 
evidence to support the transformationalist perspective.  
Pragmatic  Framework 
Because pragmatists shrug off considerations of values to focus solely on political and 
strategic dynamics, their framework avoids many of the theoretical problems that plague 
tranformationalists and critical theorists.  Instead, their goal has been to show how GCS 
fosters new relationships for learning, relationships that translate into new opportunities 
to gain influence within the world political system.  
Evidence of this behavior is ubiquitous in the TNC case.  Prominent examples 
include TNC’s participation in the Brisbane Conference, its efforts to create and promote 
PES schemes, and through its continued efforts to fully integrate the principles of 
ecosystem science into water resources management and planning (Poff, et al. 2010).  It 
is also evident in its collaboration with indigenous groups and local NGOs, most of 
which provide political support for its domestic and global environmental initiatives.  
This behavior is not merely strategic but is instead an artifact of TNC’s political ontology 
and is therefore congruent with pragmatic expectations. It demonstrates that TNC 
possesses both a high organizational capacity for learning and strategic innovation as well 
as the motivation to collaborate with a diverse range of actors in the pursuit of its 
objectives. It demonstrates as well the pragmatic insight to the important role GCS plays 
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in facilitating the formation of knowledge-based networks of specialists with shared 
beliefs in cause-and-effect relations (Haas 1992; Keck and Sikkink 1998a).  Not only is 
the characteristic inherent to TNC’s organizational structure, it is also evident in many of 
TNC’s activities. From its first undertaking in the Mianus Gorge, the TNC established a 
pattern of collaborative behavior by working in concert with local conservation 
organizations and federal agencies to safeguard the vital ecosystem functions that purify 
and sustain the Mianus River.  It is evident as well in its collaborations with Dow 
Chemical, from which the TNC secured $1.5 million for restoration work on Brazil’s 
Cachoeira reservoir.  Finally, it is evident in TNCs extensive history of collaboration with 
state agencies like USAID, a relationship that proved instrumental in launching its efforts 
in the Condor Biopreserve.  
However, this evidence also suggests that the pragmatic emphasis on institutional 
influence may be overstated.  While TNC’s involvement in the Brisbane Declaration 
makes it clear that the organization desires greater influence in the domain of global 
water politics, it is also evident that the totality of its global political endeavors cannot be 
reduced to the singular pursuit of institutional influence. From its land purchases in 
Ecuador to its methane stoves in China, so much of what TNC does has little or nothing 
to do with gaining such influence on the world political stage.  Rather, these efforts can 
only be explained in relation to the specific goal TNC pursues, which is to preserve and 
restore ecosystem integrity and biodiversity.  That TNC sometimes leverages these 
efforts and experiences to gain influence is ancillary.  In other words, for TNC influence 
is not an end but is rather a means to an end – and in some occasions it is not a necessary 
means.   Thus, while pragmatists’ expectations are congruent with the behavior of TNC, 
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the pragmatic approach is not fully satisfactory for understanding how GCS fits in the 
history of world politics.  
Crit i cal  Framework 
The evidence presented above also appears to support the critical thesis that GCS 
primarily functions as a means of normalizing the interests and perceptions of a 
hegemonic global class, a process that obliterates the diverse values of the many to 
extend the privileges of the few (Carr and Norman 2008; Pasha and Blaney 1998; Stevis 
2005).  The flexibility of its core values combined with its preference for market-based 
solutions certainly make TNC vulnerable to such a charge.  Critics have interpreted its 
close ties to multinational corporations and powerful state interests as contrary to the very 
meaning of environmentalism.  For example, Johann Hari (2010, 19) argues that these 
relationships signify a kind of creeping corporate corruption.  “They are supporting a 
system they know will lead to ecocide,” Hari writes, “because more revenue will run 
through their accounts, for a while, as the collapse occurs.”  Problems with TNCs 
corporate and state relations are only compounded by its outspoken support for market 
mechanisms, like its payment for ecosystem services scheme.   This strategy is seen as 
particularly onerous because it turns the polluter pays principle on its head, replacing it 
with an inherently unjust system that rewards polluters with the money of their victims 
(Pagiola, et al. 2004; Wunder, et al. 2008).    
On the other hand, there are some elements of TNC’s approach to water resource 
governance that critical theorists would find appealing.  For example, TNC has 
established strong and durable relationships with the local and indigenous communities 
that live on or near its sites.  TNC started this tradition of collaboration in the Mianus 
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Gorge and carried over elements of this tradition into the transnational sphere.  Today, 
TNC actively works with several local groups in Ecuador by providing them with 
scientific data and material resources.  In return, TNC has gained the trust and support of 
key local stakeholders.  In addition, TNC has gained important insight to the cultural and 
political challenges involved in modifying the behaviors of the people who are part of the 
ecosystems they are struggling to save.  In Ecuador the challenge was to get local 
communities to buy in to its PES schemes, but in Pohnpei and China the challenges are 
different.  In these locations, the challenge was to first alert people to the fact that a 
problem exists.  Next, TNC faced the challenge of educating local populations on the 
ways in which they contribute to the problem before offering them a range of appropriate 
solutions to address the problem.   
Of course, critical theorists will likely object to such claims.  They would argue 
instead that the costs of TNC’s strategic partnerships with Dow Chemical and other 
multinational corporations far outweigh the benefits gained from its other various small-
scale collaborative endeavors.  However, such criticisms ultimately rest on its myopic 
focus on the diversity of values and cultural understandings.  Critical theorist argue that 
deliberative democracy and expanded participation ought to be the watchwords for every 
issue and every process related to the global governance of water resources.  However, 
there is a tipping point beyond which the degree of urgency and/or the knowledge of 
local actors argues against their inclusion in the decision-making process.  In the final 
analysis it is not the size of the decision-making body that matters most.  Rather, what 
often matters most is the criteria by which we can delineate between legitimate and 
illegitimate claims.   In large part, this shortcoming is a throwback to the critical 
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theoretical concern for environmental justice.  Indeed, in matters of human health it is 
rational to expect people to possess some knowledge about their general health and the 
sources of environmental degradation that make them sick (Low and Gleeson 1998).  In 
contrast, critical theorists are less justified in make similar claims about the issues related 
to ecological justice.  Many people know little or nothing about the complex interactions 
that are essential to the functioning of nearby ecosystems and less still about the policy 
tools available for solving these problems.  It is in such occasions that it is preferable to 
rely on the analysis and problem-solving recommendation of the area experts.  
Critical theorists might object that an ecological conception of justice is a peculiar 
and Western idea, which tends to privilege non-democratic and “institutionalized 
attempts to capture and contain the forces of Nature by operationally deploying advanced 
technologies, and thereby linking many of Nature's apparently intrinsic structures and 
processes to strategies of highly rationalized environmental management” (Latour 2004; 
Luke 1996).  However, these observations bow under the weight of their own normative 
and methodological biases.  TNC is not principally concerned with environmental justice, 
just as it is not particularly concerned about the means it uses to achieve its objectives.  
What TNC does care about is preserving the beauty and integrity of biotic ecosystems 
and it is willing to utilize a variety of means to achieve this end.   This perhaps explains 
why TNC is just as willing to collaborate with indigenous groups as it is with 
multinational corporations, and just as willing to support regulatory solutions as it is 
market-based mechanisms.  Yet, because critical theorists privilege process over 
outcome, environmental justice over ecological justice, and diversity over, well, 
everything, there is a strong tendency among critical theorists to prejudge the merits of an 
 
   113 
actor and her actions.   However, there is no more basis for making the claim that the 
diversity of values and cultural understandings possesses greater intrinsic value than the 
diversity of species.  We should assume nothing but ask instead whether there are 
moments when the need to save nature trumps the need to feed people.  When such 
moments exist, it would be hard to justify foregoing a rapid and targeted response in 
favor of a more drawn out deliberative process. In some cases, this is precisely the kind 
of challenge TNC faces.  In sum, critical theory provides important insights to the way 
this organization fits in the world political system, but these insights unfortunately suffer 
from the failure to assess this organization on its own terms. 
Conclusion 
How can TNC and its Freshwater Conservation Initiative help us adjudicate the 
theoretical debate over GCS and the roles it plays both in global water governance and 
world politics?  First and foremost, TNC’s behavior demonstrates that GCS plays an 
important role in directing attention to the ecological dimensions of global water 
governance.  In this respect, TNC has been instrumental both as a strategic innovator and 
policy advocate.  But perhaps its most important contribution consists in its ecological 
work.  For the most part, this work has focused on harmonizing the relationships “among 
environmental health, natural diversity, our economies and human wellbeing” (Tercek 
2009).  To advance this goal, TNC has pursued a cooperative political strategy.  It works 
with states, businesses, NGOs, local communities, and indigenous groups – sometimes all 
at once.  Even as this goal-oriented approach has made TNC highly effective in 
protecting ecosystems, it has made it somewhat less effective in changing the underlying 
political and economic conditions that cause environmental degradation in the first place.   
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This case study makes clear that no single theoretical approach offers a 
satisfactory analysis of how TNC fits in the history of world politics.  
Transformationalists struggle to explain TNC’s strong ties to states and market actors, 
particularly in light of its internal paradigmatic struggle over core values.  TNC also 
confounds the expectations of critical theorists, not because it lacks some of the 
problematic characteristics they anticipate but because its ecological focus positions it 
outside the human-centered scope of the critical theoretical lens.  Pragmatists offer the 
clearest insight to TNC and the role it plays in world political history, yet the pragmatic 
tendency to reduce all behavior to a function of influence leaves makes them ill-equipped 
to account for much of TNC’s ecological work.   
This case study underscores the need for additional theoretical reduction. Thus 
far, theoretical efforts to account for the role GCS plays in the history of global water 
governance have featured either its ontological, political or axiological characteristics.  
Consequently, when analyzed in its entirety, the literature on GCS is fraught with tension.  
Yet, from this conversation it is possible to extract a set of fundamental or core functions 
of GCS.  That is, that GCS performs certain essential functions and that these basic 
functions can be revealed by examining its ontological, political, and axiological 
characteristics.  By thus joining our analysis of GCS regarding these basic functions, it is 
possible to empirically analyze its behavior so that we can return to our ordinary 
theoretical discourse with improved structure and understanding.  Although it would be 
unwise to use this one study as the basis for theoretical reform, this case does argue for 
additional empirical research into this important yet clearly misunderstood global 
political phenomenon. 
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Chapter Five: The Council of Canadians 
 
 
People are like water and the ruler a boat. Water can support a boat or overturn it 
-  William Shakespeare 
-   
Under the guidance of its National Chairperson, Maude Barlow, the Council of 
Canadians (COC) has become a leader in the global effort to redefine water as a public 
trust and human right.   This chapter examines how and why the COC came to play such 
a prominent role in the debate over global water governance in order to adjudicate 
competing theoretical claims about the role GCS plays in the world political system.   
This study of the COC is instrumental in advancing this broader objective because it 
represents that faction of water-related GCS actors that rank the satisfaction of human 
needs for water over the satisfaction of environmental and economic imperatives.  As 
such, the COC serves as the proxy for a key subset of actors that make up GCS in the 
realm of global water governance.   Its perceptions, values, and behaviors can therefore 
provide important insights to the strengths and limitations of competing theoretical 
expectations about the ontological, political, and axiological characteristics of GCS.   
 This chapter begins with a historical account devoted to the origins of the COC 
and its organizational evolution.  The focus then turns to a brief description of its 
organizational structure and the genesis of its interest in water resource issues.  This 
background information lays the foundation for a detailed analysis of the organization’s 
political ontology, specifically as it relates to water resource problems.  This discussion 
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anchors the following sections, which seek to reveal the COC’s values and strategy.  
These discussions provide the basis for the detailed analysis that weighs the accuracy of 
competing theoretical expectations about GCS with the actual perceptions, values and 
practices of the COC.   
Introduction to the COC 
Orig ins  
The COC was founded on 11 March 1985 as a response to a conservative realignment of 
Canadian politics. On 4 September 1984, Brian Mulroney and his Progressive 
Conservatives scored a decisive victory over Canada’s traditionally dominant Liberal 
party, securing 211 seats in Parliament to the Liberals’ 40.  Emboldened by this success, 
on 10 September 1984, just seven days before he officially took office, Mulroney 
traveled to the Economic Club of New York, where he announced his intention to usher 
in a new more conciliatory era of relations between the United States and Canada.  This 
meant the Canadian government would turn away from its protectionist traditions and 
adopt a supply-side economic philosophy featuring free markets and free trade.  To jump-
start this effort, Mulroney also announced his support for the liberalization of Canada’s 
foreign investment policies, particularly those related to the energy sector.  Furthermore, 
Mulroney articulated his commitment to growing Canada’s national investments in the 
areas of mutual defense and security (Mulroney 1984).   To demonstrate the depth of his 
commitment to setting what was once a rather contentious relationship on a more friendly 
and cooperative foundation, Mulroney suggested that the two national leaders hold yearly
 meetings to address areas of mutual concern.  Then-US President Ronald Reagan agreed 
and the two leaders scheduled their first meeting for March 1985.  
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 In politics, as in physics, to every action there is an equal and opposite reaction.  
In Canada, the reaction to this sudden conservative realignment of its national politics 
was immediately manifested in the equally sudden proliferation of progressive non-
governmental organizations (NGO).  Foremost of these was the Council of Canadians 
(COC). The COC set out to secure the economic and cultural sovereignty of Canada 
against the threat posed by Mulroney Conservatives and their free-market agenda.   For 
COC members, conservative free-market reforms constituted an existential threat to the 
Canadian way of life.  The COC interpreted Mulroney’s free-market initiatives as a “total 
restructuring of the national economy to suit the free-market philosophy of the United 
States” (M. Barlow 1991, xxiii).   Within this context, they described the Mulroney 
government as a “selfish, grasping, and greedy plutocracy abandoning the work of 
generations of Canadians, and the dreams of the vast majority of the people who live in 
this country, for American standards and values and priorities” (Hurtig 2002, xiii).   
COC members generally understood “the work of generations” to mean the 
cultivation of a particular national ethic that values “sharing for survival”, in contrast to 
the American ethic of “survival of the fittest” (M. Barlow 2007, 347).  They saw this 
traditional Canadian ethic manifest in the Medical Care Insurance Act, which established 
universal access to health care, as well as in Canada’s National Energy Board and its 
Foreign Investment Review Agency, both of which were set up to promote Canadian 
ownership of Canadian industry.  For the COC, Canada’s conservative realignment 
signified a radical departure from this traditional ethic.  In place of the strong social 
welfare state, conservatives favored the neoliberal policies of the Reagan administration.  
In the US, these policies produced a privatized health insurance system, Reagan’s purge 
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of Social Security disability rolls (Pear 1992), and dramatic increases in net capital 
inflows to the private sector. It is against this background that the COC came to see itself 
as the voice of the silent Canadian majority that wants an egalitarian and just model of 
public policy.  For COC members, giving voice to this majority meant opposing the 
Conservative effort to liberalize Canada’s economy.  
 The first meeting between Mulroney and Reagan provided the COC a prime 
opportunity to act on its beliefs.  Dubbed the “Shamrock Summit” in reference to the 
leaders’ common Irish lineage, this meeting cemented the cooperative tone of the 
relationship (Bromke and Nossal 1987).  In preparation for the Summit, each side took 
steps to highlight the new spirit of goodwill.  For Reagan’s part, he issued a new National 
Security Directive to assess US-Canada relations.  This review later led to Reagan’s 
acknowledgement that the U.S. bears some responsibility for the acid rain that degraded 
the soil and water quality in eastern Canada.  In the months leading up to the Summit, 
Mulroney took much larger steps to demonstrate his intent to set US-Canada relations on 
a more amicable footing.  For example, he stripped the National Energy Board of its 
powers, re-tasked the Foreign Investment Review Agency with the responsibility to 
promote foreign investments, and announced a $300 million program to eliminate 
domestic sources of acid rain (Bromke and Nossal 1987).  Two headlines in the New York 
Times effectively captured the lopsided approach to the Summit: “No economic quarrels 
face Reagan in Canada” (Douglas 1985) and “Reagan, in Quebeq, agrees to study acid 
rain issue” (Weinraub 1985. Emphasis added).  The Summit produced a fishing treaty on 
the West Coast, a commitment for more than $700 million by Canada to modernize the 
North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), and declarations by both 
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parties supporting greater bilateral trade flows and tariff reductions.  But in the end, 
Reagan had denied Mulroney the one thing he wanted most: a promise of action to 
address the US sources of acid rain.  
 The “Shamrock Summit” and its skewed outcome galvanized the COC.  In his 
history of Canadian protest activity, Jeffrey M. Ayres (1997, 111) argues that the COC 
quickly developed into “the most thoroughly focused [Canadian] organization devoted 
specifically to opposing a bilateral free trade agreement between Canada and the U.S.”  
Their objections flowed from an overarching concern with the potential loss of Canadian 
sovereignty.  Among other things, they feared that these bilateral agreements would result 
in the loss of Canadian control over sovereign energy supplies, natural resources, and 
national defense (Hurtig 2002).  Ayers recounts how the COC worked to establish a 
broad national network of social groups committed to opposing a free-trade deal.  At its 
height, this ad-hoc, anti-free trade coalition consisted of twenty national organizations 
and associated coalitions, with linkages that stretched into nearly every province and 
territory (Ayers 1997).    
Through its practices as an activist network organizer, the COC came to play a 
prominent role in the long series of national free-trade opposition efforts that animated 
Canadian politics throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s.  The “Maple Leaf Summit” 
was the first and most noteworthy of these efforts.  Held in April 1987, the “Maple Leaf 
Summit” was the anti-free trade coalition’s response to the 1985 “Shamrock Summit.”   
Scheduled to coincide with the Reagan-Mulroney meeting in Ottawa, the “Maple Leaf 
Summit” united hundreds of activists around a range of anti-free trade demonstrations.  
While the Summit itself held symbolic importance, it was most noteworthy for what it 
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produced.  That is, it birthed the Pro-Canada Network (later renamed the Action Canada 
Network), which unified the diverse elements of the anti-free trade movement within a 
single national organization, thereby making it possible to overcome a long history of 
social advocacy fragmentation (Ayers 1997).  Through its organizing capacity, the COC 
played an instrumental role in this important development and, over time, it continued to 
perform a key function in steering the activities of the Pro-Canada Network and its anti-
free trade coalition members. 
 As was the case with The Nature Conservancy, the story of the COC and its 
origins contribute important insights into its fundamental nature.  For instance, it is 
already evident that the COC grounds its organizational identity on the construction of an 
“other.”  Initially, the Mulroney administration and its free-trade policies provided the 
foil against which the COC could structure its identity.  To be clear, this is not to suggest 
that the COC was devoid of any positive conception of identity. On the contrary, the 
organization projected a positive vision of its role as the steward of a uniquely Canadian 
ethic; however, the need for such a steward only made sense within the context of some 
looming threat.  Therefore, the ultimate conclusion of its struggle against the free-trade 
agenda thrust the organization into a kind of identity crisis.  Its answer to this crisis was 
not to reformulate its core values but rather to set its identity on a more positive footing 
by establishing itself as a global voice of the effort to secure the universal values of 
human rights and social justice.  This move led to a more cosmopolitan conception of 
imagined community, of which it is but one member of a broader global community 
based on shared conceptions of morality and justice.  
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Organizat ional  Struc tu re  
Like many of the other organizations that make up GCS, the COC started out as a local 
effort led by a small group of prominent local citizens to address a local problem.  These 
early members included fiction writer Margaret Atwood, economic nationalist Mel 
Hurtig, Canadian historian Pierre Berton, and feminist activist Maude Barlow.   
 For all organizations, growth induces change and the COC was no exception.  
Today it is Canada’s largest citizen organization.  This growth has resulted in significant 
organizational adjustments (see Figure 4).  No longer just a small collection of prominent 
citizens, the COC is now a highly and hierarchically organized member-based 
organization.  Through memberships and other contributions, the COC generated $5.1 
million in 2008 (COC 2009a).  Its primary decision-making body is the Board of 
Directors, which consists of 19 members appointed to staggered two year terms.  Half of 
these positions are directly accountable to the general membership, which elects Board 
members during the Annual General Meeting.  Four Board members are directly elected 
by the chapters within each region and confirmed by the Annual General Meeting, and 
are therefore accountable to the regional chapters that elect them.  In addition, the 
national chairperson also serves on the Board.  The chairperson is elected during the 
Annual General Meeting by the membership and serves a one-year voluntary term.  This 
position is responsible for chairing Board meetings, acting as the organization’s 
spokesperson, and providing day-to-day oversight of executive functions on behalf of the 
Board.   
 The COC’s executive body is its National Executive Office.  At its head is the 
Executive Director, who functions as a CEO: this person is charged with overseeing the 
organization’s efforts to implement the principles and objectives agreed to by the Board.  
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The Executive Director is selected by the Board of Directors and is therefore directly 
accountable to that body.  Also housed within the National Executive Office are the 
offices of Organizing, Development, Campaigns and Communication, Finance, and 
Human Resources and Administration.  These offices coordinate the COC’s national 
efforts to advance its organizational interests, which they describe as campaigns.  The 
COC has seven of these campaigns: deep integration, health care, trade, water, energy, 
food, and peace.   In addition to these campaigns, the COC also sponsors the Blue Planet 
Project.  Created by the COC, this Project focuses specifically on the global dimensions 
of water resource problems, specifically those that relate to issues of trade and 
privatization.  The Blue Planet Project is an organizational oddity for the COC.  Although 
the Board of Directors oversees its operations, it is the only “campaign” with a dedicated 
staff.  Additionally, it relies on foundations and major donors for financial support, as 
opposed to the COC’s membership base.  
 The COC ultimately relies on its national network of chapters to support and 
advance its organizational priorities.  It contains 70 chapters in all, which are divided into 
four geographic regions.  Regional offices house a small salaried staff, which are hired by 
and directly responsible to the Executive Director.  Funding decisions regarding the 
regional offices and the chapters are made by the Board of Directors and the National 
Executive Office.  Beyond their role in selecting the regional Board representatives, the 
chapters do not have any voting rights nor do they have the authority to recall elected 
Board members.  Chapters hold regular membership meetings, public events and actions, 
communicate the COCs interests to the media, and acts as government watchdogs (COC 
2009a).  Each member receives the quarterly publication, Canadian Perspectives, as well 
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as frequent newsletters and other mailings.  In addition, the COC maintains an 
organizational website where members can participate in campaign blogs and find 
additional information on organization, including archives of its Annual Reports.  
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Interes t in  Water  Resou rc e  I ssues  
Water resource issues have always been a significant subject of concern for the COC.  
From the outset, the COC was apprehensive that the Mulroney administration would 
initiate bulk water exports to the US.  Initially, these concerns were founded, at least in 
part, on a perception of administrative support for the Great Recycling and Northern 
Development Canal, a massive water diversion scheme that would siphon off a large 
volume of water from Canada’s James Bay for use in the dry regions of Canada and the 
United States (Kovacs 1996).   However, throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, the COC 
situated its concerns over this and other bulk-water export schemes within the 
overarching context of its opposition to Mulroney’s free-trade agenda (COC 2009b).  
During this period, the thrust of the COC’s water-related efforts focused on an ultimately 
unsuccessful campaign to remove a provision from the first free-trade agreement between 
the US and Canada that defined water as a tradable good.  
 This domestic interest in water resource problems morphed into an issue of global 
concern in 1994, as part of the COC’s turn to global issues.   In the mid-1990s, the COC 
established close ties to the San Francisco based International Forum on Globalization 
(IFG), an organization that Maude Barlow has since joined as a member of its Board of 
Directors.  Early research on the issue of water by the IFG inspired Barlow to focus 
greater attention on the problem, prompting her to ask “who own[s] water? And who 
[gets] to make the decisions about water in a world that is running out of water?” (M. 
Barlow 2008c).  This heightened interest led Barlow to write an IFG report on the issue 
of water privatization (M. Barlow 1999), which eventually led to her co-authored 
bestselling book on the global water crisis, Blue Gold: The Fight to Stop the Corporate 
Theft of the World’s Water  (M. Barlow and Clarke 2002).  This and later works (M. 
 
   125 
Barlow 2008a; Lohan 2008) thrust Barlow and the COC into the global water spotlight, 
garnering Barlow several awards, the most noteworthy of which was the “Right 
Livelihood Award” bestowed by the Swedish Parliament, which she earned in 2005 for 
her work on the issue of global water justice.  Because Barlow has been the COC’s 
National Chairperson since 1986 and because she has taken a deep personal interest in the 
water issue, her individual contributions to this campaign have come to define the COC’s 
position as well.  Therefore, much of the information about the COC and its water 
campaign derives directly from Barlow’s writings and speaking engagements.  In the 
following discussion, this information serves as the basis for illuminating the ontological, 
political, and axiological characteristics of the COC 
Political Ontology 
Political ontology describes the way political actors perceive the character, nature, 
essence and “reality” of what exists in the world political system (Hay 2006, 80).  It 
constitutes an actor’s conception of “political being, to what is politically, to what exists 
politically, and to the units that comprise political reality” (Hay 2006, 80).  Thus, 
considerations of political ontology provide insight to the mindset of the actors who make 
up GCS, thereby allowing us to ascertain what GCS is, what it exists in relation to, and 
how it relates to these other entities, which, in their totality make up and animate world 
politics.  
 In response to the question of political being, the COC perceives itself as a pariah, 
or political outsider.  It understands its place as that of a government and corporate 
watchdog.   As such, it constitutes an “imagined community” (Anderson 1991, 6) made 
up of individuals who share a particular set of preferences, perceptions and values. It is 
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an “imagined” community because its members will “never know most of their fellow 
members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of 
their communion.” As I discuss below, part of what makes the COC a political outsider is 
its principled commitment to advancing social justice and environmental sustainability, 
among other things.   
 There is no doubt that these principles play a significant role in binding this 
community together.  However, principles alone do not define a community. Community 
is about drawing boundaries; it is about identifying who is part of your community and 
who is not.  Principles are not always the basis for drawing these distinctions.  For 
example, differences in fundamental principles do not completely explain the rift between 
the Hutu and Tutsi, between Shiites and Sunnis, or between Quebecois and all other 
Canadians.  For the COC, the boundaries of its community are not defined so much by 
the collective endeavor to secure and project shared values; rather, they are primarily 
defined by a collective exclusion of the “other.” In this respect, it does not matter as 
much that they are for justice and for sustainability (although these values still play a 
significant role), but rather that they are against governments and markets.  To reinforce 
this identity, the COC refuses to accept financial contributions from government agencies 
or corporations.  Thus, the COC has not built an organizational identity and imagined 
community on the basis of advocacy but on the basis of opposition.  Everything for the 
COC hinges on its ability to perpetuate this identity, as it constitutes the basis of its claim 
to offer a legitimately critical voice on issues of national and international significance 
(COC 2009b).    
 These insights provide some clues that will prove useful in answering how the COC 
 
   127 
might answer the question, what is politically?  Put differently, what does the COC view 
as a legitimate subject of political debate and what, if anything, does it hold is apolitical?  
In portraying itself as a critical voice and an advocate of global justice, it seems clear that 
the COC privileges the role of agency over structure.  That is, it views the roles of 
corporations, nations, the world political system, and even capitalism as contested 
domains. Specifically, it views these entities as social constructs, which implies that they 
possess instrumental rather than intrinsic value, that they are therefore malleable – 
although not infinitely so, and that civil society may possess the ability to bring about a 
positive transformation within these entities– meaning a transformation that reconfigures 
their behavior to ensure that they serve a legitimate social purpose.  What the COC views 
as apolitical is the fundamental value of water as a human right and public trust.  Viewed 
from the COC’s perspective, these values are not open to debate because they constitute 
given and eternal truths.  
 This perception of what is politically reveals what exists politically and the units the 
make up its political reality.  For the COC, there are fundamentally two types of people in 
the world: those who see our social and political systems as a means of securing equal 
treatment and fundamental rights and those who view it instead as a means of advancing 
their particular interests, even when this pursuit is made at the expense of the common 
good.  To illustrate this point, Maude Barlow frequently cites Martin Luther King, Jr., “It 
may be true that a law cannot restrain the heart but it can restrain the heartless” (Martin 
Luther King, Jr. as quoted in Barlow 2008a, 158).  For Barlow, as for the COC, the 
heartless are those who would deny the right of individuals to have reliable access to safe 
drinking water and sanitation services, regardless of the reason.  Thus, when it comes to 
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water, political reality consists solely of those who acknowledge this right and work to 
ensure it is guaranteed, on one hand, and those who would deny this right, on the other.  
The COC aligns itself with the former group, which consists of indigenous peoples, labor 
and environmental groups, women’s groups, and other like-minded associations.  Under 
the auspices of its Blue Planet Project, the COC cultivates relationships with other like-
minded NGOs around the world and works with these groups to select strategic sites on 
which to fight its political battles.  For example, the COC worked in concert with a broad 
range of water-related NGOs to support the passage of a referendum in Uruguay that 
amended that country’s constitution to declare water as a human right. In addition, the 
COC, working in concert with other NGOs, called on the government in Uruguay to 
guarantee a public system of water service delivery (COC 2004b). In contrast, the COC 
perceives itself as being diametrically opposed to the interests of multinational 
corporations, globe trotting bureaucrats, international governance organizations, and 
others that value water as a commodity, in which access depends upon the willingness or 
ability to pay.   
Axiology 
In addition to Barlow’s personal interest in water resource issues, water fits within the 
COC’s core values of sovereignty, social justice, and democracy. Taking on the challenge 
of global water governance was therefore a logical progression in the COC’s 
organizational development. When combined with the discussion above, this deep and 
consistent commitment to core values reveals key insights regarding way GCS fits in the 
history of world politics and is therefore instrumental to the overarching goal of this 
dissertation, which is to adjudicate competing theoretical claims about GCS.  To make 
 
   129 
this point more explicit, the discussion now turns to an investigation of the COC’s core 
values and its commitment to these values even in the face of considerable challenges.  
Sovere ignty 
The COC’s interest in sovereignty developed within the context of Canadian dependence 
on the US. From the COC’s perspective, the increasing asymmetry of this relationship 
threatened to bring about the slow destruction of Canadian sovereignty, its standard of 
living and its quality of life (Hurtig 2002, xi). The COC particularly values the economic 
and cultural dimensions of sovereignty.  Its concern for economic sovereignty finds 
expression through its promotion of the policies and practices associated with economic 
nationalism.  Economic nationalism is a protectionist economic philosophy that seeks to 
counter the negative effects of economic globalization by restoring Canadian control over 
Canadian enterprises.  The philosophy calls for a national moratorium on foreign 
ownership and foreign control of Canadian industry, improved market competition by 
blocking corporate mergers and takeovers, slowing and in some cases stopping the sale 
and export of natural resources, and reinvigorating national government as a bulwark 
against foreign and corporate interests (M. Barlow 1991; Hurtig 2002).  Its emphasis on 
cultural sovereignty calls for the reassertion of a unique Canadian moral presence on the 
world stage, a presence that gives expression to the shared commitment to human rights, 
non-violence, and the love of the land.   According to Maude Barlow, these values have 
been as “Canada is being seen more as a satellite of the United States and less as an 
autonomous nation” (M. Barlow 1991, 199). 
      The COC has transposed these concerns for economic and cultural sovereignty 
into the realm of global water governance. Here, its ideas of economic nationalism find 
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expression through its principled opposition to privatization and the virtual trade in water, 
which is the water used in the production and trade of agricultural and industrial products 
(Hoekstra 2003).  On these points the COC supports the position articulated by the IFG 
regarding the concept of “subsidiarity,” which calls for restoring local control over local 
resources to the greatest extent possible ("A Bias to the Local"  2009). Subsidiarity, they 
argue, promises to address the withering economic sovereignty of the poor and powerless 
by relieving them of the debt burdens that often force them to exploit their scarce water 
resources. Subsidiarity also requires the citizens of wealthy countries to regain control of 
their multinational corporations by holding them accountable for their activities in 
foreign countries (M. Barlow 2007, 160).   
 To give expression to its concerns for cultural sovereignty, the COC argues that 
water should not be valued as a commodity but as a commons and a public trust (M. 
Barlow 2008a, 2008b; M. Barlow and Clarke 2002).  Making this move grants 
governments “the right, as well as the responsibility, to intervene in the market when 
necessary and to institute regulatory measures, including the establishment of public 
enterprises” (M. Barlow and Clarke 2002, 170).  Whereas defining water as a commodity 
or market good excludes all but a narrow range of utilitarian values, defining water as a 
commons and public trust takes a more inclusive approach that is able to accommodate 
the multiplicity of values attached to water, thereby allowing us “to think not only in 
terms of income per capita but cultural identity, community, harmony between ourselves 
and with mother earth” (M. Barlow 2007, 176).  
Soc ial  Jus ti c e  
From the outset, the COC’s concern for social justice underpinned its entire philosophy.  
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Its original concerns about the Americanization of Canada were born out of its anxieties 
over the erosion of linguistic and regional equality within Canada, the growing domestic 
disparity between the haves and have nots, and the gradual dismantling of critical social 
safety nets, including medicare, publicly financed higher education, and welfare 
programs (Hurtig 2002).  Attributing these social injustices to the rise of free-trade and 
free-market agendas, the COC initially set out to expose and oppose these forces through 
its promotion of economic and cultural sovereignty.  With its global turn in 1994, the 
COC transposed these values of social justice from the national to the global sphere.  
 Water played a crucial role in this transition.  The COC’s concern for water allowed 
it to inject its values of social justice into an expanding sphere of global concerns about 
the consolidation of corporate power, resulting in a more ideologically consistent and 
thereby strategically focused global opposition.  But ultimately what gave the COC 
traction outside its domestic sphere of influence was the articulation of a social justice 
approach to water as a human right.  
  One lesson the COC learned in the course of its battles over free trade is that 
language matters.  Although its efforts to make the debates over free trade about 
economic and cultural sovereignty failed to stop NAFTA, the COC nonetheless persisted 
in viewing language and ideas as powerful weapons in the struggle for social justice.  
Armed with the notion of human rights, the COC developed into a small yet powerful 
force in the global contest over who would govern global water resources and to what 
ends.  In a recent talk on the global water crisis, Maude Barlow effectively captured the 
essence of the organization’s approach to social justice and global water governance: 
If we say collectively that there is a vacuum in our laws around water 
protection and around commons protection, not just water, and step into 
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that breech and we take a stand, who’s to stop us? Who’s to say that we 
don’t have the right to claim that that local watershed belongs to the 
watershed, belongs to the people who are dependent on it and belongs to 
the generations that come ahead?  (M. Barlow 2008c 27:27) 
 
This means that the right language can empower people - it can empower them to act and 
it can empower them to succeed against what are seemingly overwhelming odds.  The 
particular power of the human rights language, Barlow argues, is that it gives people a set 
of tools that they can then use within their territorial boundaries to challenge 
multinational corporations and their proxies within large multilateral institutions like the 
World Bank and the World Water Council.  
Democracy 
Related to this value of social justice is the COC’s commitment to democracy. In many of 
its arguments against the Mulroney administration, for example, the COC used the issue 
of democracy as a rallying cry against what it framed as an elitist and anti-democratic 
free-trade agenda.  According to Maude Barlow, the Mulroney administration had 
modeled itself after an American system that “lost its central goal, that the dream must be 
for everyone” (M. Barlow 1991, 179).  Democracy is vital, she continues, because it is 
only through this system “that people determine standards of living, access to the 
resources and wealth of a country, and the conditions under which business will be 
conducted” (M. Barlow 1991, 181). Thus, to surrender democracy “to economic forces is 
to define Canada only in terms of the bottom line, the corporate vision” (M. Barlow 1991, 
181).   
 Throughout the COC’s struggle against free trade, it fused this passion for 
democracy with its equally passionate commitment to national sovereignty.  This meant 
the COC perceived government as a potential solution to the threat posed by the rising 
 
   133 
influence of an anti-democratic corporate elite.  When Jean Chrétien and his Liberal party 
returned to power in 1993, it seemed for a moment that the COC would finally gain the 
government ally it so desperately desired.  The Liberals’ success was at least partly 
attributed to Chrétien’s campaign pledge to renegotiate key provisions of NAFTA before 
the agreement took effect on January 1, 1994.  Nevertheless, when the time came, 
Chrétien and his Liberals allowed NAFTA to take effect without a single modification.  
Maude Barlow and the COC were furious.  Writing about the incident several years later, 
Barlow said, “Chrétien’s Liberals fought Brian Mulroney’s Progressive Conservatives 
and their pro-American policies for the entire time they were in opposition and adopted 
every single plank of the Mulroney agenda when they took office, including NAFTA” 
(M. Barlow 2005, 15).  Characterizing this move as a betrayal (COC 2009c), the COC 
abandoned its commitment to advancing democracy through the institutional mechanism 
of national sovereignty, grounding it instead in the social apparatus of popular 
sovereignty.  Consequently, the COC came to view government as part of the problem, 
not the potential solution (COC 2009c). 
 Having adopted the identity of a government and corporate watchdog (COC 
2009b), the COC then extended its populist conception of democracy to the problem of 
global water governance. The COC now argues that nation-states often fail to live up to 
their responsibilities when they cede control of their water resources to the “Lords of 
Water,” a constellation of pro-market actors that includes the World Water Council, 
private water operators like Vivendi International, Suez Environment, and Thames 
Water, the water industry lobbying group AquaFed, as well as the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization.  The COC’s solution is 
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to redefine water as part of the global commons, yet ensure that it is ultimately subject to 
local and democratic management (M. Barlow 2007, 162). The COC defines a 
democratic water management system as one that uses local solutions to solve local 
problems.  Specifically, it argues that democratic solutions should display “a commitment 
to efficiency, accountability, transparency, and community participation” (M. Barlow 
2007, 162).   For the COC, the challenge of global water governance has become more 
than simply solving the particular issues surrounding water; it has instead become a 
conduit for bringing about a democratic, political transformation in our local, national 
and global political and natural systems.  In the words of Maude Barlow, water is 
“nature’s gift to teach us to live in harmony with the earth” and, by extension, with one 
another (M. Barlow 2008c 42:26).  
Political Characteristics 
Because the COC perceives itself as a watchdog struggling against the injustices and anti-
democratic tendencies of a corporate and bureaucratic elite, it has tended to adopt the 
strategies of a political outsider.3  In this David and Goliath struggle, the COC has 
adopted many of the typical strategies of an organization in its position: naming and 
shaming, public mobilization, and litigation, to mention but a few (Sikkink 2005).  
However, with the 2008 appointment of Maude Barlow to the newly created position of 
Senior Advisor on Water to the President of the United Nations, the COC had an 
opportunity, albeit brief, to also play the role of a political insider.   
Outs ide r S trateg ie s  
Throughout most of its history, the principal means through which the COC has sought to 
                                                
3 (For more on the "insider-outsider" distinction see Galtung 2000; Gulbrandsen and 
Andresen 2004). 
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advance its political objectives was by standing outside the existing political structure and 
casting blame (Martin 1990).  As a means of achieving its objective of enshrining the 
human right to water in national and international law, it is too soon to say for certain if 
this approach is a success.  Yet, as both a means of getting this issue on the international 
agenda and elevating its own organizational status in the process, there is little doubt that 
this political strategy has achieved its desired objectives.  In his strategic analysis of 
rights-based organizations like the COC, the executive director of Human Rights Watch, 
Kenneth Roth (2004), argues that this “naming and shaming” strategy is most effective 
when an organization delivers a message that clearly identifies the violation, the violator, 
and the remedy.  Because the function of a naming and shaming strategy is to generate 
public outrage and direct this outrage toward a particular set of actors and practices, Roth 
argues that this strategy works best when it frames the problem as one of arbitrary or 
discriminatory misconduct rather than as a more abstract matter of distributive justice.  
 This explanation proves quite helpful in explaining the COC’s limited success, both 
domestically and internationally.  Domestically, the COC has labeled Canada’s 
conservative Harper administration as obstructionist for its role in blocking the United 
Nations Human Rights Council from recognizing water as a human right, associating the 
administration with that dominant subset of the international community that has “failed 
to adequately manage and provide water for all” (COC 2004a).  On the international 
stage, the COC has focused its attention on the “Lords of Water,” arguing that this 
unelected collection of corporations, bureaucrats, and international institutions “have 
taken for themselves the role of speaking for the world. They are pushing one 
development model, a model through which all water is privatized and the market 
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determines allocation” (M. Barlow 2009).  What these behaviors reveal, the COC argues, 
is that governments are “abdicating the real decision-making about the future of the 
world’s depleting water supplies to a group of private interests and transnational 
corporations that view the [global water] crisis as an opportunity to make money and gain 
power” (M. Barlow 2008a, 33).  The answer they put forward is to enshrine the human 
right to water in national and international law, “to settle once and for all the question of 
who controls water” (M. Barlow 2008a, 164).  This endeavor to institutionalize the 
human right to water recently took a giant leap forward when, on July 26, 2010, the 
United Nations General Assembly declared “the right to safe and clean drinking water as 
a human right that is essential for the full enjoyment of life and all human rights” (as 
quoted in Gleick 2010).  For Barlow, this declaration is a “moral statement, a guiding 
principle of the countries of the world . . . that they have taken a step in a direction of 
saying that water is a human right and a public trust and that no one should be dying for 
lack of water” (Democracy Now 2010, 59:05).  This suggests that the next step for 
Barlow and other likeminded human rights advocates is to turn their focus from the 
institutionalization of a human right to water at the international level to a state-by-state 
effort focused on institutionalizing this right at the national level. The clear reference to a 
“moral statement” also suggests not just what Barlow and others intend to do but also 
how they intend to do it, which is to use the UN declaration as a means of shaming states 
into adopting the human right to water as a fundamental principle of their national laws.  
 In addition to this naming and shaming strategy, the COC also employs the use of 
litigation and public mobilization to achieve its objectives.  Working in concert with the 
Tay River Legal Defense Fund and the Canadian Environmental Law Association, the 
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COC supported litigation that forced OMYA Inc., a Swiss-based mining company, to 
reduce its water takings on the Tay River by two-thirds (Ehrhardt 2004).  The COC has 
also joined with Friends of the Earth, the Polaris Institute, and other water-related NGOs 
to file a complaint under the Canadian Code of Advertising Standards against Nestle 
Waters North America, arguing that its advertising campaign attempts to mislead the 
public on the true impacts of bottled water (Goldberg, Karunananthan, Wilkins, Clarke, 
and Olivastri 2008).  To mobilize public support for its water efforts, the COC hosts 
international water conferences and organizes marches, rallies, and water resource 
workshops.  Additionally, during her tenure as the national chairperson, Barlow has 
written several books on the topic of global water governance and traveled extensively to 
support her books and the COC’s agenda.  Organizational leaders in the COC also 
regularly attend international conferences, most notably the World Water Forum and the 
World Social Forum, where their efforts have focused on attracting the media spotlight.  
Ins ider St rateg ie s  
While the COC has frequently utilized lobbying and other insider strategies to advance its 
domestic objectives, it is only in recent years that it began to adopt insider strategies to 
advance its global agenda.   This development first emerged in 2007, when Maude 
Barlow accepted a position as the Water Advisor to the U.N. High Commissioner for 
Human Rights.  This led to her appointment as the Senior Advisor on Water Issues to the 
President of the United Nations General Assembly the following year.  Although the 
COC used these appointments as tokens of its success, Barlow used it as a means of 
changing the UN’s goals and decision-making procedures surrounding water resource 
issues by using her position to argue for enshrining the human right to water in national 
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and international law.  She also used these positions to challenge the “Lords of Water.”  
Speaking on behalf of the U.N. President of the General Assembly, Barlow delivered a 
rebuke to the World Water Forum for its bias towards private water companies, its failure 
to structure more inclusive and participatory deliberations, and for its explicit opposition 
to enshrining the human right to water in international law (Brockmann 2009).  Although 
it is difficult to know for certain if this speech had a direct effect, sponsors of the World 
Water Forum have thus far endeavored to show that they are placing a greater emphasis 
“on consultations with stakeholders at the (sub) regional level so as to ensure that sound 
proposals for solutions to the world water crisis are put forward in Marsaille in 2012” 
(WWC 2009. Emphasis added).  As her appointment has since expired, what is unknown 
is the degree to which the COC will continue to pursue these kinds of insider strategies 
on the international stage.  
Congruence Analysis 
The viability of a world political system made up of unitary states rests on the ability of 
that system to effectively solve such fundamental political problems as the provision and 
allocation of freshwater resources.  One consistent message coming out of the COC is 
that states have failed to live up to this basic responsibility.  As Maude Barlow points out, 
“well meaning governments have built the foundations of a system that is turning on the 
very people it was meant to serve” (M. Barlow 1999, 50).  She argues that freshwater 
resource issues have been a low priority for most governments and that the recent trend 
toward privatization only results in public subsidies for corporations whose involvement 
has only deepened the global water crisis (M. Barlow 1999).   
 Assuming she is right, what then are scholars to make of the role those 
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organizations like the COC play in righting this wrong?  Does the rising status of groups 
like the COC signify the onset of a new era in world water politics, one in which states 
and markets are increasingly made to compete for dominance with an expanding sphere 
of GCS? Alternatively, if we assume the old state-centric theories of world politics can 
accommodate this globalization of civil society, how then are we to make sense of this 
development? Is this a strategic reaction to new openings in the political opportunity 
structure? Or, by situating this globalized civil society within the political economy, 
should we view it less as a means of challenging the dominant ideology than as a means 
of obliterating the heterogeneity of cultural norms and values that currently animates 
world politics? 
Trans formational is t  Framework 
 Transformationalists define the goal of GCS as “one of reclaiming and advancing, 
at the global level, the social and political space for human freedom” (R. Taylor and 
Naidoo 2004, 184).  This means that the project of GCS is all about extending and 
deepening a cosmopolitan sense of imagined community, which, in the absence of the 
commensurate regulatory capacity of a global state, is necessary to provide the means for 
society to protect itself from the depredations of the self-regulating market (Lipschutz 
2007).  To advance this project, however, transformationalists insist that GCS must 
preserve the plural and autonomous representation of its constituents’ interests (Carr and 
Norman 2008).  Typically, this is understood to mean that the entities that make up GCS 
voluntarily commit to the universalistic norms, values, principles and practices associated 
with political and economic liberalism (Lipschutz 2006a).  However, some 
transformationalists also concede that GCS contains groups that are conservative, 
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reactionary or even nihilistically violent (Lipschutz 2007).  What these and other groups 
share in common, they argue, is an autonomy of interests. That is, they are self-
organizing, voluntary associations that are distinct from states and other institutions of 
governance, on the one hand, and markets, on the other (Kaldor 2003b).  
 If the autonomy of interests is the key to understanding GCS, then the 
transformationalist approach appears to provide a satisfactory explanation of the COC’s 
role in world politics.  Although a member-based organization, the COC does not accept 
contributions from corporations or government agencies.  This helps to explain how the 
COC has been able to preserve its independence from the agendas of states and 
international governance organizations.  Furthermore, because COC members and 
regional offices directly elect members to the board of directors, the organization’s 
agenda continues to reflect its constituents’ concerns.  Whether it was mobilizing public 
sentiment against a proposed water privatization scheme, building global alliances with 
other like-minded organizations, or staging protests during the World Water Forum, time 
and again the COC has demonstrated its autonomy and its commitment to creating and 
advancing the social and political space for human freedom.  Given its autonomy and the 
depth of its commitment to guaranteeing the human right to water, we might therefore 
conclude that a transformationalist approach provides the best insight to the role this 
organization plays in the history of world politics.  
 Nevertheless, it is difficult to imagine how the COC’s human rights approach to the 
global water crisis constitutes a fundamental transformation of the world political system, 
particularly given the COC’s equally strong preference for securing this right through 
national and international laws.  In other words, the COC does little to move our 
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imagination of world politics beyond a traditional Westphalian framework.  On the 
contrary, its efforts work to reinforce and prop up this framework, which it perceives as a 
bulwark against the real and potential dangers of unregulated market actors. Rather than 
transforming world politics, the COC acts instead to preserve the status quo against the 
impending threat of replacing collective or social property rights with a more liberal 
conception of individual market-based rights to freshwater resources.  
Pragmatic  Framework 
 Pragmatists would argue that civil society groups are never truly autonomous but 
are instead always embedded within a larger sphere of political struggle and contestation, 
where “the politics of transnational civil society is centrally about the way in which 
certain groups emerge and are legitimized (by governments, institutions, and other 
groups)” (Hurrell and Woods 1995, 468 as cited in Keck and Sikkink 1998a).  This 
means that the significance of GCS has less to do with ability of groups to formulate 
interests in isolation from the overwhelming influence of states and markets than with the 
complex and strategic interactions that translate certain ideas and norms into political and 
economic action.  Pragmatists advise us to think of GCS as a vast marketplace of ideas, 
where, like any marketplace, what determines the value of an idea is the success one has 
in selling it. By extension, pragmatists view GCS first and foremost as a factory of 
strategic innovation and diffusion, the goal of which is to gain influence within the world 
political system.    
 Thus, a pragmatist would argue that the COC’s fit in world politics is principally 
determined by its strategic exploitation of key opportunities in the global political 
structure.  Its success in selling or popularizing its ideas might therefore be attributed to a 
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host of strategic choices.  For instance, the strategic choice to frame water resources as 
human rights did not develop in isolation but is instead consistent with an established 
liberal tradition that privileges the needs of individuals above those of collectivities.  
Writing within this liberal tradition, John Rawls (1999, 79-80) argued that human rights 
“specify limits to a regime’s internal autonomy” in that “their fulfillment is a necessary 
condition of the decency of a society’s political institutions and of its legal order.”  The 
COC’s decision to frame the water debate within this human rights tradition therefore 
speaks less to its autonomy of interests than to its strategic skill.  Furthermore, by clearly 
identifying the violation, the violator, and the remedy, the COC framed this issue in such 
a way as to maximize its potential success in securing the human right to water as the 
dominant international norm of global water governance.   
 Other strategic choices, none of which are particularly innovative, also increased 
the popularity of the organization and its position. For instance, Maude Barlow’s decision 
to accept an appointment within the U.N. increased the profile and legitimacy of its 
campaign for enshrining the human right to water in national and international law.  By 
writing and publicizing books on the right to water, Barlow has attracted even greater 
media attention to the cause.  The COC has also actively participated in the creation and 
proliferation of transnational advocacy networks, which aim to make the “demands, 
claims, or rights of the less powerful win out over the purported interests of the more 
powerful” (Keck and Sikkink 1998a, 217).   
 Ultimately, however, pragmatic expectations are incongruent to the behavior of the 
COC.  Its principal flaw rests in the failure of pragmatists to grant sufficient weight to the 
role that values play in directing the behavior of the COC.  In short, pragmatists portray 
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the strategic behavior of GCS as a function of shifts in the political opportunity structure.  
A pragmatist might therefore explain the COC’s decision to go global as a function of 
new strategic political opportunities to gain domestic influence by operating in the 
international and transnational spheres (Keck and Sikkink 1998a; Sikkink 2005).  This 
would certainly explain the COC’s efforts to develop transnational advocacy coalitions 
and Maude Barlow’s decision to accept a position in the UN.  However, pragmatists 
cannot account for the level of persistence in the COC’s opposition to free trade and free 
market policies.  Nor can pragmatists explain the COC’s refusal to accept contributions 
from states or corporations.  Rather, following the passage of NAFTA, pragmatic theory 
would lead us to expect the COC to abandon its core values and adopt different values 
that are better suited to enhancing its influence within this new neo-liberal political 
climate.  Similarly, pragmatists would expect the COC to behave far more 
opportunistically in its fund raising activities. That the COC remained committed to its 
core values constitutes a major flaw in the pragmatist framework.   
Crit i cal  Framework 
 In the end, critical theories offer the most satisfactory account of the role the COC 
plays in the history of global water governance.  Critical theorists find fault with 
transformationalist and pragmatic conceptions of the world political system, which, they 
argue, embrace both the state system and liberal democracy as given, thereby foreclosing 
the possibility of ushering in a post-Westphalian world and/or rejecting the liberal 
capitalist order (Pasha and Blaney 1998).  Critical theorists blame transformationalists for 
casting the international disorder of systemic anarchy in a negative light, as “that which 
must be tamed and transcended via the growing modernization of the global relations,” 
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which includes GCS (Blaney and Inayatullah 2010, 15).  Pragmatists are taken to task for 
their failure to explicitly ask “on what - and whose - terms is the cosmopolitanism of 
transnational advocacy networks being constructed?” (Scholte 1999, 394).  The 
alternative and preferable method, critical theorists argue, is to situate GCS within the 
political economy.  This move reveals the relationship between GCS and the oligarchic 
organization of contemporary global political economy, thereby making it possible to 
determine the extent to which GCS represents an alternative to the hegemonic ordering of 
global social space (Pasha and Blaney 1998). 
 Such a critical approach would likely find much to celebrate in the COC’s 
ontological perceptions, values and strategic behavior.  The COC’s refusal to accept 
donations from corporations or government agencies clearly makes it more resilient to 
attempts by these entities to co-opt the COC for their own purposes.  In its rhetoric and 
practice, the COC also demonstrates a deep appreciation for the diversity of cultural 
norms and values.  This is exemplified through its consistent efforts to guarantee the right 
of safe and reliable access to freshwater resources for indigenous and marginalized 
groups.   
 At first glance, these values and behaviors might lead us to identify the COC as a 
positive force of diversity and human emancipation within the history of world politics. 
The strongest evidence for such a conclusion rests in the COC’s outspoken opposition to 
water privatization. The COC contends that the logic of privatization rests on the flawed 
assumptions that costly technological solutions constitute our only hope for solving the 
global water crisis.  Water commodification and privatization become necessary to raise 
the capital needed to sustain these investments.  According to the COC, this argument 
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rests on a false dilemma.  It overlooks low cost alternatives like conservation because 
such “strategies would undermine the massive investments now going into corporate 
technological and infrastructure solutions” (M. Barlow 2008b). According to Barlow, 
“the only people who don’t know that this model of globalization is over and done with 
are the people heading our countries and the big business community telling them what to 
do, and its time they listen” (Thomsen 2010).   The preferable solution then is to 
guarantee the right to water for all by enshrining water as a human right in national and 
international law.  
 Critics would, however, likely take issue with the COC’s insistence on a state-based 
alternative.  On one hand, the COC’s approach would intensify external pressure on the 
state by enshrining the human right to water in international law.  Through this 
modification of the norms of international society, states could be more easily subject to 
the shaming strategies of NGOs and others.  On the other hand, the implementation of a 
human rights regime at the national level tends to elevate the role of the judicial system 
over that of the executive and legislative, and the judicial system is the least democratic 
branch of government. Because the COC frames water both as a human right and a public 
trust, the multiplication of legitimate users generated through the adoption of a human 
rights regime would inevitably lead to conflicts over the just appropriation of finite water 
resources (Getzler 2004).  As such conflicts tend to erupt over competing interpretations 
of legislative statutes, they tend to fall under the purview of the courts. 
 Because the COC fuses the human right to water with the public trust doctrine, the 
philosophical grounds for judicial decision-making would likely continue to rest on the 
utilitarian principle of beneficial use, in which case water allocation decisions would 
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continue to privilege those uses with the highest economic returns (Ryan 2001).  This 
concept of a public trust, which has its origins in ancient Rome, has typically been 
applied in the modern context to protect rights of access for commercial interests.  As a 
trust, this instrument couches the governance of natural resources in terms of property, 
not stewardship, by designating the state as “trustee” charged with the responsibility for 
oversight.  However, the concept of a public trust does not specify the normative goals 
that steer public ownership.  Consequently, efforts to implement the public trust doctrine 
in international law would likely result in non-self executing legislation. In other words, 
because the public trust doctrine offers no guidance to the problem of moral 
considerability it could not become enacted as domestic or national law without 
additional implementing legislation (Ryan 2001).   
 Modifying the public trust through the addition of a human right is intended to 
address this problem.  The purpose is to ensure that states first satisfy the water rights of 
individuals prior to satisfying other demands on water resources.  However, the 
satisfaction of human needs for water is not a simple matter.  Humans need water for 
cooking, drinking, cleaning and basic sanitation.  However, they also need the freshwater 
embedded in the foods they eat and the sundry other goods they consume, including 
electricity and environmental services. As legislative bodies are typically not well suited 
to adjudicating these types of claims, debates over competing interpretations of the law 
are often thrust into the courts.  Because the courts tend to define matters of public trust 
in terms of property rather than stewardship, and because courts are also predisposed to 
privileging a utilitarian interpretation of the public trust doctrine (Ryan 2001), it is likely 
that this fusion of the human rights position to the public trust doctrine would likely 
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result in government policies that continue to privilege those sectors of society with 
higher economic returns.   
 Because critical theorists pay particular attention to the historical and material 
contexts of political dynamics in the world politics, of the three theoretical frameworks 
theirs is best suited to identifying these potentially harmful outcomes, particularly as 
these relate to the prospects for preserving the diversity of cultural norms and values in 
the world political system.  However, beyond its overarching interest in the preservation 
of diverse values and cultural understandings, critical theory fails to offer a coherent set 
of criteria upon which decisionmakers ought to distinguish legitimate resource claims 
from those which are illegitimate.  It is often difficult to know for certain which acts are 
most likely to generate not just political freedom but human freedom.  To say that more 
actors should actively participate in the decisionmaking process is a laudable goal, but 
there is little assurance that expanding the size of the decisionmaking body will yield a 
more effective or just outcome.   
Conclusion 
 This chapter set out to adjudicate the theoretical debate over how GCS fits in the 
history of world politics by assessing the congruence of these theoretical expectations 
about GCS with the actual values, behavior, and perceptions of the Council of Canadians 
and its campaign to enshrine in national and international law the definition of water as a 
public trust and a human right.  The COC was selected for this study because it represents 
that segment of GCS that ranks the satisfaction of human needs for water above other 
concerns for ecological integrity and economic growth.  As a proxy for this subset of 
transnational non-governmental actors, the COC represents a key faction of the much 
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larger and more diverse constellation of transnational civil society actors who are actively 
engaged in the debate over global water governance.  
 Two conclusions emerge from this analysis.  First, no one set of theoretical 
expectations satisfactorily maps the axiological, political, and ontological characteristics 
of the COC.  Transformationalists’ expectation that GCS functions as a contentious third 
sphere of world politics does appear to correlate with the COC’s perceptions, values and 
strategic behavior.  However, in linking the integrity of this independent political sphere 
to the autonomous development of interests, the transformationalist ontology becomes 
harder to sustain.  As pragmatists are quick to point out, interests do not develop in a 
vacuum but are instead the products of an intensely competitive strategic effort to gain 
influence on the world political stage (Betsill and Corell 2008; Friedman, et al. 2005).  
While this pragmatic explanation offers important insights to how and why the COC 
increased its status on the world stage, in discounting the role that values play in this 
story this approach is unable to explain why the COC remained committed to its core 
values even in the face of seemingly overwhelming adversity.   
 Because both transformationalists and pragmatists take the role of states and capital 
as given, critical approaches that situate GCS in the political economy are best suited to 
explaining how the COC might contribute to or militate against the creation of a more 
diverse and emancipatory world political system. In other words, in this instance the 
critical perspective offers the most satisfactory explanation of the ontological, axiological 
and political characteristics of GCS. Although this critical lens offers important insights 
to the potentially harmful implications of the COC’s human rights approach, it proves 
less useful for understanding how the COC ought to move forward to satisfactorily solve 
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the global water crisis.  On this point, pragmatists offer a far more satisfactory 
understanding of the COC’s behavior and achievements.  
 A second and related conclusion is that these findings suggest the need for 
additional theoretical reductions to improve the explanatory force of existing theoretical 
models.  These theoretical shortcomings reveal a fundamental failure to sufficiently 
explain the changes underway within world politics and, more to the point, the role GCS 
plays in this process.  This case study demonstrates that certain factions within GCS are 
endeavoring to modify the legitimate boundaries of state sovereignty, if not 
fundamentally transform the state system altogether.  The significance of this 
development cannot be understated, yet our theoretical models lack the ability to grasp 
this development in all its complexity.  
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Chapter 6: Green Cross International 
 
 
 In just two decades, Green Cross International (GCI) has emerged as a prominent 
global player in the fight to fundamentally transform the business-as-usual model of 
global water governance.  Under the guidance of its Founding President, Mikhail 
Gorbachev, GCI has played a key role in creating and promoting the Earth Charter, which 
defines the access to potable water as a right, and it has recently worked to enshrine this 
right by creating and promoting a Proposal for a Global Framework Convention on the 
Right to Water.  However, GCI has also been a leading global advocate for recognizing 
the full value of water, including its social, environmental, and economic values.  This 
chapter explains this irony as a consequence of GCI’s peculiar political ontology, an 
ontology that has its origins in the revolutionary insights of Russian geochemist Vladimir 
Vernadsky.  Rooted in the belief that human cognition has the capacity to fundamentally 
transform the biosphere, GCI has embarked on an ambitious yet strategically calculated 
effort to interrupt and reconfigure the normative foundation of world politics, to cultivate 
a sense of global solidarity, and to instill an ethic of responsibility.  
 By focusing on the economic and normative dimension of water governance, this 
chapter fills out the case study analysis of GCS. Chapters four and five revealed how The 
Nature Conservancy and the Council of Canadians address this problem of water 
governance in order to show how each fits in the history of world politics.  Building on 
the insights provided in chapter two, this chapter applies these same methods to the case
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 of GCI.  It provides a brief analysis of the organization’s origins, structural organization, 
and water related interests.  The chapter then offers a detailed examination of its political 
ontology, values, and politics, which sets the stage for the congruence analysis that 
follows. The chapter concludes by assessing the congruence of these findings with the 
theoretical expectations of transformationalist, pragmatist, and critical theoretical 
approaches. 
Introduction to GCI 
Orig ins  
In their history of global environmental politics, Ken Conca and Geoffrey D. Dabelko 
(2010) examine global changes during the period between the first UN Conference on the 
Human Environment, in 1972, and the most recent World Summit on Sustainable 
Development, in 2002.  Their analysis reveals six key areas of change in world political 
history: 1) a shift in the international political context from Cold War realpolitik to 
American unilateralism, 2) greater global public awareness about environmental 
problems, 3) increased scientific understanding, 4) dramatic growth in the number and 
size of national environmental bureaucracies, 5) exponential growth in the number of 
environmental NGOs, and 6) equally dramatic growth in the number of international 
environmental treaties, agreements, and environmental accords.  This observation, if true, 
provides unique insight to the origins and nature GCI.  Unlike TNC and the COC, GCI 
emerged during what is arguably the most critical juncture of this historic process, the 
1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development, in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.  Not 
only did this Conference signal the end of the Cold War but it enshrined the concept of 
sustainable development as a universal principle of global environmental governance, 
 
   152 
thereby opening up the search for new venues and approaches to solving global 
environmental problems (Tamiotti and Finger 2001).  GCI is a product of this search. 
 Although efforts to establish GCI began in earnest in 1992, the idea of creating an 
international organization that “offers assistance to the states in ecological trouble” 
(Gorbachev 1990, 202) took shape during the late 1980s and was rooted in the Chernobyl 
disaster of April, 1986, when radiation released from a damaged reactor is estimated to 
have killed tens of thousands (Rosen 2006).  This disaster spread radiation over 40% of 
Europe, where it caused as many as 200,000 abortions, then spread beyond Europe to 
contaminate parts of Asia, North Africa, and North America, exposing a total of some 
400 million people to high levels of radioactivity (IAEA 2006; Nesterendko and 
Yablokov 2009; WNC 2009).   
In addition to the negative implications for environmental and human health, 
Chernobyl was also a catalyst of fundamental political and economic transformations 
within the Soviet Union and world politics.  Having just assumed the office of Soviet 
President the previous year, Chernobyl profoundly altered Mikhail Gorbachev’s 
preferences, perceptions and values.  The disaster exposed Gorbachev to what he called 
“the sickness of our system” (as quoted in Gaddis 2005, 231), by which he meant the 
high levels of corruption and abuses of power that plagued Soviet society that were cited 
by Gorbachev and others as playing a causal role in the disaster.  His remedy was to 
greatly accelerate liberalization policies announced the previous year, policies which 
were intended to use capitalism as a means of saving socialism – a lesson he had learned 
from Franklin Roosevelt’s experiments with socialist reforms to American capitalism 
during the Great Depression (Gaddis 2005). Chernobyl also shattered Gorbachev’s faith 
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in technological solutions to developmental and environmental problems, leading him to 
the “new conviction that all technological processes which might have negative effects on 
the health and life of the population require supervision by society” (Gorbachev 1990, 
21).  Furthermore, the long-term implications of the Chernobyl disaster expanded 
Gorbachev’s time horizons, instilling him with a much greater awareness of the 
intergenerational dimensions of political and economic decision-making.  And, because 
the contamination spread across such a massive geographical area, the Chernobyl disaster 
made Gorbachev convinced of the urgent need for a holistic and cooperative approach to 
the global problems of security, trade, and environmental protection.  
 Between 1986 and 1989, Gorbachev and key members of his administration 
revealed this conviction through a series of speeches on the topics of nonproliferation and 
non-military sources of global insecurity.  Among the most notable of these was the 1987 
“Murmansk Initiative”, which laid out a set of policy initiatives aimed at establishing a 
nuclear-weapons free zone in Northern Europe.  In the specific area of environmental 
protection, the Initiative called for expanding collaborative efforts which had originally 
been designed to protect the Baltic Sea, using this experiment as the foundation for 
protecting  “the entire oceanic and sea surface of the globe’s North” (Gorbachev 1987, 5).  
In addition, the speech proposed the formation of a new cooperative effort to establish an 
integrated and comprehensive plan for protecting the entirety of the North, including its 
territorial spaces, which Northern states could then leverage against the suspicions of 
poor and developing countries in the South who perceived environmental standard setting 
and monitoring efforts as an unjustified curtailment of sovereign rights.  
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In her analysis of the speech and its outcomes, Kristian Atland (2008) argues that 
Gorbachev’s speech marks a clear departure from Soviet environmental policy prior to 
Chernobyl, when the Soviet leadership downplayed the threat of environmental 
degradation or otherwise discouraged cooperative efforts to address the problem.  Later 
speeches by Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze are consistent with Atland’s 
thesis.  These speeches conveyed a deep sense of urgency regarding the issue of 
environmental degradation as well as the need for coordinated efforts to overcome global 
environmental threats (Dabelko 2010).  Indeed, these themes gained momentum over 
time, as is illustrated by a 1989 speech in which Shevardnadze called upon the 
international community to support a new UN “green helmets” program, which could 
function as a “Center for Emergency Environmental Assistance” (Dabelko 2010).   
These efforts culminated in Gorbechev’s 1990 speech to the Global Forum on 
Environment and Development in Moscow, during which he called for the 
“ecologicalization of politics” (Gorbachev 1990).  Gorbachev began with the assertion 
that “humanity is part of the single and integral biosphere,” and that the scope and pace 
of environmental degradation had recently emerged as an existential threat to this totality 
(Gorbachev 1990, 199).  He went further by arguing in favor of dramatic modifications in 
the “factors of further progress in order to ensure man’s initial right – the right to life” 
(Gorbachev 1990, 199).  For Gorbachev, this meant finding ways to incorporate 
ecological externalities or costs into decisions involving production and consumption 
choices.  It also meant making far greater investments in, and support for, scientific 
research.  Additionally, it involved the deeper integration of ecology into education 
systems as well as a holistic effort to harmonize human relations with nature.  If, 
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Gorbachev argued, humanity was part of and embedded within a single and integral 
biosphere, then countering the threat of environmental degradation necessitated a new 
binding international code of ecological ethics.  Although he envisioned the UN as a key 
player in this effort, he also cited the need for other international organizations to play an 
integral role in this ecologicalization of world politics.  Notably, it was at this conference 
that he first argued for creating an international green cross, which could supplement the 
UN “Green Helmets” initiative proposed the year before.  Modeled after the International 
Red Cross, his proposed green cross would specialize in resolving environmental 
emergencies, like the Chernobyl disaster.  
From the entirety of his speech, it was this single brief recommendation to 
establish an international green cross that attracted international media attention.  The 
New York Times headline read, “Gorbachev Calls for Program To Save Global 
Environment,” The Sun Herald announced, “Call For World ‘Green Cross’ Plan,” and the 
Guardian labeled it as “Moscow’s ‘Green’ Debut.”  During the 1992 Rio Conference, 
several delegates voiced their support for Gorbachev’s green cross concept and 
encouraged him to launch the organization (GCI 2009b). A Swiss organization, entitled 
“World Green Cross,” emerged at the same time and pursued the same objectives.  In 
1993, the two organizations merged to officially launch Green Cross International. Its 
stated mission “is to respond to the combined challenges of security, poverty and 
environmental degradation to ensure a sustainable and secure future” (GCI 2009c) 
Organizat ional  Struc tu re  
   
To advance this objective, Gorbachev crafted the organizational features of GCI to reflect 
the core governance principles he sought to advance, namely cooperation, open and 
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multi-sectoral participation, and transparency.  The organizational model he chose was 
that of a democratically structured people’s movement, meaning that GCI “defines, 
promotes, launches and implements its programs in co-operation with its National 
Organizations” (GCI 2009a, 3).   As such, GCI adheres to a decision-making model 
grounded on the democratic principle of majority rule.  That is, decisions are made by the 
majority of participants within each of the organization’s decision-making bodies.  
 Green Cross National Organizations (NO) constitute the GCI’s membership base.  
NOs are financially self-sufficient entities, which means they receive no financial support 
from GCI Headquarters.  Thus, each NO is a quasi-autonomous entity.  To qualify for 
membership, NO applicants must demonstrate their financial self-sufficiency, submit an 
Action Plan that describes planned projects, at least one of which must advance one of 
GCIs international programs, and provide information on potential board and staff 
members.  Upon acceptance, new NOs undergo one year of probationary status, after 
which time they can apply for full National Organization status.   As of March 2010, 
there were 31 NOs spread across six continents (see Figure 5 below).  
GCI’s supreme decision-making body is the General Assembly (see Figure 6 
below).  Membership of this body consists of the top elected officials from each of the 
NOs, the Founding President, the President and CEO, the Vice Presidents, the Treasurer, 
and the members of the Board of Directors.  Meetings of the General Assembly are 
convened by the Board of Directors and are held at least once every two years. Specific 
powers include, but are not limited to, the election of members to the Board to Directors, 
review of the last two years reports and financial budget, and the resolution of all legal 
matters associated with GCI (GCI 2009a, 6). 
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The Board of Directors is GCI’s central strategic and governing institution.  The 
Board meets at least once per year to select GCI officers, including the President and 
CEO, review NO program reports, and other related duties.  The Board consists of 5-15 
members, including the Founding President, President and CEO, First Vice President, 
Treasurer, and others who are elected to the Board by the General Assembly.  Although 
the GCI Charter recommends that qualifying members of NOs also serve on the Board, 
their inclusion is not required. Members serve two-year terms and may serve up to three 
consecutive terms.  
 The Honorary Board is an advisory body to GCI.  It consists of 15-35 individuals 
who have volunteered their time, resources and good name to advancing GCI’s 
objectives.  Members are selected by the General Assembly and are eligible for re-
election indefinitely. Honorary Board members do not have voting rights within the 
 
   158 
organization; however, they are encouraged to propose strategies for GCI policies and the 
General Assembly must consider these strategies during its meetings.   
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GCI’s executive body consists of the offices of its President and CEO as well as 
its Headquarters Staff.  The President and CEO oversee the day-to-day implementation of 
decisions made by General Assembly and Board of Directors. In addition, the President 
and CEO make strategic decisions regarding how best to manage operations to advance 
GCI’s objectives.  In addition, the President and CEO chairs the GCI Council and GCI’s 
Program Implementation Committee.  Located in Geneva Switzerland, the Headquarters 
Staff is subordinate to the President and CEO.  Its primary responsibility is to carry out 
the day-to-day work of the organization in a manner that is consistent with its principles 
and objectives.  
 The GCI Council consists of CEOs from the six most active NOs.  It functions as 
the primary coordination body for all NOs, and, in this capacity, advises the President on 
matters of GCI management.  The President nominates GCI Council members, who are 
then endorsed by the Board.  The Board meets no less than four times per year.  
 The Programs Implementation Committee is made up of the Chairpersons of 
GCI’s International Programs.  These Programs include Energy, Water, Environmental 
Security, the Social, Medical Care, and Educational program, and the Education and 
Value Change program.  This Committee serves as a clearinghouse for program 
development and advises the President on related matters.  Neither the GCI Council nor 
the Programs Implementation Committee have voting rights.  
 GCI also reserves the honorary status of Founding President to Mikhail 
Gorbachev in recognition of his contribution to the organization and his ten-year tenure 
as President and CEO. This title empowers Gorbachev to serve as the organization’s 
ambassador.  As of May 2010, Alexander Likhotal filled the position of GCI President. 
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Likotal was a professor of international relations at Moscow University and a former 
advisor and spokesperson for Mikhail Gorbachev.  
 GCI finances its activities through two sources: the annual contributions of its 
members and grants, contributions and donations from international agencies, national 
governments, foundations, industries and individuals (GCI 2009a). However, GCI does 
not make its financial statements available to the public, which makes it difficult to 
determine who funds the organization and to what extent these funding arrangements 
have changed over time. What makes this particularly odd is that this policy stands in 
stark contrast with those of its NOs, many of which make their annual financial reports 
available on their websites.  When asked about its policy, GCI simply replied that this 
information is confidential and that any information deemed suitable for the public could 
be found on its website (Gueorguieva 2010).  
GCI in Global  Wate r Governance  
 
From the outset, GCI focused significant attention on freshwater resource problems.  Its 
founding charter identifies water as one of four focus areas. The others are energy, 
communication and the Earth Charter, and environmental education.  Specifically, the 
charter calls attention to the problem of water conflicts prevention and resolution.  As 
water resources grow increasingly scarce, there is rising concern that the competition 
over water will devolve into intra- and inter-state conflict.  This issue of water conflict 
prevention had attracted significant international attention throughout the early 1990s.  It 
was made salient by a 1991 UN proposal to use the Ataturk Dam in Turkey to shut off 
flows of the Euphrates into an intransigent Iraq (Gleick 1993).  Framing water as a 
security problem was partly a matter of conceptual convenience; it extended the 
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relevance of Cold War political theories to the new political difficulties of the post-Cold 
War era (Dalby 2002).  An examination of GCI’s other focus areas reveals how it would 
work to reduce the danger of water conflicts.  It’s focus on energy efficiency and 
conservation reveals a preference for demand-side policy solutions. In addition to this 
top-down approach, GCI’s focus on environmental education, communication and the 
Earth Charter, points to a preference for bottom-up strategies directed toward the social 
construction of preferences, perceptions and values.  
 This sophisticated and comprehensive approach to water resource problems was 
partly the product its historical and institutional context.  By most estimates 1992 marked 
a turning point in the history of global water governance (Conca 2006; Finger and 
Allouche 2002b).  In January 1992, a preparatory meeting for the UNCED met in Dublin 
to specifically address global water resource problems.  This meeting was noteworthy 
because it was the first to argue that “Water has an economic value in all its competing 
uses and should be recognized as an economic good” (WMO 1992).  In doing so, the 
Dublin Conference attributed water scarcity to a single cause, which was the “past failure 
to recognize the economic value of water” (WMO 1992).  This economic argument 
attracted widespread attention during the UNCED held later that year.   The Conference 
action plan, titled Agenda 21, enshrined this economic principle by defining water as both 
a social and economic good.  The action plan called for additional research on the use of 
economic instruments to “take into account opportunity costs and environmental 
externalities” (UN 1992b, 18.15).   It argued that economic measures might prove 
beneficial to the development and strengthening of cooperation over water resource 
allocation and provision (UN 1992b, 18.12).   This economic focus marks a dramatic 
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shift from the traditional emphasis on supply-side solutions to water resource problems.  
The fact that Agenda 21 defines water as an economic good signifies that the 
international focus had shifted to demand-side water resource problems, that decision-
makers sought an effective way to use public policy to solve these problems, and the 
widespread awareness that the best solution is one that reconfigures public preferences, 
perceptions, and values of water.  
 GCI’s approach to water resource problems was also informed by Gorbachev’s 
experiences with the Aral Sea.  The Aral Sea was once the fourth largest lake in the 
world; it was a huge, shallow, and saline body of water located in the deserts of the 
south-central Soviet Union, straddling the border of present-day Kazakhstan and 
Uzbekistan.  In the 1950s, the Soviet Union diverted water from its tributaries to irrigate 
millions of hectares of land for cotton production.  This so-called “white gold” was a key 
export commodity throughout the period of Soviet rule.  Shortly after taking power, 
Gorbachev instituted a policy of Glasnost, or political transparency, which soon exposed 
the environmental costs these diversions imposed on the Aral Sea.  By the 1990s, the 
surface area of the Aral Sea had shrunk by half and the water volume was down by 
seventy-five percent (Calder and Lee 1995).  Gorbachev led an effort to redirect water 
back into the rivers, however, these efforts proved insufficient.  By the early 1990s, 
growing water scarcity had caused significant tensions among several Central Asian 
states.  Scientists now agree that there is little hope of restoring the Aral Sea to its 
previous size and health.  Declared by UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon to be “one of 
the worst environmental disasters in the world” ("Shrinking Aral Sea underscores need 
for urgent action on environment"  2010), the desiccation of the Aral Sea is one of two 
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cases, along with the Chernobyl disaster, that Gorbachev credits with shaping his view 
“that the developments in science and technology of the past century bring with them not 
only huge benefits, but also great responsibility, as human mistakes or mismanagement 
can now cause irreversible damage” (Gorbachev 2007).  Gorbachev attributes the 
mistakes and mismanagement to the “struggle for short-term profit, encouraged by the 
unregulated free market, [which] has led to unacceptable human and environmental 
abuses, often in the name of ‘economic growth’” (Gorbachev 2007).   The answer, 
therefore, is to fully incorporate the humanitarian and environmental externalities into the 
price of goods and services in order to convey more accurate information to the consumer 
about the implications of purchasing decisions.   
 In sum, these early influences on Gorbachev and GCI reveal four things.  First, 
they demonstrate that GCI emerged at a moment of widespread skepticism about the 
business-as-usual model of global water governance.  This is most evident in the shift 
from supply-side to demand-side strategies of water governance, but it was reinforced for 
Gorbachev by his experiences with inappropriate technology in the Chernobyl and Aral 
Sea disasters.  Second, GCI emerged at another turning point in world history – the end 
of the Cold War.  As a cold warrior, Gorbachev likely felt comfortable defining new 
global political problems like water governance in the familiar context of security 
concerns.  Third, GCI also emerged at the onset of a paradigmatic crisis in government 
regulation.  Long experience with corruption and the lack of political transparency 
culminated in a backlash against direct government management, which is manifest here 
in the Dublin Statement redefining water as an economic good.  GCI, like many others, 
believed that a healthy dose of market discipline might correct the bad behavior of 
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governments.  Finally, proposals for economic solutions to demand-side problems also 
point to a widespread desire to reconfigure popular preferences, perceptions and values.  
The significance of this point will be made clearer in the discussions that follow. 
Political Ontology 
GCI’s economic perspective on water resource problems has its roots in a unique political 
ontology.  Theirs is an ontological perspective that perceives humanity in its totality as a 
global civilization and the living world as a singular and infinitely complex unit, or 
biosphere.  This worldview finds its philosophical footing in the work of Russian 
Geochemist Vladimir Vernadsky.  Writing in the 1930s and 1940s, Vernadsky explored 
the perennial question regarding the place and role of humans in Earth’s evolution.  In the 
course of his research, Vernadsky identified three distinct phases in the Earth’s 
evolutionary history: the geosphere, the biosphere, and the noosphere.  The geosphere 
describes the geological epoch of Earth’s evolutionary history between the Archean 
period and the Pleistocene when the Earth was nothing but inert matter.  The biosphere 
denotes the geological epoch of biological life, which includes the complex totality of 
living and inert matter, like soil or lake water (Verdansky 1999c). What delineates the 
biosphere epoch from the geosphere epoch is the evidence of shifts in the geochemical 
cycle of carbon. Prior to the Pleistocene, the geochemical cycle remained unchanged, yet 
in the biosphere epoch the geochemical composition of carbon changes over time 
(Verdansky 1999a).   
The noosphere marks yet another break in the evolutionary history of Earth, 
which can be demarcated by the “intense growth of influence of the living matter of one 
species (civilized humanity) upon the shift in the biosphere condition” (Verdansky 
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1999b, 95).  Noosphere, literally translated as the sphere of human thought, describes the 
emergence of scientific knowledge and organized human labor as geological forces that 
reconstruct the biosphere, thus marking a further shift from the evolution of species to the 
evolution of the biosphere.  The defining attribute of this epoch is human thought, which 
binds all of humanity into a single totality.  “If man understands this,” Vernadsky argued, 
“and does not use his brain and his work for self-destruction, an immense future is open 
before him in the geological history of the biosphere” (Verdansky 1999d, 98).  
 Although this noosphere concept informs GCI’s cosmopolitan ontology, GCI 
nonetheless recognizes a certain fragmentation within the larger global society, and 
argues that “all parts of this community are essential to the functioning of the whole” 
(GCI 2009a).  These parts include businesses and governments, international 
organizations, other elements of the environmental movement, and globalization, 
conceived of as an overarching yet constructed process of modernization and excessive 
materialism.  Because these entities constitute a single social formation, each is 
embedded within yet responsible for reigning in the excesses of this overarching 
globalization process.  This implies that agency is not determined by social structure but 
rather has the capacity to consciously alter the structural condition.  In his forward to an 
edited volume on the biosphere and noosphere (1999, ix), Gorbachev argues “what is 
really needed is a new synthesis comprising the valuable elements of many existing 
perspectives, including liberal and socialist values and individualist and community 
ideals.”  This implies that normative interventions are required to reconfigure the 
structural dimensions of a reckless and indeed unsustainable globalization process.   
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To achieve this normative intervention, each element of this organic world 
political system must therefore exercise a higher degree of self-restraint.  International 
organizations like the UN need more power in order to do a better job of monitoring 
environmental degradation and protecting areas of global importance.  States need to 
devise more appropriate regulations and pursue more effective enforcement of these 
regulations.  Businesses need to incorporate the full cost of their production processes 
into the price of their goods (Gorbachev 2001a).  And NGOs need to do a better job of 
ensuring that the problem of development is a “subject of constant concern and attention 
by the international community” (Gorbachev 2000a, 246).  For its part, GCI perceives 
itself as an “international, independent, not-for-profit, and non-governmental 
organization” (GCI 2009a, 1).  Its peculiar political ontology, rooted in the geological and 
evolutionary ideas of Vernadsky, directs its energy to reconfiguring the normative 
foundation of world politics.  This objective contrasts with the goals of the TNC, which 
pursues its ecological objectives within the existing normative framework of world 
politics.  It also contrasts with the goal-seeking behavior of the COC, which endeavors to 
preserve a traditional normative framework against what it perceives as the threat of a 
new neoliberal approach.  The next section describes the types of values GCI seeks to 
inscribe through this endeavor.   
Axiology 
I believe in the cosmos.  All of us are linked to the cosmos.  Look at the sun.  If there is 
no sun, then we cannot exist.  So nature is my god.  To me, nature is sacred.  Trees are 
my temples and forests are my cathedrals 
Mikhail Gorbachev, 1997 
 
If we accept the proposition that humanity has the capacity to consciously reconstruct the 
social structure through some form of normative intervention, the question then is what 
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norms or values will allow humankind to evolve within the limits of the biosphere?  The 
preamble of the charter of GCI offers one possible answer.  It begins with the simple 
statement that “all life is sacred” (GCI 2009a, 1).  By this it means that all forms of life 
possesses intrinsic value, which implies that every element of the planetary community is 
essential to the functioning of the whole.  In addition to their material value, all forms of 
life also bear certain spiritual and cultural values that rejuvenate the human spirit, 
“inspiring human consciousness with wonder, joy and creativity” (GCI 2009a, 1).  “To 
preserve life in its integrity and diversity,” GCI argues we must instill all of humanity 
with an ethic of responsibility and restraint if we are to have any hope of preventing 
further “destruction and waste for short-term utilitarian reasons and to restore now the 
damage that we have already done” (GCI 2009a, 1). 
 In political terms, this means that GCI values such democratic principles as 
participation, transparency, and accountability.  GCI understands participation as a multi-
sectoral and multi-scalar process, with multi-sectoral participation referring to the open 
and equal involvement of members from sectors of “government, spiritual communities, 
science, business, the arts, education, journalism, and issue-focused activism” (GCI 
2009a, 2).  In contrast, multi-scalar participation refers to the participation of peoples 
across the global and local dimensions of a given environmental problem.  A necessary 
step toward more effective and open participation of this sort, of course, requires a 
stronger ethic of tolerance for difference, which means that views or beliefs ought not to 
be imposed by force (Gorbachev 2000a).  It also necessarily implies unprejudiced 
communication among participants, which is the seed for mutual understanding, trust, 
and a deeper sense of human solidarity (Gorbachev 2000a).   
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Transparency and accountability also contribute to this overarching goal of 
securing a sense of solidarity, which was made painfully evident in the cases of 
Chernobyl and the Aral Sea.  In each case, it was the lack of transparency that enabled 
the Soviet government to pursue reckless policies and harmful environmental practices.  
The lesson learned was that making information and decision-making procedures open 
and available to the public engenders a sense of investment by society, enhances the 
efficiency and effectiveness of public policies, and reduces the likelihood of corruption.  
Indeed, this was Gorbachev’s experience after implementing Glasnost within the Soviet 
Union and it was a policy that he enthusiastically promoted upon taking up the 
Presidency of GCI (Gorbachev 2000a).  Accountability fills out the range of democratic 
values that are central to GCI’s efforts to promote a deeper sense of human solidarity and 
advance the project of sustainability.  Specifically, GCI is concerned with the 
accountability of states, many of which resort to claims of sovereignty as a shield against 
the criticism of international society.  To hold states accountable, GCI supports the 
creation of a special code of rights and responsibilities for governments, the purpose of 
which is to restrain potential violators of democratic norms (Gorbachev 2000a).  The next 
section provides a much more specific account of the strategies GCI employs to instill 
these norms within the world political system. 
Political Characteristics 
Water, like religion and ideology, has the power to move millions of people.  Since the 
very birth of human civilization, people have moved to settle close to water.  People 
move when there is too little of it.  People move when there is too much of it.  People 
write and sing and dance and dream about it.  People fight over it.  And all people, 
everywhere and everyday, need it. 
Mikhail Gorbachev, 2000 
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Water has emerged as the primary vehicle through which GCI has attempted to realize its 
particular brand of human solidarity.  Its water-related activities focus on three particular 
areas of the development problem.  First, GCI has used the water issue as a way to 
intervene in the normative dimensions of the global development paradigm.  It does this 
by contesting the sustainability of existing norms, promoting alternative norms, and 
supporting the reconfiguration of structural power within the political system.  Second, 
GCI has called for greater and more effective investments in the water sector.  Its 
investment proposals focus on the need for a full valuation of water, increases in official 
development assistance, and targeting governance reforms to attract private investments.  
Finally, GCI implements water resource initiatives that support water-resource projects 
designed to reduce tensions and educate people on the environmentally sustainable 
practices that are appropriate for those who live on or near transboundary river basins.  
For a brief moment it appeared that the Rio Conference might usher in a global 
commitment to choosing a new direction for development and a new era of civilization, 
rooted both in an ethic of responsibility and mutual understanding.  Indeed, had the plans 
and proposals made at Rio been implemented there would have been little need for an 
organization like GCI.  But alas, too little effort was made and this brief opportunity was 
soon eclipsed by a retreat to the disorderly business of politics as usual.  From 
Gorbachev’s perspective, the Rio Conference had lost momentum because its outcome 
“did not fulfill the criteria of a genuine charter that could stand like a third pillar together 
with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the United Nations Charter” 
(Gorbachev 2006, 88).  Working in close cooperation with Maurice Strong, then 
chairman of the Earth Council and Secretary-General of the Rio Conference, Gorbachev 
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launched an ambitious effort to remedy this situation.  His solution was to develop an 
Earth Charter, which could serve both as a legislative framework for sustainable 
development and as a kind of textbook for a new development ethic.  Its core principles 
call for 1) building a deeper sense of respect and care for the community of life, 2) 
protecting and restoring ecological integrity, 3) ensuring social and economic justice, and 
4) upholding democracy, nonviolence and peace.  Officially published in 2000, by 
December 2009 the Earth Charter received over 20,000 individual endorsements and 
more than 5,000 organization endorsements, which represent millions of people (Jimenez 
and Motyrov 2009, 7).  Today, GCI’s efforts to implement the Earth Charter constitutes 
one of the organization’s four focus areas and is the principal way it endeavors to modify 
the values and behavior of the world political system.   
The Earth Charter references water in two distinct contexts.  The first recognizes 
access to potable water and sanitation as a right, locating this right in the same category 
as the right to clean air, food security, and shelter (ECC 2000).   In 2004, Gorbachev 
attempted to advance this initiative by introducing a new GCI-sponsored proposal to 
establish a Global Framework Convention on the Right to Water.  The stated objective 
was to strengthen international law and legal rights regarding freshwater resources.  Like 
all its initiatives, GCI advanced this objective by adopting a cooperative approach to 
problem solving.  In so doing, it sought advice and support from a host of NGOs and 
business interests, including the World Water Council, Suez, and the International 
Secretariat for Water.  Its proposal begins by framing the right to water to mean the 
“fundamental access to ‘water for life,’” and “productive water” (GCI, et al. 2005).   It 
defines “water for life” in clear terms as the sufficient quality and quantity of water 
 
   171 
required to satisfy basic human needs for “drinking, hygiene, cleaning and cooking, and 
subsistence agriculture” (GCI, et al. 2005).  GCI goes on to define “productive water” as 
water used in activities with an economic value in the marketplace. Although recognized 
as a distinct and separate right, this right to “productive water” is nonetheless held as 
“necessary and access to it must be guaranteed” (GCI, et al. 2005).  The Proposal denies 
that water is a “mere product or simple commodity” to be exploited for “excessive profits 
or speculative purposes,” but is instead considered a public good while it is in its “natural 
state” (GCI, et al. 2005).  It goes on to underscore the need to balance the right to “water 
for life” with that of “productive water,” asserting that the right to water should balance 
the needs of individuals, ecosystems, and the needs of “agriculture and cattle farming, 
industry and energy production, and leisure activities” (GCI, et al. 2005).   
In addition to referencing the right to water, the Earth Charter also references the 
ecological needs for water.  GCI has endeavored to advance this objective through its 
Water for Peace program, which promotes conservation and cooperation over shared or 
transboundary water resources.  In one example, GCI supported efforts to reduce water-
related tensions between Israel and Palestine by educating local Palestinians on the 
causes and consequences of groundwater pollution, with the goal of monitoring, 
alleviating and managing pollution there (GCI 2008).  More recently, Gorbachev 
launched a high profile water initiative, titled “Memorandum for a World Water 
Protocol,” in the European Parliament on February 12, 2009.  The Memorandum calls for 
making the inclusion of water in global climate change negotiations a high priority.  It 
calls specific attention to the issues of conflict prevention, the right to water for all, and 
the need to safeguard the global water heritage for future generations.  In sum, the 
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Memorandum calls for a new “global water political paradigm,” which involves 
overcoming the current paradigm of  “more harvesting and more money per water drop” 
and replacing it with “more life and living together per water drop” (IERPE and The 
World Political Forum 2009, 10).  
In addition to these strategic interventions into the normative dimensions of water 
governance, GCI also works to increase international investments in the water sector.  To 
this end, GCI has pursued a two-pronged strategy of calling for higher and better targeted 
official development assistance, as well as greater predictability and transparency in 
national water laws to attract private investments.   To advance the first objective, GCI 
embarked on networking activities with the Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF), Oxfam, 
CARE, and other international NGOs to lobby the Commission for Sustainable 
Development to double the water-related financing from donors to developing countries, 
to more effectively target development assistance to those countries with the greatest 
need, and to pressure national governments to assess the full economic, social and 
environmental values of their ecosystems so that they can incorporate this information 
into their water resources decision-making (CSD NGO Consortium 2005).  Working 
independently, GCI has endeavored to reframe the global economic recession as an 
opportunity to shift from the kinds of harmful investments that were typical of the 
previous free-market economic model to a more sensible and long-term approach that 
features green investments in areas like water infrastructure, investments that “can be a 
veritable panacea not just for the current economic crisis but can be a structural 
correction for the world economy as such” (Likhotal 2009).  
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At the national level, GCI has been a vocal advocate of state-level regulatory 
reforms that attract private-sector investments in the water and sanitation sector.  In a 
lecture entitled “Gulf Security and Regional Watercourse Management: Implications for 
the UAE” (2005, 23), then GCI Vice President Bertrand Charrier argued “users, not 
taxpayers, should pay the full cost of water delivery and there should be a compensation 
system for poor people.  To conserve water and reduce demand, everyone should have to 
pay something, with the ultimate goal of paying for water supply and sanitation in full.”  
Charrier goes on to observe that public funding is in a state of decline that will likely 
continue into the foreseeable future.  Thus, he concludes “it is imperative that public 
funds be used only for purposes for which it would be impossible to attract other sources” 
(2005, 24).  To attract private funds, he argues it is necessary to ensure both a predictable 
and transparent regulatory framework, as well as one that protects the interests of 
investors and consumers.  Yet even with these reforms, Charrier observes that the need 
for significant government subsidies will likely persist and therefore that governments 
may still be required to maintain their budgets at current levels (Charrier 2005).   What 
private sector involvement offers then is the promise of much needed investments and 
technology transfers.  In a region estimated to need some $200 billion in additional water 
investments by 2025 (Permal 2010), this analysis was likely received as a heavy dose of 
sobering news. 
In addition to the strategies listed above, GCI also implements water resource 
initiatives at the local level.  For example, through its Smart Water for Green Schools 
initiative, GCI finances the construction and implementation of rainwater harvesting and 
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ecological latrines4 at schools adjacent to transboundary river systems around the globe.  
A pilot project began in 2010 and will focus on the La Plata, Volta, Mekong, and Jordan 
River Basins.   As of this writing, the first project was underway in Ghana at a school 
situated within the Volta River Basin.  Here, GCI and its corporate partner Pureology are 
financing the construction of a 5,000 gallon rainwater harvesting tank and a number of 
ecological latrines.  GCI predicts that these systems will provide a much needed and 
reliable supply of safe drinking water while offering the added benefit of educating the 
local population on the kinds of environmental practices that are appropriate for 
transboundary river basins (GCI 2010).   
Congruence Analysis 
This empirical analysis of GCI offers an additional insight to the variability within GCS.  
Whereas the particular perceptions, values and behaviors of previous case studies 
highlighted non-governmental activity associated with the environmental and public 
dimensions of water resources, this chapter focused instead on that subset of actors that 
privileges an economic approach to the global water crisis.  This section will explore the 
unique problems this principled position poses to the competing theoretical 
interpretations of the role GCS plays in the history of world politics.  Specifically, the 
theoretical challenge presented in this case study centers on the disconnect between 
GCI’s rhetoric and its behavior. Can the transformationalist insistence that GCS 
constitutes a contentious and self-directed political sphere accommodate GCI’s 
collaborative approach and its close associations with state and corporate interests?  Can 
pragmatists’ concern for the role of strategic innovation and strategic diffusion prove 
                                                
4 Ecological latrines are toilets that use little or no water and have the ability to generate 
fertilizer that is safe for agricultural use.  
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sufficient to explain the consistency of perceptions and values that are central to GCI’s 
strategic behavior?  Can critical concerns for the diversity of cultural norms and values 
provide relevant insights to the disconnect between GCI’s rhetoric and behavior?  This 
section endeavors to flesh out these and other questions in order to adjudicate these 
competing theoretical takes on the way GCS fits in the history of world politics.   
Trans formational is t  
There is much here that recommends a transformationalist interpretation of GCI and its 
wide ranging efforts to reconfigure the landscape of global water governance, not the 
least of which is an ontological perspective that reduces all of humanity to a single and 
interdependent totality – a geological and evolutionary force unified and distinguished by 
the capacity to reason yet plagued by an irrational tendency for self destruction, a 
tendency that is most evident in the disorderly fragmentation of the world politicalsystem 
into egoistic nation-states.  GCI marks a departure from this destructive reality, and it is 
because of this that transformationalists would interpret it as something new on the world 
political scene.  It marks the emergence of a new political sphere, they might argue, one 
that is less committed to the idea of the sovereign state for its own sake than the evolution 
and prosperity of humanity in its totality.  Its goal to interrupt and reconstruct the very 
normative foundation of development would certainly appear to transformationalists as 
an act of defiance or rejection of the state-centric world political system, just as its 
ecological work in Palestine and Ghana might appear the same.  Specifically, 
transformationalists would interpret GCI’s efforts to shaping the discourse over the 
human right to water or sustainable development as proof positive that the rise of this 
NGO has coincided with a decline of the state, since such influence, whether it is 
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manifest on the states themselves or on their populations, must certainly constrain the 
ways that states conduct their affairs.  How else can we explain the lasting appeal of 
something like the Earth Charter, which is evident in the endorsements of so many inter-
governmental organizations, NGOs, universities, cities, and individuals?  Certainly this 
effort, directed not at states but rather at the normative framework within which states 
operate, must necessarily enhance the stature and autonomy of an organization like GCI 
to the detriment of the self-centered state.   
   But transformationalists would nonetheless struggle to account for the utter 
absence of contentious politics or the belief, expressed here by Gorbechev, that “it takes 
strong states to confront a world in rapid transformation” (Gorbachev 2004, xvi).   GCI 
does seek to bring about a radical transformation in the history of world politics but one 
that is fundamentally normative, not structural.  It seeks to interrupt the business-as-usual 
conception of development, which emphasizes only the right to liberty – a negative right 
of non-interference - by privileging instead a deep sense of positive obligations through 
its preferred ethic of responsibility.  Its goal is not to wither the state and thereby elevate 
the role of GCS but rather to follow the ethical mandates of this ethic of responsibility by 
taking positive steps to redress environmental harms when they occur and, whenever 
possible, to prevent them from occurring in the first place.  In the pursuit of this 
objective, GCI has focused its effort on the global water crises because water is 
something everyone needs, which means that a normative transformation of global water 
governance has “the power to move millions of people” (Gorbachev 2000b).  
In her book, Taking Action, Saving Lives, Kristen Shrader-Frechette (2007, 177) 
argues that in avoiding the worst problems, like the problem of development, to focus 
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instead on very clear sub-problems for which complete remedies are achievable, groups 
like GCI strategically circumvent theoretical disagreements over different rationalities. 
As a result, sub-problem successes are then used as a basis for building momentum to 
tackle the overarching problem.   To be effective in achieving their ultimate goal, 
however, the actors who follow this small-wins strategy must keep their eyes on the 
prize.  As this chapter has made clear, the prize for GCI is the normative reconfiguration 
of world politics, not the kind of structural and ontological reconfiguration 
transformationalists lead us to expect.  To achieve this larger objective, GCI has pursued 
a variety of top-down and bottom-up efforts that seek to realize this through an 
incremental process of gradual reform.  From the top-down, GCI has called on states to 
fully implement existing commitments regarding the allocation and provision of water 
resources.  Since to do so would necessarily empower states, it seems clear that GCIs 
argument works to reinforce rather that to weaken the position of states in the world 
political system.   
Similarly, its bottom-up efforts to induce a normative change in the global 
governance of water resources primarily focus on the full valuation of water, which 
includes it economic, social and environmental values.  The purpose of doing so is two-
fold.  First, this effort is designed to establish a new set of criteria to guide decision-
making over water resources.  Second, a full and transparent valuation of water is 
essential for overcoming the information deficits that plague the water supply and 
sanitation sectors.  Criticisms aside, the point in defining water as an economic good is to 
effectively convey information about the scarcity of the resource so that the individuals 
and groups can act as a check against attempted abuses of power.  Since both goals seek 
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to reconfigure and empower the roles of states and markets in the domain of global water 
governance, the ontological claims made by transformationalists do not appear to stand 
up in this case.   
Pragmatis ts  
Because pragmatists sidestep these ontological issues by focusing on the political or 
strategic dimensions of GCS, it may appear that they offer a more satisfactory account of 
the way GCI fits into the history of world politics.  From a pragmatic point of view the 
primary function of GCS is to provide information for the purpose of changing decision-
maker’s minds.  Its ability to perform this function determines its degree of influence 
within, or value to, the world political system (Betsill and Corell 2008).   
This pragmatic lens draws our attention first to the types of activities GCI 
undertakes to transmit its information about the global water crisis to decision-makers.  
Here, pragmatists would likely point to GCI’s efforts to create and implement the Earth 
Charter as an example of strategic innovation in the generation and dissemination of 
information regarding widespread discontent with the business as usual models of global 
water governance specifically and development more generally. Pragmatists would also 
point to its continuous involvement in international water conferences like the World 
Water Forum as another signifier of its relevance and influence within the world political 
system.  Additionally, pragmatists would interpret its networking activities, which are 
multi-sectoral and multi-scalar, as yet another sign of its political relevance and potential 
influence within world politics.  The fact that GCI has been granted access to a wide 
range of venues to transmit its information provides further evidence of its relevance and 
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potential influence.  These venues range from the European Parliament to political 
negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis.  
Pragmatists would also point to several of GCI’s resources as critical assets to its 
continued relevance and potential influence within the world political system.  These 
resources include its organizational expertise in the area of water conflict negotiation and 
resolution, popular support for its Earth Charter initiative, as well as its large network of 
National Organizations.  Although the problem of counterfactuals makes it difficult to 
establish a clear causal chain (Sekhon 2004), the strongest evidence of GCI’s influence is 
found in the thousands of organizational endorsements for its Earth Charter initiative, 
endorsements that represent millions of people around the world.  
 Yet for all these strengths, the pragmatic approach loses sight of the forest for the 
trees.  In this case, it tends to look only where the “light is brightest: on actors and their 
actions rather than on the interplay of agents with structures” (Lipschutz 2006b, 110).  By 
focusing on these actions alone, pragmatists miss the values and objectives that spawn 
and guide these actions.  Thus, they overlook the more profound role GCI plays in world 
politics.  Its goal is not merely to influence decision-makers but rather to interrupt and 
reconfigure the normative framework of global governance.  This, after all, is the key 
reason GCI focuses so much attention on the issue of global water governance.  It views 
water not just as an effective means of reconstructing the rules and decision-making 
procedures of world politics but also as a way of reconfiguring the preferences, 
perceptions and values of millions of people.  Thus, pragmatists cannot account for the 
fact that its “small-wins” strategic move to target water resource problems is part of a 
larger strategic effort designed to remake the landscape of world politics.   
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Crit i cal  Theory 
Given its overarching concern for preserving the heterogeneity of values and cultural 
understandings within the world political system, a critical theory approach offers the 
most satisfactory theoretical account of GCI’s role within the world political system.  
This is due to the fact that GCI is fundamentally focused on interrupting and 
reconfiguring the normative framework of world politics.  Effectively, GCI argues that 
the normative paradigm of world politics is significant because it determines the practices 
of global governance, the kinds of problems that system of governance can solve, and 
what constitutes a legitimate problem-solution.  GCI’s complaint is that the current 
normative paradigm projects a neo-liberal conception of development, that this paradigm 
has failed to resolve multiple critical problems within the system, that it is no longer 
possible to evade these problems, and therefore it is necessary to establish a new set of 
normative commitments of global governance. The strength of critical theory is that it 
provides the necessary tools to evaluate the axiological implications of GCI’s normative 
propositions for solving the perceived normative crisis within the world political system. 
 The strengths of the critical approach are that it draws attention to the 
implications of GCI’s argument for a universal normative realignment of water 
governance and world politics, it raises some important questions about the disconnect 
between GCI’s rhetoric and its behavior, and opens up additional questions about its 
democratic contribution to the world political system.  GCI’s normative framework rests 
on the assertion of global solidarity.  To quote Gorbachev, “If we are to deal successfully 
with the environmental crisis, the persistent, widening gap between rich and poor, the 
epidemics of new, previously unknown diseases, and finally the challenge of terrorism, 
we must work together, in concert” (Gorbachev 2004, xvi).   Critical theorists would say 
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that such a claim of universality is warranted, but that it can be problematic if it results in 
the homogenizing of difference into sameness (Blaney and Inayatullah 2002).  This 
means that claims to universality should respect cultural differences and be cognizant of 
the historical and structural forces that caused inequality. At least on paper, it seems the 
solidarity GCI seeks to project is one that is sensitive to the problem of cultural 
difference and the need to protect the heterogeneity of values and cultural norms.  
However, according to Gorbachev, “we need to find a paradigm that will integrate all the 
achievements of the human mind and human action, irrespective of which ideology or 
political movement can be credited with them” (Gorbachev 2001b, 13).  This concern for 
diversity is most evident in the Earth Charter, which speaks to both the issues of 
biological diversity as well as cultural diversity. 
 There is, however, a lingering concern for the disconnect between GCI’s rhetoric 
and its actions.  In his lecture in the UAE, Bertrand Charrier revealed a tendency to slip 
from the use of economic mechanisms as a conveyance of information to a conveyance of 
profit.  As Charrier made clear, GCI supports government restructuring efforts designed 
to reduce the state’s role and increase that of the private sector.  Ironically, Charrier also 
admits that this effort will do little to reduce the budgetary burdens of the state since the 
needs to preserve subsidies to the poor will continue into the foreseeable future.  Critical 
theorists would argue that to take such a position only works to reinforce and extend the 
kind of neo-liberal development model that GCI seems to oppose.  These concerns also 
extend to GCI’s human rights proposal.  One critical legal analysis has argued that its 
“conflation of commercial and human rights fundamentally undermines that very 
rationale for a new international instrument concerning water as a human right, which is 
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to guarantee that priority be given to human not commercial interests” (Sack Goldblatt 
Mitchell 2005, 1-2. emphasis added).  The analysis goes on to fault the proposal for 
defining water as a commodity and for its tacit consent to privatization and free-market 
policies, explaining that these methods “do not offer a viable model for providing social 
or public services” (Sack Goldblatt Mitchell 2005, 2).  However, the most damaging 
characteristic, according to the analysis, is its use of a human rights instrument to impose 
free-market economic policies.  The authors allege that this constitutes “an unprecedented 
incursion of such policies into the sphere of international human rights law” (Sack 
Goldblatt Mitchell 2005, 2).   
 Beyond the obvious questions such concerns generate about GCI’s commitment 
to constructing a new more responsible world order, there are lingering questions about 
GCI’s democratic credentials.  From an organizational perspective, GCI is only 
imperfectly democratic.  Its reluctance to disclose its financial statements suggests that 
lack of internal transparency that is antithetical to the kind of global democratic values it 
often proclaims.  Furthermore, the fact that it limits membership to National 
Organizations raises additional concerns about legitimacy and accountability, although 
these legitimacy concerns are somewhat offset by its role in creating and promoting the 
Earth Charter.       
 One of the most common criticisms of critical theory is that if fails to offer a 
viable alternative to a given problem.  In this case, however, it is not entirely clear that 
the problems posed by GCI’s support for privatization nor its organizational structure are 
so critical as to recommend an alternative.  One key contribution of critical theory is its 
capacity to illuminate who is likely to pay and who is likely to suffer.  In this particular 
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case, it is unclear whether the actions of GCI will eventually conform to the rhetoric or 
vice versa.  GCI’s close ties to privatization advocates like the World Water Council and 
Suez might suggest an answer.  Yet, GCI also remains a staunch supporter of the Earth 
Charter, which is decidedly not a free-market doctrine.  Thus, from a critical theory 
perspective, the answer to how GCI fits in the history of world politics remains decidedly 
ambiguous.  However, critical theory typically frames ambiguity as an analytical 
strength, not as a problem to be overcome.  Because critical theory situates actors and 
their actions within their historical and situational contexts, the story of their implications 
for world politics is often left incomplete.  In other words, the critical theoretical 
approach to diachronic analysis does not make any pretence to the type of predictions 
often associated with positivism.  Rather, the purpose of critical theory is often to 
frustrate taken-for-granted assumptions about the nature of the world political system and 
the political phenomena that animates this system.  Thus, when viewed through a critical 
lens, an ambiguous conclusion is also often a satisfactory one insofar as this ambiguity 
functions to create a measure of uncertainty and doubt into the purposes and implications 
of an agent and its actions.  
Conclusion 
This chapter suggests that critical approaches to GCS offer the best insights into how GCI 
fits in the history of world politics.  If actors within GCS pursue reforms to the 
fundamental norms and values of global governance, the question from a critical 
perspective is whether the alternative values they propose are sensitive to the diversity of 
cultural understandings and values that animate the world political system. In this case 
the disconnect between GCI’s rhetoric and its behavior raises doubts about the nature of 
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its relationship to the hegemonic historic bloc, a global social formation perceived by 
critical theorists as a singularly self-interested and undemocratic political threat to this 
diversity.  On one hand, GCI’s political ontology and values both suggest that the 
organization marks a new and progressive axiological break in the history of world 
politics.  On the other hand, the analysis of GCI’s strategic behavior suggests that it also 
supports for-profit policies, policies that work to reinforce and project the interests and 
values of the hegemonic historic bloc.  Because this is a problem that neither the 
transformationalist nor pragmatist approaches revealed, this finding suggests that the 
critical approach offers the most satisfactory insights to the way GCI fits in the history of 
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Chapter 7: GCS, Global Water Governance  
and the History of World Politics 
 
 
This dissertation argues that theoretical deliberations on global civil society (GCS) have 
entered a new developmental stage.  Chapters one and two described the first stage as a 
process of hypothesis acceptance. Some early theoretical accounts of post-Cold War 
politics boldly claimed to discover the emergence of a new phenomenon in the history of 
world politics - GCS.  A small group of scholars took up this theory and set to work 
gaining widespread acceptance for their claim that the sudden flurry of transnational non-
governmental activity should be viewed in its totality as a singular political entity.  The 
successful conclusion of this initial stage occurred sometime in the late 1990s, when the 
concept of GCS finally gained inclusion into the contemporary political lexicon.  
However, the successful conclusion of this outward-looking phase gave way to arrival of 
a new inward-looking phase, as scholars undertook the task of defining the conceptual 
parameters of GCS. What exactly are its defining characteristics?  Does it have any 
inherent tendencies?  For example, how does it function? Does it exhibit any normative 
biases?  And what is the nature of its relations with the other elements of the world 
political system?  Over time, the effort to answer these and other related questions 
splintered what had been a small but coherent theoretical conversation into three distinct 
and incommensurate theoretical camps. This dissertation has embarked on the ambitious 
goal to adjudicate this contemporary theoretical debate. 
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 In Chapter three I argued that the global water crisis offers an interesting 
opportunity to achieve this end.  Why? Because water is something everyone needs. We 
need reliable and safe access to drinking water to stay healthy.  We need it to fuel our 
industries and produce our food.  Sometimes we need it to for aesthetic or cultural 
reasons too.  So when the governance of water resources breaks down, the effects tend to 
be immediate and widespread.  As just one example, the United Nations (UN) estimates 
the death toll from recent flooding in Pakistan is upwards of 1500 and warns that this 
number is likely to rise (Charbonneau 2010).   Unsafe and insufficient water supplies are 
also serious and immediate concerns.  The World Health Organization estimates that one 
child dies every twenty seconds from preventable water-related disease (Ordzhonikidze 
2008).   We only need compare the immediacy and severity of water governance 
problems with issues of climate change or deforestation, each of which are serious and 
pressing issues in their own right, to understand the relative import of water resource 
problems.  While the latter issues are significant problems they nonetheless generate 
effects that we measure in years or generations, not days and minutes.  As a result, water 
resource problems generate the degree of urgency that is often missing in the global 
climate change and deforestation debates.  Breakdowns in water governance prompt 
people to take action. But scratch the surface of any local or national water resource issue 
and you will likely expose a problem of global dimensions.  
The paradox of scholarship on global water governance consists in the persistent 
failure to pay serious attention to the role GCS plays in this story.  The exception to this 
point is Ken Conca’s recent work on the global water governance, yet his findings have 
thus far failed to stimulate any durable consideration of GCS among water resource 
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scholars.  It is a goal of this dissertation therefore to advance this cause by once again 
calling attention to the need for additional research on this issue.  One unanticipated 
discovery in this dissertation is that it offers a glimpse of the vast depth and breadth of 
GCS activity in the domain of global water governance.  The organizations studied in this 
project play an important role in shaping the rules, norms and decision-making 
procedures of global water governance.  They undertake extensive ecological projects. 
For example, The Nature Conservancy’s water conservation project in the Condor 
Bioreserve is so large that it has implications for nearly every aspect of the biosphere.  
GCS plays a prominent role as well in shaping widespread preferences, perceptions and 
values about water.  For example, the Council of Canadians has been instrumental in 
normalizing the human right to water as a global ethic of water resources governance.  
This concluding chapter draws on these case studies to construct an overarching 
congruence analysis, the goal of which is to offer recommendations for theoretical 
revision.  The chapter begins with a brief review of the congruence analysis methodology 
presented in chapter one, specifically focusing on its strengths and limitations.  In sum, 
congruence analysis offers an effective way of clarifying and refining theories that lack 
the degree of clarity and internal consistency to be tested in a more rigorous way.  
Building on this foundation, the chapter flows into a systematic congruence analysis of 
the three theoretical perspectives on the role GCS plays in the history of world politics.  
This inquiry begins with the transformationalist perspective, which describes GCS as an 
ontological break in the history of world politics.  In this section, the key concern is 
whether the case studies justify the transformationalist assertion of a zero-sum 
configuration of power in the world political system.  In the next section, the chapter 
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presents an analysis of the pragmatic claim that GCS marks a political or strategic break 
in world political history.  In this section, the core question is whether the pragmatic 
claim of mutual and strategic gains offers a sufficient and satisfactory account of the role 
GCS plays in the world political system.  The final section focuses on the axiological 
claims emanating from critical theory.  Here, the key question is whether the critical 
concern for axiological diversity can provide a satisfactory account of the role GCS plays 
as an agent of incremental structural change.  The chapter concludes by offering 
additional reflections on this subject as well as suggestions for future research. 
Congruence Method 
In their analysis of qualitative case study research methods, Blatter and Blume (2008) 
note that the main mechanism of control in the congruence method is the rivalry between 
multiple theories.  For the congruence method to be effective, the authors warn that these 
theories must be coherent and conceptually rich.  This means that the theories must go 
beyond merely presenting a hypothesis regarding the causal relationship between an 
independent and dependent variable.  Instead, these theories should contain 1) discrete 
ontological assumptions about the most important actors, 2) competing observations of 
causal processes, and 3) different explanations of actors’ preferences, perceptions, and 
values.  The congruence method pits these abstract concepts and predictions against 
concrete observations in order to determine the relative worth or validity of the 
competing theoretical frameworks.  To make these determinations, Blatter and Blume 
(2008, 328) recommend “giving most weight to the conceptual core of a theoretical 
framework,” as opposed to the alternative method of weighing and counting every match 
and mismatch between prediction and outcome.  While this approach is insufficiently 
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rigorous to make a clear determination about which theory is right and which is wrong, it 
does reveal their relative explanatory strength.  Such insights promote the immediate goal 
of theoretical refinement and the ultimate goal of producing a theoretical framework 
capable of withstanding the rigors of a process-tracing approach.  
The Trans fo rmati onal is t  Approach 
The first of these is the transformationalist approach, which argues that the root cause of 
our failure to solve global problems like water governance rests in the collective inability 
to move beyond our state-centric imagination (Wapner 1991).   This argument rests on 
two observations.  First, that states and international organizations have been increasingly 
forced to contend with transnational non-governmental actors who challenge their 
governance authority.  Based on this observation, transformationalists argue that GCS is a 
contentious and democratizing political force (Kaldor 2003a; Keane 2001; Lipschutz 
1992, 2006b).  Their second observation is that many of the activities associated with 
GCS often ignore the state entirely.  Transnational non-governmental actors frequently 
take it upon themselves to directly engage in governance activities of their own.  This 
observation leads to the assertion that GCS constitutes a self-directed political sphere 
(Wapner 1996).  What fuses these various arguments into a coherent whole is the shared 
assumption that there is a finite quantity of power within the world political system, so 
that the gains made by one actor or set of actors must be offset by losses elsewhere within 
the system.  It is this conception of a zero-sum system that forces the issue of autonomy 
to the fore.  Transformationalists perceive autonomy as the manifestation of power, 
which makes it essential for measuring power variations within the system.  It is therefore 
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taken as self-evident that recent increases in the scope and scale of GCS have coincided 
with a withering of the roles that states and markets play within this system.  
 Yet the findings in this dissertation offer no support for the transformationalist 
perspective.  That is, the case studies did not substantiate the claim that the rise of GCS 
coincides with the withering of states and/or markets.  On the contrary, all three case 
studies revealed GCS to be a strong advocate for modifying the state, if only to increase 
the state’s authority over environmental resources.  Through its Parks in Peril program, 
The Nature Conservancy (TNC) worked to build the state’s capacity to more effectively 
govern natural parks.  TNC’s other water resource activities, including its payment for 
ecosystem services proposals and its leadership on the issue of environmental flows are 
also directed toward expanding and refocusing the state’s authority over water resource 
problems.  Likewise, the Council of Canadians (COC’s) efforts to enshrine the human 
right to water in national and international law functions to expand the state’s authority 
over water resource governance.  What the COC opposes is the loss of democratic 
decision-making that coincides with privatization. It therefore perceives the state as a 
bulwark against the perceived pressure of encroaching non-democratic market forces.  
Green Cross International (GCI) also works to establish a stronger state role as part of its 
long-range strategic plan to reorder the normative foundations of world politics.  From 
this perspective, building a strong state is tantamount to instilling an ethic of 
responsibility across such a large and diverse global population.  
 While the data gathered for this study is insufficient to conclusively falsify the 
transformationalist claim of an ontological break in the history of world politics, it does 
nevertheless support the alternative hypothesis that power within this system is of an 
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unbounded quantity.  This study finds that even the most contentious political actor 
works for the expansion of state authority in the domain of global water governance.  
This suggests that the recent expansion of GCS has not crowded out the state, as 
transformationalists expect, but rather that it has been ancillary to the state, which is a 
claim that is more in-line with the theoretical accounts of pragmatists and critical 
theorists.  Certainly, there is always the possibility that other elements of GCS may seek 
to undermine or weaken the state, perhaps to make way for the expansion of market 
forces or the introduction of other non-state governance mechanisms.  However, as such 
actors are embedded within the larger domain of GCS, their preferences and actions alone 
cannot be interpreted as being tantamount to the characteristics of the larger totality.  In 
sum, it seems clear that the introduction of GCS is only problematically described in 
terms of a zero-sum game, in which GCS gains power only at the expense of other key 
elements within the world political system. 
The Pragmat ic  Approach 
The data uncovered in this dissertation does lend a high degree of credibility to the 
pragmatic argument that GCS marks a political or strategic break in the history of world 
politics.  This argument diverges from the transformationalist approach in its assumption 
that GCS remains firmly embedded within the existing state-centered power structure of 
the world political system.  Building on this assumption, pragmatists argue that GCS 
constitutes an expanding domain of strategic innovation and diffusion within this 
overarching structure.  Some pragmatists allege that the expansion of GCS enables 
domestic political actors to sidestep structural roadblocks at the domestic level by 
facilitating the creation of transnational advocacy coalitions that bring external pressure 
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to bear on domestic political authorities (Keck and Sikkink 1998a).  Others assert that 
GCS elevates the status of certain knowledgeable transnational non-governmental actors 
in decision-making processes (Haas 1992).   Still others examine the formal and informal 
negotiations between GCS and states to reveal the multiple ways in which GCS elevates 
the status of particular issues on the international agenda (Betsill and Corell 2008; 
Friedman, et al. 2005).   
What these theorists share in common is an overarching interest in the role GCS 
plays in the production and strategic use of knowledge.  This implies that pragmatists do 
not perceive knowledge as power but instead as a means of attaining and conveying 
power, which they define as influence (Betsill and Corell 2008).  This also suggests that 
power is not a finite quantity but is instead without bounds, which means that mutual 
gains within the world political system are both possible and preferable.  One actor does 
not have to lose so another can win.  Instead success depends on the strategic production 
and deployment of knowledge.  Pragmatists argue that GCS is instrumental to this 
success because it facilitates the expansion and diffusion of the strategic repertoire.  
  Each of the three case studies revealed the pragmatic approach to be an effective 
tool for revealing the strategic implications of GCS.  In the TNC case, the pragmatic 
expectation of strategic learning and innovation offered a plausible explanation for the 
shift in TNC’s core values, from an ecocentric position that emphasized the need to save 
nature from people to a more anthropocentric position that stressed the need to save 
nature for people.  Put simply, pragmatists expect non-governmental actors to set aside 
their core values when they perceive these values as a critical barrier to achieving their 
strategic objectives.  The TNC case was also consistent the pragmatist hypothesis linking 
 
   193 
power/influence to strategic innovation and diffusion.   This hypothesis accounts for 
TNC’s significant influence in world politics, attributing this success to its production of 
knowledge about environmental problems and its efforts to disseminate this knowledge 
through its partnerships with international organizations, states, corporations, NGOs, and 
indigenous groups.   
The pragmatic approach also accounts for COCs limited success in enshrining the 
human right to water in national and international law.  Pragmatists argue that non-
governmental actors are most likely to succeed 1) when they obtain access to the 
decision-making process, 2) when they effectively convey information to the decision-
makers involved in this process, and 3) when they make judicious use of their resources 
so as to shape the decisionmaking outcome (Betsill and Corell 2008).  In this case, 
COC’s contentious strategies often make it a political outsider.  On those rare occasions 
when the organization gained access it frequently pursued radical tactics that reduced its 
credibility within the institutional setting. It is no coincidence, however, that the COC 
scored its most significant success after its national chairperson, Maude Barlow, accepted 
an advisory position inside the U.N. General Assembly.  To the extent that the COC 
nevertheless holds fast to a contentious strategy, pragmatists would predict that this 
success might well prove to be the high-water mark of its human rights initiative.  
Pragmatic expectations also proved effective in explaining the limited success of 
GCI’s efforts to resolve water resource conflicts.  GCI is regularly granted access to 
decisionmakers. By framing the problem and problem-solution in universal terms, its 
claims often resonate with the preferences, perceptions and values of many 
decisionmakers. In addition, GCI has enhanced its credibility by undertaking direct 
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efforts to address the key causes of water conflicts. Although its efforts to promote the 
Earth Charter have been successful in earning widespread support, they have been less 
successful in bringing about the kinds of global normative transformation is GCIs 
overarching objective. This is largely because the Earth Charter marks a dramatic 
departure from the business-as-usual model of sustainable development.  Thus, in spite of 
receiving significant global support for this initiative, GCI has framed the Charter in a 
way that does not resonate with key global decisionmakers.  
 In spite of these theoretical strengths, this dissertation exposed several critical 
flaws in the pragmatic perspective.  In the COC case, the pragmatic expectation that 
actors will privilege goal attainment over core values did not materialize.  Even in the 
face of repeated and devastating failures, the COC refused to set aside its principled 
commitment to deliberative democracy.  Indeed, at a critical juncture in the 
organization’s history – the passage of NAFTA – the organization renewed its committed 
to this core value by setting out to project this value into the transnational sphere.  Above 
all, it was this enduring commitment that attracted international attention to the COC, 
culminating with Maude Barlow’s appointment as senior advisor on water issues to the 
President of the United Nation’s General Assembly.  
In the case of GCI, pragmatic expectations regarding strategic behavior proved 
too narrow to fully capture the significance of GCIs contribution to global water 
governance.  This flaw is partly a consequence of failing to grant sufficient weight to the 
role that values play in shaping behavior.  GCI’s overarching goal is to interrupt and 
reconfigure the preferences, perceptions and values of water governance, aligning them 
in accordance to its particular conceptions of ecological sustainability.  Because 
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pragmatists focus on the interactions of actors and institutional outcomes, their model 
failed to reveal the political relevance of GCIs ecological work and other non-
institutional activities.    
More importantly, these flaws speak to a more critical problem with the pragmatic 
perspective on strategic behavior. Theoretically, strategic behavior begins when an actor 
confronts a particular situational context.  Given this context, the actor assesses the 
situation and rank-orders her preferred outcomes then decides which among a range of 
possible actions is best suited to maximizing her probability of achieving this preferred 
outcome. Pragmatists clearly understand the process up to this point.  What they 
misdiagnose are the origins of actor preferences.  As a rule, pragmatists assume that 
preferences are determined by motives, shift in the opportunity structure, and the ability 
to rationalize behavior.  Therefore, pragmatists expect actors to cast aside their core 
values when they prove inconvenient to achieving some strategic objective.  Pragmatists 
insist that the most preferred outcome is one that maximizes an actor’s influence (Betsill 
and Corell 2008), and they are particularly interested in the ways that influence is 
manifest or achieved in an institutional context.  However, this dissertation revealed that 
core values are not so lightly cast aside.   Furthermore, it demonstrated that 
considerations of institutional influence are not always the overriding concern in strategic 
decisionmaking processes. Thus, while the pragmatic approach may prove helpful for 
granting insights to the role GCI plays in a given institutional context, as the sum of these 
institutional activities do not define the totality of its political endeavors the pragmatic 
approach was ultimately poorly suited to explaining how GCI fits in the history of world 
politics.    
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 Again, neither the methodology nor the data allow for a conclusive rejection of 
the pragmatic approach.  Rather, what these findings reveal instead is a pressing need to 
revise pragmatic conceptions of power and influence.  In their study of NGO influence, 
Betsill and Corell (2008) define power as capabilities, or the sum of the available 
resource an actor possesses.  Influence is distinct, they argue, because it points to the 
relations between actors.  Specifically, it describes the ability of one actor to convince 
another to do something she would not do otherwise. The pragmatic conception of power 
is unsatisfactory because it overlooks or denies the relational dimension of the term.  
Capabilities only convey power in certain situations or contexts.  For example, U.S. 
military capabilities do not convey power in its relations with France, but they do convey 
power in the course of its relations with Iran or North Korea. Hence, power is not merely 
the sum of capabilities.  Rather, power is a measure of the skill with which an actor 
leverages her capabilities in order to increase the probability of achieving a preferred 
outcome.   
In many instances, pragmatists are correct in their assertion that greater influence 
is the most preferred outcome.  Certainly, the US has endeavored to leverage its 
economic and diplomatic capabilities to influence French foreign policy toward Iraq and 
Afghanistan, just as it has also worked to influence Iran’s policies on nuclear 
proliferation.  However, when the action shifts to an institutional or multilateral context, 
influence is rarely the end but is rather best understood as a means to an end.  Were it 
otherwise, actors would rarely opt out of multilateral negotiations or international 
institutions.  Hence, influence is not distinct from power but is instead a particular 
manifestation of power. Because GCI is concerned with the global dimension of water 
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resource problems and because it believes the root cause of this problem resides in the 
flawed normative foundation of world politics, its most preferred outcome is one that 
interrupts and reconfigures these norms in order to bring about a deeper sense of 
solidarity and a more harmonious and sustainable relationship with nature.  Thus, GCI’s 
ability to leverage its influence within a given institution or multilateral negotiation is 
perceived by GCI as yet another means of achieving its most preferred outcome.  This 
means that influence is not distinct from power; rather, influence functions as a capability 
an actor can draw upon to maximize her probability of achieving some desired objective.  
And just as states can misjudge and misuse their military capability, thereby diminishing 
their power, so too can NGOs abuse or misuse their influence.  GCI’s foray into the 
contested domain of human rights may well prove to be a case in point.  
Crit i cal  Theory 
In the final analysis, the critical theory perspective offers the most satisfactory account of 
how GCS fits in the history of world politics.  That is, the evidence presented in this 
dissertation supports the claim that GCS marks an axiological break in the world political 
system.  However, this conclusion comes with an important caveat.  While the cases 
investigated in this dissertation confirm the expectation that GCS tends to function as a 
means of projecting and normalizing the values of a dominant global capitalist class, it 
would nevertheless be a mistake to conclude that GCS is necessarily a counter-
democratic development.  In the simplest terms, GCS is a contested political domain.  
Indeed, there are already signs that a vibrant counterhegemonic element within GCS has 
emerged in recent weeks to challenge the austerity measures instituted throughout Europe 
and South America.  My point is not that this activism will develop into a durable 
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counterhegemonic force but rather that GCS contains the seeds for such a development to 
hold.  Therefore, I agree with Jan Art Scholte (2007, 27) when he argues, “given highly 
diverse cultural, economic, political and social circumstances across the world, every 
global civil society initiative must chart its own way to greater democracy.”   
For critical theorists, the modality or encoding of power is a central concern. 
Critical theory perspectives grow out of the normative claim that the diversity of values 
and cultural understandings within the world political system is an attribute we should 
protect and nourish, not a problem to be overcome.  In applying this normative 
framework to GCS, critical theorists have investigated the extent with which GCS can 
recognize and accommodate cultural diversity (Blaney and Inayatullah 2006; Inayatullah 
and Blaney 2004). Studies also focus on the structural origins of cultural homogeneity in 
order to position GCS in relation to these structural features (Stevis 2005).  
Consequently, critical theorists are less concerned with variations in the scope and scale 
of power.  Rather, they are more concerned with whether particular configurations of 
power tend to reinforce the realm of hegemony that is supportive of the status quo or the 
realm of counterhegemony in which emancipatory forces can be constituted (Cox 1999).  
GCS reinforces the realm of hegemony when its values and practices conform to 
the established social order rather than working to bring about its transformation into 
“heterogeneous (global, regional and local) social processes and political arrangements, 
involving complex ways of demarcating and negotiating, separate, shared, and 
overlapping authority” (Blaney and Inayatullah 2002, 130).  This observation marks a 
departure from the transformationalist insistence on the self-directed nature of 
transnational non-governmental activity. It departs as well from the pragmatist assurance 
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of the possibility of progressive incremental reform. For critical theorists, an actor either 
supports the status quo or she seeks the radical transformation of the world political 
system – there is no middle ground.  Because critical theorists perceive GCS to be a 
product of powerful state and capital interests, they expect it to support the status quo by 
reinforcing and extending the preferences, perceptions and values of this hegemonic 
historic bloc (Cox 1997) 
 The three case studies lend significant support to the critical theoretical 
expectation that GCS tends to reflect the dominance of state and corporate power.  Of 
these, TNC offers the strongest support for this view.  In expanding its global footprint, 
TNC brought its values into conformity with those of its state and corporate sponsors.  
Once transformed, TNC became the agent of these entrenched interests by working to 
normalize the commodification of water through its payment for ecosystem services 
schemes.  Rather than challenge the status quo, TNC works behind the scenes to enhance 
the legitimacy of the existing social and political order by proposing incremental reforms.  
Central aspects of GCI’s behavior also reflect and reinforce the dominance of state and 
corporate interests.  For example, its human rights argument equating the right to “water 
for life” with that of “productive water” constitutes an effort to defend the status quo 
against more radical and transformative interpretations of the human right to water.  This 
support for the status quo is also manifest in GCI’s regulatory proposals, which call for 
increases in private sector investments.  Of the three cases, only the COC’s enduring 
support for enshrining the human right to water in national and international law offered 
an unambiguous example of a counterhegemonic organization.  In this instance, critical 
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theory offered a satisfactory explanation for the COC’s behavior, which, critics would 
argue, likely emanates from the COC’s refusal to accept state or corporate contributions.         
 For all these insights, critical theory perspectives nevertheless contain two critical 
shortcomings.  First, the singular focus on cultural diversity only problematically extends 
to concerns about the non-human world.  For critical theorists, such considerations extend 
only to the limits of environmental justice, which focuses attention on the distribution of 
environmental goods and harms.  Because both TNC and GCI explicitly recognize the 
intrinsic value of nature, their ethical circle includes considerations of ecological justice, 
which rests on the proposition that a thing is good or right not simply because it results in 
the equitable distribution of goods and harms among people, but rather because it tends to 
preserve the integrity, stability and beauty of the biotic community (Leopold 1989).  
Critical theorists tend to dismiss the ecocentric perspective, warning that at best it fails to 
“make meaningful discriminations within the [human-animal] continuum” (Low and 
Gleeson 1998, 140) and at worst prompts a slippery slope to ecofascism (Ferry 1995; 
Zimmerman 2005).  
There is little need here to wade into this particular philosophical debate.  Rather, 
it is sufficient to show that a shortcoming of the critical approach is its insistence on 
evaluating GCS according to the normative standards established by critical theory.  To 
make this move is to commit the fallacy of overlooking alternatives, which is to forget 
that things may happen for a variety of reasons.  For instance, cultural diversity may be as 
much a cause as a consequence of environmental injustice.  For instance, in their research 
into the limits to adaptation to climate change, Adger, et al. (2009, 349)  argue, 
“adaptation to climate change is limited by the values, perceptions, processes and power 
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structures within society.”  In contrast to the assertions of critical theorists, their findings 
show that certain cultural values can prevent people from taking the steps necessary to 
prepare for dramatic climatic changes, including shifts in precipitation and flow regimes.  
Thus, the critical project of preserving the diversity of cultural understandings and values 
may have the unintended effect of exacerbating existing environmental injustices.  If this 
is true, then the ecological work carried out by TNC – work that is frequently supported 
by states and corporations - may actually offer a more humane and viable alternative to 
the kind of grim dystopian forecasts of Adger and his colleagues.  This suggests that the 
causes of environmental injustice may have more to do with the endogenous variables 
that prevent people from identifying and successfully adapting to climactic changes than 
the political strategies of groups like TNC and GCI.  
 The second shortcoming of the critical perspective is that it struggles to account 
for incremental changes in the structural configuration of world politics.  Critical theory 
would likely interpret TNC’s payment for ecosystem services initiative as a reflection of 
state and corporate interests.  However, because this initiative is non-profit, it does offer 
one subtle yet significant adjustment to the for-profit status quo.  Nevertheless, even this 
step is likely to fall well short of critical theorists’ demands for more radical solutions, 
like those that are consistent with the precautionary principle.  This principle places the 
burden of proof on developers and other agents to demonstrate that their plans and 
activities do not pose any serious risks of environmental harm (Stevis 2002).  
This radical position means that critical theorists would also view support for 
commodity pricing as additional evidence that GCS functions to support the status quo.  
GCI perceives pricing strategies as an effective means of conveying information about 
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resource scarcity and resource quality, thereby allowing individuals and groups to make 
more informed decisions about the costs associated with their resource use.  Both TNC 
and GCI advocate a full-cost pricing regime, which means that the price of water should 
express the social, political and environmental externalities associated with water 
resource allocation and provision.  Although such adjustments might be painful, if done 
correctly they could be effective in stimulating greater political pressure to resolve the 
underlying causes of resource scarcity, and thus incrementally induce significant and 
widespread political, social and environmental reforms.  Nevertheless, the emphasis 
placed on counterhegemonic sources of potential radical transformation blinds the critical 
approach to the positive potential of these types of incremental structural reforms. 
In sum, GCS is not the most powerful feature in world politics, nor is it 
completely autonomous, but we can now tentatively characterize its emergence as an 
axiological break in the history of world politics.  That is, the rise of GCS signals the 
“centralized construction of norms and far reaching production of legitimacy, spread out 
over world space” (Negri and Hardt 2001, 13).  This dynamic is evident in the support for 
liberalization by GCI and TNC.  Critical theory perspectives also correctly diagnose the 
rise of resistance to these developments within GCS, the aim of which is to check and 
direct the progressive process of capital accumulation.  Critical theorists do not entirely 
discredit the emancipatory potential of GCS, but argue instead that GCS functions “as a 
site of both inequality and movements to redress inequality, of seemingly 
incommensurable identities and values and the negotiation of commonalities, of 
imposition and domination and the possibility of conversation and democracy” (Pasha 
and Blaney 1998, 444).  
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Conclusion 
What implications if any do the findings of this dissertation offer for our understanding of 
the theoretical debates about GCS?  In other words, where do we go from here?  This 
dissertation suggests that there are only limited benefits to be gained by studying GCS as 
a totality.  The degree of variability within GCS is simply too great to make this 
enterprise worthwhile. On the other hand, this finding may prove beneficial for guiding 
theoretical and empirical studies of the actors that make up GCS.  It suggests, for 
example, that as researchers we ought to evaluate these actors on their own terms.  At a 
minimum, this means that pragmatists would benefit from revisiting their conceptions of 
power and influence, by grounding their analyses on the actor’s preferences, perceptions 
and values, and by incorporating extra-institutional activities, like ecological work.   The 
case study methodology employed in this dissertation may prove useful for guiding this 
expanded research agenda.  In addition, while these findings also confirm the expetations 
of the critical theorists perspective they do not do so unequivocally.  For example, critical 
theory perspectives could benefit from incorporating the needs of nature into their 
conceptions of justice.  This is not to suggest that critical theorists are wrong to stress the 
importance of maintaining diverse cultural understandings and values; rather, it is only to 
suggest that other considerations, such as the need to maintain ecosystem integrity, are 
also worthy of consideration.  
In the final analysis, it is the complexity and diversity of GCS that makes this 
constellation of actors so difficult to clearly define.  In other words, GCS is not one thing 
but many.  This complexity in turn contributes to the complexity and diversity of world 
politics, at once shaking up the established order of things even as the struggles for power 
that are inherent to its internal dynamics seemingly undermine its ability to effectively 
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address the global problems it set out to solve.  Just imagine what might be accomplished 
if these actors could instead set aside their petty differences and join forces to solve a 
common concern, like freshwater governance.  The Nature Conservancy, the Council of 
Canadians, and Green Cross International, each focused on its particular area of 
expertise, working in concert to solve the multiple dimensions of a water resource 
problem.   Until the actors who make up GCS can learn to embrace their differences, it 
seems GCS will sadly fail to live up to its potential as possibly the one last hope for 
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